History, Transfer, Politics : Five studies on the legacy of Uppsala philosophy by Strang, Johan
 
 
Johan Strang 
 
 
History, Transfer, Politics 
 
Five Studies on the Legacy of Uppsala 
Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by due 
permission of the Faculty of Arts at the University of 
Helsinki in auditorium XIV (Main Building, Unioninkatu 
34), on 24th of April, 2010, at 10 am. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1458-8331 (series) 
ISBN 978-952-10-6159-2 (book) 
ISBN 978-952-10-6160-8 (pdf) 
Tampere 2010 
Juvenes Print – Tampereen Yliopistopaino Oy 
 
 
Contents 
 
 
Acknowledgements i 
 
PART 1  
Introduction – history, transfer, politics 1 
 
i. Preliminaries  
a. The aim of the studies 3 
b. Scope, sources and previous research 9 
c. The main actors and their context 14 
 
ii. History  
a. Philosophy, past and present 31 
b. Analytic philosophy and the history of philosophy 37 
 
iii. Transfer  
a. Beyond the nation 43 
b. The colonisation of Hägerström 48 
c. The Hedenian moment 57 
d. Uppsala – a self-sufficient periphery? 64 
 
iv. Politics  
a. Philosophy and politics 71 
b. Value nihilism and politics 75 
c. Politics as rhetorical struggle 84 
d. The politics of philosophy 89 
 
v. Summaries  
I. Arvet efter Kaila och Hägerström 95 
II. Theoria and logical empiricism 98 
III. Two generations of Scandinavian Legal Realists 99 
IV. The Scandinavian value nihilists and the crisis of democracy 101 
V. Overcoming the rift between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ 102 
 
vi. Results 105 
 
References 109 
 
 
 
 
PART 2  
Five Studies on the Legacy of Uppsala Philosophy 131 
 
Study I  
“Arvet efter Kaila och Hägerström – den analytiska filosofin i 
Finland och Sverige”, originally published in Stefan Nygård & 
Johan Strang (eds.), Från idealism till analytisk filosofi – den moderna 
filosofin i Finland och Sverige 1880-1950, Helsingfors: Svenska 
Litteratursällskapet i Finland / Stockholm: Atlantis, 2006: 237-266. 
 
Study II 
“Theoria and Logical Empiricism - on the Tensions Between the 
National and the International in Philosophy”, originally published 
in Juha Manninen & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Vienna Circle in the 
Nordic Countries – Networks and Transformations of Logical Empiricism 
[Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 14], Dordrecht: Springer, 2010: 
69-89. 
 
Study III 
“Two Generations of Scandinavian Legal Realists”, originally 
published in Retfærd, vol. 12, no. 1, 2009: 61-82. 
 
Study IV 
“The Scandinavian Value Nihilists and the Crisis of Democracy in 
the 1930s and 1940s”, originally published in Nordeuropaforum, vol. 
19, no. 1, 2009: 37-63. 
 
Study V 
“Overcoming the Rift Between ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’ - Gunnar Myrdal 
and the Philosophy of Social Engineering”, originally published in 
Ideas in History, vol. 2, no. 2, 2007: 143-177. 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
As a researcher in the humanities you cannot mind your own 
company. Still, it is undoubtedly the many encounters and ex-
changes of ideas and views with friends and colleagues that have 
made the dissertation passable and the years I have devoted to it 
memorable. 
I have benefited from the generous supervision of three senior 
scholars based at the University of Helsinki. At a decisive moment 
many years ago, Professor Jan von Plato of the department of 
philosophy encouraged me to pursue my interests in history and 
politics, and he has since then continuously offered me his 
professional support when called upon. Research Director Henrik 
Stenius of the Centre for Nordic Studies (CENS) took me under 
his wings when I was an undergraduate. Without his inspiration, 
warm attention, and genuine enthusiasm this dissertation would 
never have been written. Professor Pauli Kettunen of the depart-
ment of Social History has been an extra-ordinary source of both 
knowledge and novel interpretations, and I am most grateful for 
having been introduced to his networks.  
I am especially indebted to two friends and colleagues who each 
effectively stand behind one of the two methodological perspec-
tives adopted in this thesis. From Jussi Kurunmäki I have learned 
immensely regarding political theory, political and intellectual 
history, and, not least, conceptual history. Similarly, it was Stefan 
Nygård who introduced me to the literature on cultural transfers. I 
am full of gratitude for all the hours of work and pleasure we have 
shared so far, and it is with great anticipation that I look forward to 
future common endeavours. 
Furthermore, I want to thank André Maury and Nils Gilje for 
commenting upon the introduction and several of the articles, and 
in this connection I can also express my appreciation for the 
encouraging comments by Juha Manninen and Svante Nordin as 
pre-examiners of the manuscript.  
I am also deeply indebted to my friends at CENS, especially the 
participants of the EINO-seminar: Malte Gasche, Norbert Götz, 
Acknowledgements 
 
ii 
Johannes Kananen, Jani Marjanen, Mirja Österberg, and many 
guests, who have provided me with a critical and inspiring home in 
which I have been able to present my ideas as early drafts and 
nearly finished manuscripts. I also want to thank Mathias Haegg-
ström and Emil Kaukonen at CENS for all their assistance in 
practical matters, as well as the staff at the Renvall Institute for 
Area and Cultural Studies (now known as the Department of World 
Cultures) for offering me a stimulating and diverse scholarly 
environment. 
Likewise, I want to thank my colleagues in Bergen, particularly 
the kind and professional staff at the Stein Rokkan Centre for 
Social Studies (not least to our proud, but arguably not so pro-
fessional, football team), and to the Bjørnson-seminar at the 
Department of Archaeology, History, Cultural Studies, and Reli-
gion, at the University of Bergen for generously providing me with 
a second intellectual home when I arrived here in 2007. I have 
received valuable comments on the introduction (as well as on 
some of the articles) from Svein Ivar Angell, Björn Furuhagen, 
Morten Hammerborg, Teemu Ryymin, Sissel Rosland, and Svein 
Atle Skålevåg.  
I would also like to thank my colleagues and friends at the 
Department of Philosophy at the University of Helsinki, especially 
Thomas Wallgren and Joonas Leppänen for their patience and 
assistance during the weeks before I handed in this manuscript for 
pre-examination, and Auli Kaipainen and Panu Raatikainen for 
their help in arranging for the publication of this book. 
The dissertation has been produced as part of the project Demo-
kratisoituminen ja hyvinvointivaltio poliittisina kamppailuina Suomessa ja 
Ruotsissa funded by Koneen säätiö, the graduate school Européer i 
Norden och från Norden funded by the University of Helsinki, and the 
project Intellectuals Beyond the Nation funded by the Academy of 
Finland. My stay in Bergen has been partly financed by the Nordic 
Centre of Excellence in Welfare Research, (NordWel: The Nordic 
Welfare States – Historical Foundations and Future Challenges). And at 
crucial stages at the very beginning of my career as a graduate 
student (and incidentally also as a father), I received support in the 
form of scholarly grants from Svenska litteratursällskapet and Ella och 
Georg Ehrnrooths stiftelse.  
Acknowledgements 
  
iii 
The five studies are reprinted here with the kind permission of 
the original publishers.  
My deepest gratitude goes to Line, Elmer, and Lea, for their 
almost daily success in directing my attention towards completely 
different but no less important things than this dissertation. 
 
Johan Strang, Bergen, March 2010 
 

 
 
 
 
 
PART 1 
Introduction – History, Transfer, Politics 
 
 
 
 

 
 
i. Preliminaries 
 
a. The aim of the studies 
 
The studies presented in this volume examine how a group of 
young intellectuals succeeded in colonising the legacy of an 
important Swedish philosophical movement, the so-called Uppsala 
philosophy of Axel Hägerström, and the challenges they faced in 
consolidating this legacy with philosophical and political currents in 
the late 1930s and 40s. On the one hand, the studies focus on how 
Uppsala philosophy was merged with, and gradually replaced by, 
novel philosophical trends imported from abroad, particularly 
logical empiricism. Thus, the studies tell the story of the making of 
Hägerström as the father of the Swedish analytic tradition. On the 
other hand, Hägerström’s philosophy, particularly the “value 
nihilistic” theory, mounted a serious political challenge for these 
intellectuals. Accordingly, the studies examine how this younger 
generation struggled to combine value nihilism with a strong nor-
mative programme in favour of democracy and social engineering. 
Thus, they tell the story of the making of Uppsala philosophy, or 
rather, analytic philosophy, as the democratic and progressive phi-
losophy of the Swedish welfare state. 
Axel Hägerström (1868-1939) is a key figure in the intellectual 
history of 20th century Sweden. Serving as Professor of Practical 
Philosophy1 at Uppsala University from 1911 to 1933, he is often 
said to have marked a decisive turning point in Swedish philosophy. 
With Hägerström’s Uppsala philosophy the idealistic tradition after 
Christopher Jacob Boström (1797-1866) was finally and completely 
overthrown in favour of the modern philosophical approach of 
                                                 
1 At Swedish and Finnish, as well as some German universities it is 
common to distinguish between two different departments in philosophy, 
following the Aristotelian division between theoretical philosophy, which 
concerns logic, epistemology and metaphysics on the one hand, and 
practical philosophy, which concerns ethics, aesthetics and political phi-
losophy on the other. 
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conceptual and logical analysis (Källström 1986: 11-14; Sigurdson 
2000: 45). In this way, Hägerström is said to have established the 
analytic tradition in Swedish philosophy. Hägerström is also con-
sidered to be the founder of Scandinavian Legal Realism, a radical 
but influential legal theoretical school that aimed at studying law as 
a social phenomenon (Björne 2007: 154-69, 315-37; Blandhol 
1999). Sometimes Hägerström is also depicted as the originator of a 
non-normative or even “positivistic” Swedish tradition in social 
science (e.g. Eliaeson 2000; Føllesdal 2003). Moreover, Hägerström 
is often ascribed a significance reaching far beyond the universities. 
His value theory, according to which value judgements cannot be 
true or false but have to be interpreted as emotive outbursts, has 
been said to have initiated a moral tradition that continues to 
influence Swedish intellectual and political life. Hägerström has 
even been portrayed as a philosophical representative of the mod-
ernisation of Swedish society, as something of a court philosopher 
of the Swedish “people’s home” (folkhemmet), i.e. the emerging 
welfare state (Fredriksson 1994: 209; Sigurdson 2000: 11, 235-58). 
In its ambition to overcome conservative constraints and transform 
law into a vehicle for social reform, Hägerström’s legal philosophy 
has been called the legal ideology of the Swedish or Nordic welfare 
state (Malminen 2007: 82). Conversely, critical voices have regularly 
been raised about the connections between Hägerström and more 
problematic features of modern Swedish society. Hägerström is 
sometimes blamed for the de-moralisation of politics (Bexell 1995: 
115), or the weak position of individual rights in Sweden (Nergelius 
1996: 94-7). More incensed theorists have claimed that Häger-
ström’s philosophy is responsible for paternalistic, state-absolutistic 
and even totalitarian tendencies in Sweden (Bjarup 1982: 195ff; 
2005; 12; Sundberg 1978: 191ff; 1984).2 Whether positive or nega-
                                                 
2 Hägerström figures regularly in the cultural debates in Swedish 
newspapers, mostly in negative terms. Finalising this manuscript, I came 
across an editorial of Dagens Nyheter (August 4, 2009) – characteristically 
entitled “The return of morality” (“Moralens återkomst”) – which claims 
that Hägerström turned the Swedes into narcissists and that the time is 
ripe to review the Hägerströmian legacy. 
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tive, there seems to be little argument about Hägerström’s pro-
found influence on modern Swedish society.3 
From a historical point of view, Hägerström was undoubtedly a 
central figure in the intellectual life of Sweden in the 1920s and 30s 
(Källström 1984; 1986). However, it is perhaps surprising to learn 
that few of those historical actors that subscribed to Hägerström’s 
programme in the 1930s and 40s seem to have studied his philos-
ophy in any great detail. Hägerströmian scholars such as Gunnar 
Myrdal (1898-1987) and Herbert Tingsten (1896-1973) have, in 
retrospect, admitted that their knowledge of their master’s theories 
was largely second hand (Myrdal 1958: 250; Tingsten 1961: 145). 
Moreover, many of those younger members of the Uppsala School, 
such as Ingemar Hedenius (1908-82), Konrad Marc-Wogau (1902-
91) and Anders Wedberg (1913-78), who canonised Hägerström as 
the father of the Swedish analytic tradition, were in fact disciples of 
the other main figure of the Uppsala School, Adolf Phalén (1884-
1931), and were in many ways very critical of the ideas and theories 
of Hägerström. 
Indeed, it seems as if the figure of Hägerström was far more 
important than Hägerström’s actual philosophical arguments and 
scholarly publications. His philosophy was well in line with the 
secularist and enlightenment ideals of cultural radicalism, the 
liberal-socialist movement that formed a pivotal part of Scan-
dinavian intellectual life since the 1880s, and which is said to have 
enjoyed something of a renaissance between the wars, particularly 
in the 1930s (Skoglund 1991: 186-205).4 Hägerström’s central 
position and popularity was much due to the fact that he was able 
                                                 
3 Important exceptions are Danielsson 1990; Strömholm 2002: 35. 
4 Politically, the cultural radical movement of the 1880s can be interpreted 
as an alliance between liberals and Social Democrats. Among the leading 
members of the most influential cultural radical student organisation were 
Karl Staaf (1860-1915), the Liberal Prime Minister in 1905-06 and 1911-
14, and Hjalmar Branting (1860-1925), Social Democratic Prime Minster 
in three different governments between 1920 and 1925. The most inter-
nationally famous names associated with Scandinavian cultural radicalism 
are arguably Georg Brandes, Harald Høffding, Henrik Ibsen and August 
Strindberg. On the position of Hägerström and the value nihilistic theory 
within the cultural radical tradition, see e.g. Runeby 1995: 167-256; Skog-
lund 1991: 172-85; Wiklund 2006: 149-57; Östling 2008: 199-293. 
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to introduce and cement the ideas of cultural radicalism in the 
rather traditionalist philosophical department in Uppsala. Marking a 
break with Boströmian idealism, and more importantly, with 
Boströmian moral and political conservatism, Hägerström became 
something of an intellectual icon for young intellectuals with radical 
and progressive ambitions. Of course, neither cultural radicalism 
nor Hägerström were univocally celebrated. By the more conserva-
tively inclined, the Hägerströmian ideas were charged of being 
uncultured and even dangerous. Hägerström was controversial and 
often the subject of fierce debates, but for “those who wanted to 
change things”5 it was of utmost importance to prove that one 
belonged to Hägerström’s camp and to present oneself as a 
follower of his ideas. 
However, in the course of a few years around the Second World 
War, Hägerström and Uppsala philosophy disappeared from the 
scene, and were replaced by the international influence of logical 
empiricism and analytic philosophy. The studies in this volume are 
about a young generation of scholars that struggled for, and even-
tually won, the right to represent Hägerström’s legacy. They focus 
on the challenges that these young intellectuals faced in trying to 
reconcile the Hägerströmian legacy with the changing philosophical 
and political ideas and expectations of the 1930s and 40s, particu-
larly with logical empiricism and analytic philosophy on the one 
hand, and democracy and social engineering on the other. 
 
(I) The first study, “Arvet efter Kaila och Hägerström – den 
analytiska filosofin i Finland och Sverige” (Strang I),6 describes how 
the image of Hägerström as the father of the analytic tradition was 
created by a particular faction of younger Uppsala philosophers, i.e. 
Hedenius, Marc-Wogau and Wedberg, who (re-) presented the 
Hägerströmian philosophy as a parallel movement to logical empiri-
cism and the Cambridge School of Russell and Moore. 
                                                 
5 This and all subsequent translations from the Nordic languages are mine. 
The original will be given in footnotes. “[Hägerström] tilltalade dem som 
ville ändra på saker och ting”. Gunnar Myrdal’s characterisation, quoted 
by Källström 1997: 151. 
6 In this pdf-version, the references to the five studies follow the 
pagination of the original publications. 
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(II) The second study, “Theoria and logical empiricism – on the 
tensions between the national and the international in philosophy” 
(Strang II), looks more closely at the introduction of logical empiri-
cism to Sweden by examining the confrontations between Uppsala 
philosophy and logical empiricism in both the editorial board and 
in the pages of Sweden’s leading philosophical journal Theoria. 
(III) The third study, “Two generations of Scandinavian Legal 
Realists” (Strang III), focuses on how the legal philosophy of 
Hägerström was simultaneously colonised and defeated by a second 
generation of Uppsala philosophers, i.e. Hedenius and the Dane Alf 
Ross (1899-1979), to a large extent by criticising and replacing 
Hägerström with ideas and arguments inspired by logical empiri-
cism. The study also argues that their criticism was, to a large 
extent, politically motivated. With the rise of totalitarianism on the 
European continent, many critical voices were raised against the 
moral and legal “relativism” or “nihilism” of Hägerström, allega-
tions that Hedenius and Ross tried to overcome by transforming 
and redescribing the Hägerströmian philosophy. 
(IV) The fourth study, “The Scandinavian value nihilists and the 
crisis of democracy in the 1930s and 40s” (Strang IV), discusses the 
attempts of the second generation of Scandinavian value nihilists 
(i.e. Hedenius, Tingsten, and Ross) to overcome the accusations of 
a connection between value nihilism and totalitarianism, and to pre-
sent value nihilism as a “democratic” philosophy. 
(V) Finally, the fifth study, “Overcoming the rift between ‘is’ 
and ‘ought’ – Gunnar Myrdal and the philosophy of social 
engineering” (Strang V), examines Myrdal’s attempts to consolidate 
the Hägerströmian tenets with a strong normative political pro-
gramme for (Social Democratic) social reform. 
 
The studies have been written with the intention of approaching 
intellectual history, or the history of philosophy, historically; that is, 
to highlight the historical context and situation of the intellectuals 
of this period in time in order to be able to analyse what they were 
doing in writing their texts.7 The studies should not primarily be 
                                                 
7 Here I draw upon the so-called Cambridge School in the study of intel-
lectual history, programmatically launched by Quentin Skinner in his 
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understood as contributions to the contemporary philosophical 
discussion, for example to that between non-cognitivists and moral 
realists in meta-ethics. Neither should they be received as contri-
butions to the debate concerning the correct interpretation of 
Hägerström’s philosophy. Rather, one key argument of my studies 
is that a conscious redescription of Hägerström’s ideas was an 
important and often very successful strategy in order to claim his 
legacy and to reconcile it with both philosophical and political 
currents. Uppsala philosophy was not a set of philosophical doc-
trines that remained unchanged from 1920 to 1950, rather Uppsala 
philosophy, and particularly the value nihilistic theory, formed an 
important intellectual heritage, and as such it was the subject of 
fierce struggles for monopolisation. It was by no means self-evident 
that Hägerström and the Uppsala School would end up being 
presented as a pre-history of the Swedish analytic tradition or as 
something of a court philosophy of the Swedish welfare state. 
The historical ambition in these studies is pursued in two related 
ways. It has, first of all, been the ambition to pay special attention 
to the transfer of logical empiricism to Sweden. The transformation 
from Uppsala philosophy to analytic philosophy occurred in con-
stant interaction with the international philosophical scene. Thus, in 
order to understand the historical situation in which the intel-
lectuals acted, it is crucial not to separate such connected realities 
from each other.8 The confrontation and eventual consolidation of 
logical empiricism and Uppsala philosophy deserves particular 
attention. This is not only because it has been somewhat neglected 
in previous studies on the history of Swedish philosophy, but also 
because logical empiricism, and in particular the Vienna Circle, was 
an intellectual movement that played a rather similar political and 
cultural role on the European continent as Uppsala philosophy did 
in Sweden. 
Secondly, the studies aim to take special notice of the political 
intentions of the actors, particularly with regard to the two (related) 
                                                                                                  
“Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas” (1969), and even 
more programmatically redescribed in Skinner 2002. See below: Chapter ii. 
8 On this point I draw upon the recent discussion on cultural transfers, 
histoire croisée, and transnationale Geschichte. See below: Chapter iii. 
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main political challenges of the 1930s and 40s in the Nordic 
countries, i.e. the rise (and fall) of the totalitarian threat, and the 
emergence of a new, nationalistic and modernistic, Social Demo-
cratic political rhetoric of the people’s home and social engineering. 
Philosophical and intellectual traditions are not construed in 
academic isolation, but in constant interaction with political and 
cultural life.9 In the 1930s and 40s, it became a pressing challenge 
to present the Uppsala School as a politically scrupulous and 
“democratic” philosophy. However, the studies also attempt to 
examine the philosophical scene itself as a “political” game in 
which the difference between friends and enemies was well defined 
and in which the philosophers and theoreticians profiled them-
selves by making rhetorical-political “moves”.10 
History, transfer and politics will form the prism through which 
the studies are presented in this introduction. I will proceed as 
follows: The remaining parts of this preliminary chapter will define 
the scope of the studies, describe the historical sources and pre-
vious research that have been used in the studies, and give a brief 
presentation of the main actors and their intellectual and political 
context. The following three chapters are devoted to a discussion 
of the topic in the light of the three methodological perspectives: 
history (Chapter ii), transfer (Chapter iii) and politics (Chapter iv). 
Chapter v gives summaries of the five studies, while the final 
chapter (vi) is devoted to a discussion of the results of the studies 
and the prospects that they initiate. 
 
b. Scope, sources and previous research   
 
Diachronically, the scope of the studies comprise the 1930s and 40s, 
which are periods of great change and modernisation in Sweden as 
elsewhere. But as our convention of categorising periods of time in 
                                                 
9 Here I draw upon what Kari Palonen (2003b: 3, 175) has labelled “the 
Skinnerian revolution in political thought”, from a study of theories and 
ideas applied in a separate field of politics to an analysis of thought and 
theories as movers in the political world itself.  See below: Chapter iv. 
10 On rhetorical “moves” see e.g. Skinner 2002: 115. 
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decades has little to do with the events portrayed in this volume, 
there should be no need for particular excuses in those cases where 
the studies refer to sources or events that date a couple of years 
before 1930 or after 1949. Moreover, due to the nature of the 
studies, the scope will sometimes be greatly exceeded. Some of 
Hägerström’s main works were written many years before the 
1930s; his famous inaugural lecture was delivered in 1911, but 
continued for some time to play a central role in marking a turning 
point in Swedish philosophy. Similarly, some of the things that 
were written about the Uppsala School during the latter half of the 
20th century have been used as sources describing the creation of 
the image of Hägerström as the father of the Swedish analytic 
tradition. 
Geographically, the studies focus mainly on Swedish philoso-
phers and intellectuals. However, as one of the main methodo-
logical presumptions has been that intellectual history should not 
be written from an isolated national perspective, substantial space 
will be given to comparative (especially Strang I) and transfer 
(especially Strang II) perspectives. Moreover, the studies also pro-
ceed from the idea that intellectual life in Sweden to a considerable 
extent was entangled with the discussions in the neighbouring Nor-
dic countries, and thus Norden forms an important extension of the 
geographical scope, somewhere between the national and the 
international.11 
The historical sources analysed in the five studies consist mainly 
of theoretical texts published as books or articles in scholarly jour-
nals. For some studies, a thorough examination of all volumes of a 
journal in the 1930s and 40s have been called for – Theoria in the 
study on Theoria and logical empiricism (Strang II), and Tidsskrift for 
rettsvitenskap as well as Svensk Juristtidning in the study on Scandi-
navian Legal Realism (Strang III). Some studies also make extensive 
use of more popular (i.e. less scholarly) publications, such as Tiden 
(a Social Democratic journal which emphasised culture and debate), 
and Spektrum (a modernist journal that appeared in the early 1930s). 
By contrast, newspapers have not been subjected to any detailed 
                                                 
11 For an account of the construction and significance of Norden as a 
cultural and historical region, see Sørensen & Stråth (eds.) 1997. 
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analysis – most of the references to dailies that nevertheless occur 
in the studies are quoted via secondary literature. The only study 
that makes systematic use of private correspondences is “Theoria 
and logical empiricism” (Strang II), which analyses letters from the 
Theoria archive at Lund’s University Library. In the other studies, 
private correspondences occur only sporadically and form no 
essential part of the argument. In the study of the establishment of 
analytic philosophy in Finland and Sweden (Strang I) important 
additional sources are the assessments that have been written by 
referees used in professorial appointments (sakkunnigutlåtanden), and 
other documents related to these appointments, such as appeals 
and answers to these appeals.12 
When looking for previous research on the history of Swedish 
philosophy in general and the Uppsala School in particular, it is 
undoubtedly to the writings of the intellectual historian Svante 
Nordin that one primarily turns. With Romantikens filosofi – svensk 
idealism från Höijer till hegelianerna (1987), Den boströmska skolan och den 
svenska idealismens fall (1981) and Från Hägerström till Hedenius – den 
moderna svenska filosofin (1983) Nordin has given a comprehensive 
                                                 
12 The practice of employing a number of “independent” scholars to 
evaluate the competence of the applicants may be unfamiliar to non-
Nordic readers and deserves some additional comment. These (public) 
statements form an exceptionally fascinating source as they quite explicitly, 
and frequently also in a rather ferocious tone, expose the dividing lines 
between different intellectual schools and movements. However, they are 
also burdened with some methodological predicaments. It is, for example, 
often rather difficult to distinguish an “objective” assessment of an appli-
cant from blatant sectarianism, as the evaluation of a scholar belonging to 
the same philosophical movement tends to be more positive than the 
evaluation of an outsider, regardless of the scrupulous intentions of the 
evaluator. Moreover, it is not always clear that the evaluation should be 
understood as an assessment of the general scholarly merits of the appli-
cant, as it might be affected by certain attributes and qualities connected 
to the particular Chair, whether these are explicitly stated as directives to 
the evaluator, or implicitly present as something of a cultural legacy. 
Finally, one should also acknowledge the fact that the assessments are 
influenced by non-scholarly factors such as language, nationality, politics, 
or even personal relations, particularly as the philosophical communities 
of Sweden and the Nordic countries in the 1930s and 40s were rather 
small. 
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account of Swedish philosophy from the early 19th to the late 20th 
century. The books continue to serve as standard references on the 
topic. My studies build mainly on Från Hägerström till Hedenius, 
which was the first detailed historical examination of the trans-
formation from the Uppsala School to analytic philosophy. By 
emphasising the Kantian premises of Uppsala philosophy, and the 
many theoretical similarities to Neo-Kantianism (in particular as it 
was practised in Marburg by Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp), 
Nordin was able to go beyond the reigning “analytic reading” of 
Uppsala philosophy in order to give a more accurate picture of the 
philosophical ambitions of Hägerström and Phalén themselves.13 
My studies seek to complete Nordin’s work by, on the one hand, 
expanding on the political connotations of the philosophical 
struggles, and on the other hand, by focussing more closely on the 
role of logical empiricism in Sweden. 
Besides Nordin, Jan Bengtsson and Hans Ruin deserve to be 
mentioned among those who have presented alternatives to the 
analytic reading of Hägerström. In his Den fenomenologiska rörelsen i 
Sverige Bengtsson emphasised the phenomenological influences on 
many of the great names of Uppsala philosophy (Bengtsson 1991: 
83-113).14 Ruin, on the other hand, has made an effort to launch a 
discussion on the Nietzschean influences on Hägerström – obvious 
already in the final paragraph of “Om moraliska föreställningars 
sanning”, where Hägerström asks for a moral philosophy “beyond 
good and evil” (Hägerström 1911: 65) 15 – but nevertheless largely 
ignored by historians of philosophy (Ruin 2000). My studies have 
also been able to draw considerably on more theoretical philo-
sophical analyses of Hägerström and his value theory. Especially Bo 
Petersson and Sven Danielsson have shown how Hägerström’s 
value theory was anchored in the Austrian act-psychology and 
                                                 
13 A more recent account of the transformation from Uppsala philosophy 
to analytic philosophy is provided by Nordin in the biography Ingemar 
Hedenius – En filosof och hans tid (Nordin 2004b), and a brief outline in 
English of the philosophical scene in Sweden in the 1930s and 40s is 
included by Nordin in Ernst Cassirer, the Swedish years (Hansson & Nordin 
2006: Chapter 2). 
14 See Bengtsson 1992 for a brief English version. 
15 “…på andra sidan om gott och ont”. 
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Werttheorie of Brentano, Meinong and Ehrenfelds, and that it in this 
sense Hägerström’s theory was very different from the semantic 
and linguistic version of value nihilism that was defended by 
Hedenius (and Ross) in the 1940s (Petersson 1973; 2009a; 2009b; 
Danielsson 1993).16 Arguably however, whereas most of these 
studies have been more concerned with discussing the correct 
interpretation of Hägerström and his value theory, i.e. with pro-
posing alternatives to the analytic reading of Uppsala philosophy 
and Hägerström, my studies aim rather at a historical examination 
of the emergence of the analytic reading itself. 
Within the field of jurisprudence, Hägerström and Scandinavian 
Legal Realism continue to draw much historical attention. But while 
some of these studies are meticulously theoretical and thus appear 
rather esoteric to an outsider (Helin 1988; Lyles 2006), others tend 
to have a very explicit critical political message which arguably 
hampers the historical reconstruction (Bjarup 1982; 2005; Slagstad 
1987). Of course, there are exceptions, and among them particu-
larly Sverre Blandhol’s examination of the political connotations of 
Alf Ross’s legal theory in Juridisk ideologi – Alf Ross’ kritikk av natur-
retten (1999) deserves attention. I also want to mention Patricia 
Mindus’s biography A Real Mind – The Life and Work of Axel Häger-
ström (2009) even if it appeared too late for me to have been able to 
use it in my studies. 
The political and cultural significance of Hägerström and the 
Uppsala School has been a recurring topic among Swedish intel-
lectual historians during the past decades. For example, in his 
examination of the ethical and political ideas of Hägerström, 
Tingsten, Alva and Gunnar Myrdal, and Hedenius, Ola Sigurdson 
attempted to connect the value theory to the processes of 
modernisation and the problems of the current welfare state of 
Sweden (Sigurdson 2000). This was important and interesting nor-
mative approach and message, which however largely falls beyond 
                                                 
16 Hägerström is also mentioned in Stephen Satris’s Ethical Emotivism. 
Even if language prevented Satris from making a more detailed analysis of 
Hägerström, he seems to be indicating that Hägerström belongs to the 
tradition of Werttheorie and not to the group of “positivistic emotivists” 
such as Ayer and Carnap (Satris 1987: 9, 11). 
History, Transfer, Politics 
 
14 
the scope and intention of my studies. Instead, I have made exten-
sive use of the works of Staffan Källström, who has analysed the 
role of the value nihilistic theory in the scholarly as well as the 
cultural and political debates of the 1920s and 30s from a more 
historical perspective (Källström 1984; 1986; 1988; 1991; 1997; 
2002).17 In my studies I do not apply the same broad cultural 
perspective as Källström, rather, I seek to focus on the ways in 
which the philosophers and theoreticians themselves struggled to 
adjust their philosophy to the changing demands and expectations 
of this turbulent period. Moreover, while Källström focuses on a 
period when Uppsala philosophy “still was a living part of Swedish 
intellectual life” (Källström 1984: XI),18 my studies continue his 
work by examining how Hägerström’s work was used and trans-
formed by those who claimed his legacy, and how it eventually was 
eliminated and replaced by the new ideas of analytic philosophy.19 
 
c. The main actors and their context 
 
The philosophical scene during the first decades of the 20th century 
was largely marked by discussions that followed the fall of idealism 
and the rise (and fall) of naturalistic philosophy and experimental 
psychology. There were a great number of philosophical reactions 
and movements which can be seen not only as different proposals 
for a modernisation of philosophy, but also as competing accounts 
in a debate on the very nature of the philosophical enterprise 
(Heidegren 2004: 488-96; Kusch 1995; Nygård & Strang 2006). 
One of the key questions was philosophy’s relation to natural 
science – whether philosophy should merge with the natural 
sciences or defend its status as an autonomous discipline. In 
Germany, where experimental psychology was thriving, the most 
significant trend that defended the autonomy of philosophy was the 
                                                 
17 Only Källström 1988 is in English. 
18 “…då Uppsalafilosofin fortfarande är en levande tradition”. 
19 The literature on the individual scholars examined in my studies will not 
be accounted for here. Instead I refer to the references of the particular 
studies. 
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large and heterogeneous Neo-Kantian movement that sought to 
overcome idealism by returning to Kantian premises. But there 
were also a number of alternative directions: for example, the 
Lebensphilosophie of Wilhelm Dilthey and the phenomenology of 
Edmund Husserl. In France, the intuitionism of Bergson chal-
lenged the empiricist-positivist tradition of Auguste Comte and 
Émile Durkheim. In the United States pragmatism was gaining 
influence, and in Britain, where there had been a late revival of 
idealistic philosophy, there was a reaction in the philosophical 
analysis of the Cambridge philosophers G. E. Moore and Bertrand 
Russell. 
It was as part of this pluralistic context that the logical empiri-
cism of the Vienna Circle (and the Berlin Society for Empirical 
Philosophy – Die Gesellschaft für Empirische Philosophie) emerged in the 
late 1920s, most notably through the programmatic pamphlet 
Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis (Hahn, Carnap & 
Neurath 1929).20 It was, first and foremost, a reaction against 
“school philosophy” and was characterised by the ambition to 
practise philosophy in close relation with the special sciences. Many 
of the logical empiricists shunned the label “philosophy” altogether 
as they thought it was tainted with metaphysical, i.e. unscientific, 
connotations. The theoretical background and intentions of the 
Vienna Circle have been a matter of extensive discussion in recent 
literature. Some argue that logical empiricism can be seen as a Neo-
Kantian attempt to save the Kantian system from the disaster that 
was lurking in the revolutionary ideas of Einstein. While abandon-
ning Kant’s idea of a synthetic a priori the logical empiricists (here 
mainly Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach) tried to use formal 
logic as a new relativised a priori that was able to adjust to changing 
                                                 
20 I generally prefer to use the label “logical empiricism” to “logical 
positivism”. This is mainly due to the fact that the pejorative label 
“positivism” was largely shunned by the historical actors themselves. Still, 
it is probably safe to say that “logical empiricism” and “logical positivism” 
are generally used synonymously. For example, the proceedings from a 
conference in Helsinki in 1992 were entitled Eino Kaila and Logical 
Empiricism on the back and front covers, but Eino Kaila and Logical 
Positivism on the spine (Niiniluoto, Sintonen & von Wright 1992). For the 
origin of the different labels see e.g. Stadler 1997: 28-9. 
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scientific paradigms (Friedman 2000; Richardson 1998). Others em-
phasise the anti-Kantian roots of the Vienna Circle, and argue that 
logical empiricism should be understood as an attempt to syn-
thesise the empiricist programme of the Austrian phenomenalist 
Ernst Mach with the insights of French mathematical conventiona-
lism (Pierre Duhem and Henri Poincaré) (Uebel 2003; Stadler 2007: 
19). These different accounts on the relation between logical 
empiricism and Kantianism should arguably not be seen as mutually 
exclusive. Rather, they are signs of inner tensions as well as 
theoretical developments of the ideas within the movement. More 
than anything, the recent historical work on logical empiricism has 
been able to discredit the idea of logical empiricism as a set of static 
philosophical doctrines.21 
If the first decades of the 20th century were characterised by a 
plurality of different philosophical movement and trends, the 1930s 
and 40s can be seen as a period of mobilisation and gradual polari-
sation, a process that eventually formed the two separate and antag-
onistic traditions – the analytic and the continental – that marked 
the philosophical discussion throughout the latter half of the 20th 
century (Friedman 1999). Thanks to the efforts of the adminis-
trative locomotive of the Unity of Science movement, Otto 
Neurath (1882-1945), the logical empiricists had established close 
relations to the philosophers in Cambridge and to the American 
pragmatists. These contacts formed a fruitful base for integration 
when the logical empiricists were forced to emigrate from the 
European continent due to the rise of fascism and Nazism in the 
1930s. While many of the emigrated “pre-continental” philosophers 
returned to Europe after 1945 (e.g. Max Horkheimer and Theodor 
Adorno), most of the “pre-analytic” philosophers stayed in the 
United States. This was the ultimate reason for the emergence of 
the rift between Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy and (what was 
later labelled) “continental philosophy” which marked Western 
philosophy throughout the 20th century (Strang I: 238-46). 
                                                 
21 Central works in the reassessment of logical empiricism and the Vienna 
Circle are, for example, Friedman 1999; 2000; Friedman & Creath 2007; 
Giere & Richardson 1996; Parrini et al 2003; Richardson & Uebel 2007; 
Richardson 1998; Stadler 1997; Uebel 1991; 1992. 
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The philosophical scene in the Nordic countries largely mir-
rored this development, even if the local traditions and constella-
tions marked the reception and appropriation of international ideas. 
In his book on the modern breakthrough in Nordic university 
philosophy 1860-1915, Carl-Göran Heidegren examines the differ-
rent ways and the different rhythms by which idealism was 
abandoned in the Nordic countries, as well as the diverse proposals 
for modernisation that followed (Heidegren 2004). However, as 
elsewhere, it was arguably the events in the 1930s that had a 
formative influence on the direction of Nordic 20th century phi-
losophy (von Wright 1972: 5-6). During the late 1920s and early 
1930s, three leading and rising Nordic philosophers came in 
contact with the Vienna Circle and gradually established themselves 
as international names within the logical empiricist movement 
(Manninen & Stadler 2010). The Finn Eino Kaila (1890-1958) 
repeatedly visited Vienna in the period between 1929 and 1934 and 
was the commentator outside the Circle to write a critical review of 
“logical neo-positivism” (Der logistische Neupositivismus. Eine kritische 
Studie, 1930) (Niiniluoto 2006: 186). The Dane Jørgen Jørgensen 
(1894-1969) came in contact with the Vienna Circle through his 
interest in formal logic, and received the honour of arranging The 
Second International Congress for the Unity of Science in Copenhagen in 
1936 (Faye 1998; Koch 1998; 2004: 187-241; Stadler 1997: 372-7), 
and with Arne Næss (1912-2009), who studied in Vienna in 1934-
35, Norway acquired a young representative of the movement 
(Thue 1997; 2006). Kaila, Jørgensen and Næss were Professors of 
Philosophy at the leading universities of their countries and thus 
logical empiricism became a major trend in Nordic philosophy at a 
remarkably early stage. It was the numerous and influential pupils 
and successors of Kaila, Jørgensen and Næss who made analytic 
philosophy the dominant tradition in Nordic post-war philosophy. 
The Swedish analytic tradition, on the other hand, has tradi-
tionally been said to have domestic roots in the Uppsala philosophy 
of Axel Hägerström, often presented as a “parallel movement” to 
logical empiricism and the Cambridge School.22 As mentioned 
                                                 
22 See e.g. Källström 1986: 14 or Sigurdson 2000: 45 for fairly recent sub-
scriptions to this view. In Chapter iii, b & c, I examine how this analytic 
History, Transfer, Politics 
 
18 
above, this “analytic” reading of Hägerström has recently been 
criticised by a number of scholars who have pointed to features of 
the Hägerströmian and Phalénian philosophies that were firmly 
rooted in other philosophical traditions, such as neo-Kantianism, 
phenomenology, Nietzsche and act-psychology.23 My studies do 
not aim to judge or rank these different interpretations, nor do they 
intend to propose yet another alternative reading of Hägerström. 
Rather, my focus is on how and for what purposes the analytic 
narrative was created in the first place (Strang I; II; III). The many 
different ways in which the Uppsala School has been interpreted 
are in themselves a good indication of the heterogeneous philoso-
phical context that the Uppsala philosophers were part of. In a 
situation not yet marked by a general division between the analytic 
and the continental, the Uppsala philosophers were able to borrow 
from different philosophers and schools without being concerned 
about whether or not they represented the “right” tradition. 
The variety of ways in which Uppsala philosophy has been 
placed in the international philosophical landscape of its time are 
also largely due to the peculiar intellectual culture in Uppsala. It 
was, of course, by no means unusual among the philosophers of 
the early 20th century to conceive of their own ideas and their own 
philosophies as the very first properly scientific philosophy – think 
of Husserl or the logical empiricists. In Uppsala, however, this was 
combined with a rather sectarian attitude that was close to being 
plainly parochial. As international collaboration and foreign phi-
losophies (not least logical empiricism) were received with 
suspicion, the extent to which the Uppsala philosophers actually 
drew upon foreign philosophical movements can be hard to 
determine.24 
There was also a major difference between Sweden and the 
other Nordic countries in how the philosophers conceived of the 
relation between philosophy and the special sciences and, perhaps, 
                                                                                                  
reading was produced by Hedenius (e.g. 1941: 9), Marc-Wogau (e.g. 1949: 
17) and Wedberg (e.g. 1966: 366). 
23 See Nordin 1983; Bengtsson 1991; 1992; Ruin 2000; Petersson 1973; 
Danielsson 1993. 
24 See Chapter iii.d, for a discussion of the peculiar academic culture of 
Uppsala. 
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particularly psychology. The professors of philosophy in Finland, 
Denmark and Norway were often also responsible for teaching 
psychology. So while the philosophers in these countries were often 
apt scholars both in philosophy and psychology, this was seldom 
the case among the Swedes.25 Thus, while Kaila, Jørgensen and 
Næss might have been naturally inclined to sympathise with the 
logical empiricist ideal of cross-disciplinary discussion, and used a 
variety of psychological, mathematical (logical) and social scientific 
methods as integrated parts of their philosophical approach,26 
arguably, sometimes to the extent that they tried to reduce philos-
ophy to natural science, the Swedes, and particularly the Uppsala 
philosophers were much more concerned with defending the auto-
nomy of the philosophical discipline (Heidegren 2004: 374-7). In 
fact, this difference must be seen as one of the main reasons for the 
Uppsala philosophers’ sceptical attitude towards logical empiricism. 
Indeed, the Uppsala philosophers often framed their debate with 
the logical empiricists in the late 1930s as a discussion between 
philosophers and physicists (Strang II: 79-83).27 
Like any other school or movement, Uppsala philosophy prob-
ably seemed more united from the outside than it was for those 
who participated on the inside. In fact, the Uppsala School was, 
since the late 1920s, divided into two antagonistic wings with the 
disciples of Adolf Phalén challenging the position of Hägerström as 
the sole front man of Uppsala philosophy. Phalén was originally a 
pupil of Hägerström, but as Professor of Theoretical Philosophy in 
Uppsala (1916-31) he soon became a leading figure himself, with a 
group of faithful disciples that developed and implemented his 
“dialectical method” by which contradictions in our concepts and 
                                                 
25 The Nordic journal Psyche. Tidskrift för psykologisk forskning was estab-
lished in 1906 by a docent in psychology from Sweden (Sydney Alrutz, 
Uppsala) and three professors of philosophy from the neighbouring 
countries (Harald Høffding, Copenhagen; John Mourly Vold, Oslo; Arvi 
Grotenfelt, Helsinki). See Heidegren 2004: 53. 
26 See e.g. Kaila 1934; Jørgensen 1941; Næss 1939. Kaila’s and Jørgensen’s 
interest in psychology and the natural sciences is emphasised by von 
Wright (1972: 6), while Næss’s interest in the social sciences is docu-
mented by Thue (1997; 2006). 
27 Given their suspicions of “school philosophy” this way of framing the 
discussion was hardly contested by the logical empiricists. 
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conceptions were exposed.28 Among “the Phalénians”, Gunnar 
Oxenstierna (1897-1939) was arguably the most profiled. In 1937 
he was elected to represent the Phalénians (and Uppsala philoso-
phy) in the debate with the logical empiricists (Philipp Frank) in 
Theoria (Strang II: 82-3). Oxenstierna had also been a prominent 
candidate to succeed Phalén as the Professor of Theoretical Philos-
ophy in Uppsala in 1931, but he lost the race largely due to Häger-
ström’s negative statement (Nordin 1983: 96-9).29 The Phalénians 
took this as a provocation, and made a series of attempts to regain 
their position in the 1930s (Strang I: 236-7). My studies argue that 
the Phalénians eventually won this battle, but that they did it by 
colonising the figure of Hägerström and by merging him with the 
novel philosophical ideas that they were importing from Cambridge 
and Vienna (Strang I; II; III). 
The central actors in this process were three younger members 
of the Phalénian wing, Ingemar Hedenius, Konrad Marc-Wogau 
and Anders Wedberg. They all graduated with dissertations that 
were largely doctrinal applications of the Phalénian programme, but 
during the late 1930s they became increasingly interested in the 
ideas of Moore and Russell, as well as of logical empiricism, which 
they started using as weapons against their Hägerströmian rivals. 
The studies presented in this volume focus especially on Hedenius, 
who by taking over Hägerström’s role as a controversial spokesman 
of value nihilism, was more important than anyone else in claiming 
the Uppsala legacy and in transforming it in accordance with the 
novel philosophical ideas of logical empiricism. During the 1940s 
Hedenius, Marc-Wogau and Wedberg succeeded in obtaining 
Chairs in Philosophy in Uppsala and Stockholm, which effectively 
                                                 
28 See Bengtsson 1991: 96-104 and Nordin 1983: 52-9 for useful descrip-
tions of Phalén’s philosophy. A shorter account in English is provided in 
Hansson & Nordin (eds.) 2006: 107-9. 
29 Oxenstierna emerged as a favourite after the death (suicide) of another 
senior member of the Phalénian wing of Uppsala philosophy, Carl 
Hellström (1892-1932). 
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meant the establishment of the analytic hegemony in Swedish post-
war philosophy (Strang I: 261-3).30 
Between Hägerström and Phalén there was another important 
senior Uppsala philosopher, Einar Tegen (1884-1965), who, al-
though closer to the Phalénian camp, tried to maintain a mediating 
role between the factions. Tegen was an original figure within the 
Uppsala School in his interest in communication and exchange with 
foreign philosophers and intellectuals – he has been called 
“Uppsala philosophy’s window to the world” (Nilsson 1989: 58).31 
Tegen was the first Uppsala philosopher to obtain a Chair outside 
Uppsala and it was during his period as Professor at Lund 
University in 1931-37 that Tegen, as the first (Swedish)32 Uppsala 
philosopher, came in contact with the logical empiricists in 1934 
(Strang II: 79-80). 
The Hägerströmian disciples in the field of philosophy, such as 
Martin Fries (1898-1969) and Erik Jonson (1889-1958), were not 
very vocal in the debates and therefore they play a negligible role in 
my studies. Instead, among the “orthodox Hägerströmians”,33 it 
was the legal theorists Vilhelm Lundstedt (1882-1955) and Karl 
Olivecrona (1897-1980) who more loudly than anyone else fought 
the Hedenius’s attempts to claim the legacy of their master (Strang 
III: 70-71). Especially Lundstedt, who conceived of himself as the 
main representative of Hägerström’s ideas in the field of legal 
science, aggressively defended Hägerström against any form of 
criticism.34 The younger Olivecrona was arguably more relaxed in 
his relation to the Hägerströmian legacy, but his controversial 
sympathies with Germany during the Second World War makes 
                                                 
30 Marc-Wogau became Professor of Theoretical Philosophy in 1946, 
Hedenius obtained the Chair in Practical Philosophy in 1947, while Wed-
berg became Professor of Theoretical Philosophy in Stockholm in 1949. 
31 “…uppsalafilosofins fönster ut mot världen”. 
32 The Dane Alf Ross, who can also be considered to have been an 
Uppsala philosopher, had been corresponding with Neurath since the 
spring of 1934. 
33 “Ortodoxa Hägerströmianer” [orthodox Hägerströmians] was a label 
that Hedenius and Marc-Wogau used of their adversaries. See e.g. Nordin 
2004b: 120. 
34 See especially Lundstedt 1942. 
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him an important figure in the struggles concerning the political 
significance of Hägerström. 
Among the legal theoretical followers of Hägerström, the Dane 
Alf Ross had a key role. Originally a pupil of Hans Kelsen, Ross 
became deeply influenced by the tenets of Hägerström during the 
late 1920s. Even though he did not belong to the Phalénian camp, 
he was nevertheless central with regards to the introduction of 
logical empiricism into Nordic philosophical and legal theoretical 
discussion. My study “Two generations of Scandinavian Legal 
Realists” examines the controversies between Lundstedt and Olive-
crona on one side, and Hedenius and Ross on the other, as a 
struggle for the right to Hägerström’s legacy (Strang III). 
Despite the vocal and central position of Hägerström in the 
scholarly and public debate in the 1930s, Uppsala philosophy was 
only one part of the philosophical scene in Sweden. There were 
lone wolves, such as John Landquist (1881-1974), who was a main 
representative of Bergson’s philosophy in Sweden and one of the 
fiercest critics of Uppsala philosophy (see below: 90-2). However, 
besides the Uppsala School, the main camp in Swedish philosophy 
was the heterogeneous grouping of philosophers attached to 
Sweden’s other main university in Lund and the university college 
in Göteborg (Göteborgs Högskola) (Hansson & Nordin 2006: 112-
5).35 To this group belonged scholars such as Alf Ahlberg (1892-
1979), Gunnar Aspelin (1898-1977), Malte Jacobsson (1885-1966), 
Anders Karitz (1881-1961), Alf Nyman (1884-1970), and Åke 
Petzäll (1901-57). The Lundians did not form a school in the sense 
that they shared a methodological or theoretical doctrine; they 
honoured classical Bildung and many of them were interested in the 
history of philosophy. They were also considerably more open to 
foreign influences than their colleagues in Uppsala. It is hardly a 
surprise that it was in Göteborg, rather than in Uppsala or Stock-
                                                 
35 There was something of a philosophical alliance between Göteborgs 
Högskola and Lund University, which meant that it was easier to move 
between these institutions than it was to move up north to Uppsala. A 
similar alliance could be said to have reigned between Uppsala and 
Stockholm, with Stockholm representing the modern and progressive 
alternative to the rather traditional Uppsala. 
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holm, that a chair was established for the great German philos-
opher Ernst Cassirer when he sought refuge in Sweden in 1935.36 
It was also the Lundian philosophers that were the first in 
Sweden to pick up on logical empiricism. A key figure in this con-
nection was Åke Petzäll, Professor at Lund (1939-57), who wrote 
an introduction to Logistischer Postivismus in 1931, followed by a 
more critical examination in 1935 (Petzäll 1931; 1935). Petzäll was 
exceptionally committed to international collaboration, and enjoyed 
a lively correspondence with Neurath during the 1930s. However, 
logical empiricism did not break through in Sweden with Petzäll. 
Although it was discussed at seminars and in the corridors of the 
philosophical department in Lund, it did not find any devoted 
adherents as it did in the neighbouring Nordic countries (Aspelin 
1976: 30).37 Instead, Petzäll’s most lasting achievements were, on 
the one hand, the establishment of the international philosophical 
institute, Institut International de Collabroation Philosophique, in Paris in 
1937, and the founding of the philosophical journal Theoria in 1935. 
Theoria rapidly became the main philosophical forum in the Nordic 
countries, and, with the political development on the continent, it 
also established itself as a leading European journal during the late 
1930s (Strang II). 
The political discussions in Sweden during the 1930s and 40s 
were, as elsewhere, overshadowed by the rise of fascism and 
Nazism on the European continent, the Second World War, and 
the reorientation and reorganisation of political life after 1945. 
While the Swedish government strove to keep aloof of these events 
in accordance with the ideal of neutrality, intellectuals and the 
general public were engaged in discussions in which representatives 
of many different political directions were represented. Even if 
those supporting Sweden’s official policy or the Western countries 
                                                 
36 The arrival of Cassirer was undoubtedly a significant event in Swedish 
philosophy, and Cassirer took his Swedish years seriously, publishing a 
thorough analysis of Hägerström’s philosophy (Cassirer 1939). Cassirer’s 
Swedish years have been treated in Hansson & Nordin 2006. 
37 However, in my studies I argue that Petzäll nevertheless was pivotal in 
the transformation of Swedish philosophy through his efforts to introduce 
international philosophical movements, and mainly logical empiricism, in 
Theoria. See Strang II. 
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greatly outnumbered the proponents of totalitarian or extremist 
ideologies, quite a few intellectuals were active members of differ-
ent national socialist factions. Despite its parliamentary failure 
Nazism was still a very immediate political challenge in Sweden 
(Berggren 2007; Götz 2001; Oredsson 1996). Moreover, there were 
also a great number of intellectuals who supported Germany in the 
war without being particularly fond of the Nazi ideology. These 
sympathies could instead be rooted in the traditional German 
orientation of Swedish and Nordic culture and science, in an anti-
bolshevist attitude, or in an engagement for the struggling neigh-
bour Finland. By 1943, when the outcome of the war became 
apparent, the number of German sympathisers naturally decreased. 
The rise of totalitarianism and particularly Nazism has often 
been regarded as a response to the global economic crisis that 
occurred in the late 1920s and early 30s, but the economic crisis 
was also the background for the rise of different forms of inter-
ventionist policies under democratic rule such as Roosevelt’s New 
Deal. Similarly, in the Nordic countries, and especially in Sweden, 
the depression is often regarded as a main reason for the political 
reorientation that spawned the welfare state.38 The 1930s marked 
the establishment of Social Democracy as the main political force 
in Sweden, and saw the breakthrough of the interventionist 
economic policies of Keynes and the Stockholm School, as well as 
the great compromises on the labour market (Saltsjöbaden). It is, of 
course, possible to question the idea of the 1930s as a massive 
turning point in Swedish political history, for example by pointing 
at features associated with the Swedish welfare state that were put 
into effect much earlier (at the turn of the century) or later (in the 
1950s or 60s). However, as argued by Pauli Kettunen, the 1930s 
nevertheless marked a significant change in political rhetoric, i.e. in 
terms of the questions that were conceived of as central (Kettunen 
2008: 146). It was during the 1930s that Sweden evolved from 
                                                 
38 Literature examining the Nordic Welfare States from a historical 
perspective has in recent years become quite vast. See e.g. Finn Christian-
sen et al (eds.) 2006; Hilson 2008; Sejerstedt 2005; and the special issue on 
the Nordic welfare states in the Scandinavian Journal of History 2001:3. For a 
useful comparison between Sweden and some continental countries, see 
Berman 2006. 
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being an impoverished and peripheral part of Europe, into 
something of a beacon of modernisation. This new image was not 
only produced domestically, but also widely recognised and re-
produced abroad.39 
It would, of course, be wrong to credit (or blame) only the 
Social Democrats for this image or development; not only did they 
often co-operate with the Liberals (Folkpartiet) and the Farmer’s 
League (Bondeförbundet), it is also plausible that the economic recov-
ery (or boom) that followed the recession was a result of other, 
non-party-political, developments. Moreover, it is perhaps also 
likely that the other political parties would have employed a rather 
similar politics during the 1930s as the Social Democrats did. 
However, it is fair to say that this modernistic turn in Sweden was 
largely associated with the Social Democrats, and that the rise of 
the Social Democratic party made it an attractive forum, or vehicle, 
for ambitious young intellectuals with new ideas. The 1930s was the 
decade when the Social Democrats more strongly than before 
abandoned Marxist and class-based rhetoric in favour of a de-
ideologised, nationalistic and modernistic (Bernsteinian) pro-
gramme most succinctly captured by the concept of folkhemmet, the 
people’s home, launched in 1928 by the leader of the Social Demo-
cratic party, Per-Albin Hansson, who later became Prime Minister 
(1932-46). 
Folkhemmet was not a modernistic image as such. On the 
contrary, its connotations were conservative, nationalistic and 
“communitaristic”, playing considerably on the unity of the nation 
and its people.40 In this sense it was not only in the rejection of 
Marxism that the 1930s signified something of a “turn to the right” 
for the Swedish and Nordic Social Democrats (Kayser Nielsen 
2004). But this nationalistic turn did not distinguish the Social 
Democrats from other political movements of the 1930s. Rather, 
the decade was generally marked by a wave of cultural nationalism, 
                                                 
39 Most notably by Childs 1936. 
40 For an analysis of the “communitaristic” aspects of the ideas of Swedish 
Social Democracy in the 1930s, see Berman 2006: 15 & 152-76. For an 
analysis of the “völkish” aspects of the rhetoric of “folkhem”, see Götz 
2001 and Trägårdh 1997; 2002. 
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which meant that almost all parties tried to claim the right to the 
nation and its symbols (Linderborg 2001: 250-1). The success of 
the Swedish Social Democratic “people’s home” rhetoric, in com-
parison to the right wing nationalisms on the European continent, 
relied on “democracy” being presented as part of this national 
heritage, which left little room for totalitarian nationalist political 
rhetoric (Berggren & Trägårdh 2006: 195-226; Kayser Nielsen 
2004). Domestically, the success of the “people’s home” was 
perhaps that it supplied a traditionalist counter image to the pro-
gressive and modernistic ideals of the Social Democrats during the 
1930s. Radicalism and modernism was veiled in a nationalistic and 
traditionalistic metaphor. 
Clearly, this was not an uncontroversial development. By no 
means all of the Social Democrats adhered to the modern or 
nationalistic ideas, and for many, the struggle between Communism 
and Social Democracy remained a question of the correct inter-
pretation of Marx.41 However, for a significant faction of younger 
Social Democrats, it had become time to make a stronger break 
with the Marxist legacy, and it is to this faction that many of the 
intellectuals examined in the present studies belonged. In 1932, the 
economist and Social Democratic intellectual Gunnar Myrdal 
programmatically presented a social political ideology that emerged 
from the collapse of the great ideologies of the French Revolution, 
socialism and liberalism (Myrdal 1932a: 6). According to Myrdal 
this was an ideology that was “rational and had the romantics of an 
engineer” (Myrdal 1932b: 25).42 Besides Myrdal, one of the main 
agents regarding this re-orientation of Social Democracy was 
Herbert Tingsten. As a member of the Swedish Social Democratic 
Party in the 1930s, he wrote its ideological history in two volumes 
(Tingsten 1941a; 1941b). One of his main theses was that the party 
was undergoing a gradual shift from a class-based to a general-
                                                 
41 Conversely, there had been many non-Marxist Social Democrats before 
1930. 
42 “Dess romantik är ingenjörens”. 
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welfare programme, and the book was undoubtedly intended as a 
contribution to the processes that it described.43 
Closely related to this was the idea that political and social 
problems could be solved by rational and scientific solutions rather 
than by ideological confrontation and class struggle. In this connec-
tion Gunnar Myrdal, together with his wife Alva, are particularly 
important not only as historical actors who more than anyone else 
expressed the progressive, future-oriented, modern and scientific 
attitude of the 1930s, but also as mythical figures that epitomise the 
modernistic ideal of social engineering in the historical self-
understanding of Sweden.44 The political and cultural position of 
Uppsala philosophy in Sweden was intimately connected to this 
modernistic aura and on this point the parallels to the Vienna Circle 
are obvious. In the same way that the logical empiricists of the 
Vienna Circle were engaged with modern and progressive political 
and cultural movements in central Europe, for example by giving 
lectures to the Bauhaus architects (Galison 1990; 1996), Häger-
strömian ideas were associated not only with progressive politics, 
but also with more general cultural trends such as functionalistic 
architecture.45 
Hägerström himself was apparently very much at ease with his 
position in the cultural and political debates, at least he did not 
publicly disapprove of the ways he was used. Following the ethos 
of cultural radicalism, “the ideas of 1880”, Hägerström was con-
vinced that his philosophy contributed to the progress of human-
kind, for example, that his value nihilistic theory would help to 
liberate human beings from the constraints of traditional (con-
                                                 
43 Arguably, it was the failure of the Social Democrats to comply with this 
vision that prompted Tingsten to leave the party in 1944. See e.g. 
Johansson 1995: 249-50; Linderborg 2001: 204-23. 
44 See Marklund 2007 and 2008, and Östlund 2007, for a discussion of the 
history of the concept “social engineering”. 
45 For example, in 1932 the Danish designer Paul Henningsen (1932: 45) 
argued that there was a link between the current ambition to create an 
epistemology without the concept of “truth”, a moral theory or a Welt-
anschauung without the concept of “good”, and the architectural ambition 
to abandon the concept of “beauty”. 
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servative) morality.46 He was never politically active, but lectured on 
socialism and was known as one of Sweden’s foremost critical 
experts on Marxism (Olausson 1980: 325).47 For those who 
adhered to the ideas of cultural radicalism, and for progressively-
minded intellectuals, not least within the Social Democratic party, 
Hägerström enjoyed a position as something of a modernist 
prophet. Myrdal, Tingsten and many others, saw him as an icon, to 
whose camp it was important to belong, and whose ideas it was 
important to subscribe to.48 They also formed something of an 
intellectual network in which there were vivid discussions and 
correspondences. From 1938 to 1943, many of them collaborated 
in a series of cross-disciplinary seminars at the university college in 
Stockholm (Stockholms Högskola) in which a wide range of 
philosophical, social and political issues were debated. The seminars 
were organised and directed by the professors of philosophy, 
economics and social science, i.e. Tegen, Myrdal and Tingsten 
(Nilsson 1989: 66-7). 
After the Second World War, those who had been explicitly 
anti-fascist, anti-German, democratic and progressive were in an 
advantageous position from which they were able to determine the 
intellectual and political direction of Sweden and to discredit those 
who they conceived of as their enemies. The actors examined in 
these studies were leading figures among “the men of 1945” who, 
on the basis of the cultural radical ideas of 1880, established the 
anti-totalitarian (i.e. simultaneously anti-communist and anti-
fascist), democratic, liberal as well as rational, pragmatic and 
secularised “ideas of 1945” that dominated Swedish political and 
intellectual life during the post-war years (Ers 2008: 92-3; 
Johansson 1995: 224-45; Östling 2008: 198-203). Of course, there 
were many diverging views within this group. Most significantly, for 
Tingsten the post-war era meant a radical break with Social Demo-
                                                 
46 See e.g. Hägerström 1911: 63; 1932: 137; 1934b: 92 for such optimistic 
formulations. 
47 Hägerström’s lectures on socialism were posthumously gathered in 
Hägerström 1946. See also Hägerström 1909. 
48 For example, Källström (2002: 21) has described how Gunnar Myrdal in 
the mid-1930s travelled to Uppsala in order to receive Hägerström’s 
“blessing”. 
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cracy and any form of planned economy, and he devoted much 
time and space as editor-in-chief of the leading liberal newspaper 
Dagens Nyheter to a criticism of the Social Democrats and to a pro-
motion of his own version of the End of Ideology thesis. For Myrdal 
and Ross on the other hand, Social Democracy remained the 
answer to the challenges of the post-war era, and their task was 
rather to elaborate on how socialism was compatible with demo-
cracy, not least in the face of the arguments raised by liberal 
scholars such as Tingsten and Hayek.49 
The emerging analytic hegemony in the discipline of philosophy 
was intimately connected to the “ideas of 1945”, not least as 
Tingsten gave much space in the culture section of Dagens Nyheter 
to Hedenius, Marc-Wogau and Wedberg (Ers 2008: 92; Nordin 
2004b: 135-9). While other philosophies were stigmatised as 
fascistic, communistic, irrational and foreign (i.e. German), the new 
analytic philosophy was presented as rational, progressive and 
democratic (Strang IV; V). It was also furnished with domestic 
roots in the Uppsala tradition of Hägerström, and thus analytic 
philosophy also established itself as the sole heir and representative 
of the cultural radical tradition since the 1880s. 
                                                 
49 These disagreements seem to have been one of the reasons for the 
break in the relationship between Myrdal and Tingsten. See e.g. Johansson 
1995: 65-8. 

 
 
ii. History 
 
a. Philosophy, past and present  
 
The history of philosophy can be written in many ways. The studies 
presented in this volume aim at taking history seriously, which 
distinguishes them from studies that analyse historical texts using 
what they believe are the best available contemporary philosophical 
tools, or present the philosophical classics as a series of alternative 
answers to the same recurring philosophical problems, as if Aris-
totle, Kant, and Hägerström were participating in a round table 
discussion. It is undoubtedly a main dividing line that goes between 
historical and philosophical histories of philosophy.50 The differ-
ence is frequently treated as a polarisation between two antagonistic 
positions that quarrel over the correct approach to the history of 
philosophy. The historian might accuse the philosopher of anach-
ronism; that the historical text is interpreted as a contribution to a 
discussion of which the author had no intention of contributing to, 
or one that he or she could not have been familiar with. The phi-
losopher on the other hand, might claim that the historical 
approach is merely antiquarian as it aims at conserving historical 
intellectual landscapes for their own sake, instead of making the 
ideas instrumental for current purposes. 
Rather than treating the historical and the philosophical 
approach as two competing accounts of the nature of the relation 
between history and philosophy, let alone as two antagonistic ideo-
logies or Weltanschauungen, I believe that they should be conceived 
of as two complementary perspectives. Which perspective one ap-
plies in a particular study depends not on the absolute “truth” or 
superiority of the one approach over the other, but on one’s own 
                                                 
50 The ideas presented in the following section do not pretend to be 
groundbreaking. I build largely on studies such as Glock 2008; Kusch 
1995; Rorty 1984; Rorty, Schneewind & Skinner (eds.) 1984; Sorell & 
Rogers (eds.) 2005. 
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intentions and interests. If you want to learn what Aristotle meant, 
what his text were intended to say, and what role they played in 
their own context, you should adopt a historical perspective, and 
conversely, if you wish to examine to what extent the doctrines of 
Aristotle endure or contribute to a contemporary philosophical 
analysis you do not need to bother about the question whether or 
not Aristotle would accept your account as a description of his 
intentions. There can, of course, be more or less successful applica-
tions of an approach, but it is by any standard an unfair criticism to 
claim that a scholar has the wrong sort of interests or that he or she 
has written the wrong sort of book. 
The historical and the philosophical perspective both provide 
indispensable contributions to the scholarly discussion and they 
complement each other in various ways. It would, in fact, be 
impossible to write a history of philosophy by strictly and exclus-
ively adopting one of the perspectives; the historian of philosophy 
is undoubtedly always to some extent both a historian and a 
philosopher (Rorty, Schneewind & Skinner 1984: 9). In order to 
analyse a historical text, the philosopher needs to know what it 
says, which might prove difficult if the text presumes, or refers to, 
ideas and theories that have long ago disappeared from common 
knowledge. Philosophical vocabulary changes with time and there-
fore the philosopher might be in need of a “historical reconstruct-
tion” in order to have something to analyse in the first place. 
Conversely, the historian cannot approach the text without some 
philosophical and other prejudices originating from his or her own 
contemporary horizon. Indeed, there would be little point in a 
study that merely repeated the arguments of the historical text, or 
commented upon them from the same historical horizon 
(supposing that would be possible). This would merely amount to 
another equally (in)comprehensible text as the one we started with. 
After all, the job of the historian is to make sense of historical 
philosophical texts for a contemporary audience (Rorty, Schnee-
wind & Skinner 1984: 10-1). The historical and the philosophical 
approaches are to be understood as generalisations (or ideal types) 
that are never practised in their extremes. 
This is not to say that the distinction between the historical and 
the philosophical approach is unnecessary. The most problematic 
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and confusing studies are those in which the author is unclear or 
hesitant regarding his or her perspective, perhaps by alternating 
between them, or by confessing to one approach while practising 
the other. My studies proceed from the assumptions that the 
problems and questions that the historical actors tried to answer 
were in many respects different from those that occupy philoso-
phers today and that in order to give a historical account of the 
texts we have to ask ourselves what questions they were intended to 
answer (Collingwood 1939: 39). The aim is, following the British 
intellectual historian Quentin Skinner, to understand what the his-
torical actors did in writing their texts, and to interpret them as 
“moves” which can only be understood when their historical 
context is properly acknowledged.51 Rather than studying the 
history of philosophy as a series of different answers to the same 
perennial questions or with the ambition of finding similarities 
with, or anticipations of, current philosophical ideas and trends, the 
ambition is to uncover the position and intentions of the author 
and his or her texts in their original context. 
It should be emphasised that by aspiring to uncover “the inten-
tions of the author” it is not suggested that the historian should try 
to empathically place him-/herself in the head of the historical 
actor and think as he or she did (Skinner 1988: 279-81). The 
intentions and meanings that the historian aims at uncovering are 
not subjective states of mind. The idea is to study the historical 
texts as linguistic acts – speech acts – that are understandable 
against a field of recognisable conventions.52 That is, the task of the 
                                                 
51 See e.g. Skinner 1969. More recently, Skinner has discussed methodo-
logical questions in e.g. Tully (ed.) 1988 and Skinner 2002. The most 
famous applications of his ideas are Skinner 1978; 1996 and 1998. The 
secondary literature on Skinner is vast and, apart from Tully 1988, in 
which Skinner engages in discussion with both critics and devotees, I will 
mention only Palonen 2003b. 
52 Skinner adopted John L. Austin’s speech act theory as part of his 
methodology. According to Austin’s analysis, an utterance can be inter-
preted not only in terms of its syntactic and semantic aspects (i.e. as a 
“locutionary act”), but also as a performative utterance, i.e. as an “illocu-
tionary act”, by which Austin meant what the speaker or author did in 
saying or writing something, for example, the acts of promising, 
recommending or warning. See Austin 1962. 
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historian is to draw the best possible conclusions from an examina-
tion of, for example, the linguistic conventions of the time, the 
background of the author, the situation in which the text was 
written and published, and the audience to whom the text was 
directed. 
In the focus on the use of language and the interest in the 
changing meanings of concepts, the Skinnerian approach is inti-
mately connected to the Begriffsgeschichte of Reinhart Koselleck. But 
where Koselleck and his associates often focus on how the use and 
meaning of a particular concept has changed over longer periods of 
time and have a strong lexical tendency and ambition, most 
ambitiously presented in the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe series 
(Brunner et al (eds.) 1972-97), those who follow Skinner are more 
interested in special situations or “moments” of conceptual inno-
vation and change (Palonen 1999; Kurunmäki 2000: 26; Skinner 
2002: 180).53 Conceptual changes often occur as a result of 
“rhetorical redescriptions”, moves by which the historical actor, the 
“innovative ideologist” uses a term in a way that differs from the 
conventional use, or from the way the term is employed by 
(political) opponents (Palonen 2003b: 51-6, 161-9; Skinner 1988: 
112). There are, of course, many different strategies by which an 
actor can attempt a rhetorical redescription. It is, for example, quite 
common to try to rename a phenomenon when the original label 
has become tainted by unwanted connotations. For example, after 
1989 the label “communism” disappeared from the official names 
of many west-European parties on the left wing.54 Conversely, 
sometimes one can adopt and try to take over a word or a concept 
that has an established positive (or negative) connotation by using it 
in a new way. The Social Democratic appropriation and gradual 
                                                 
53 The intellectual historian J. G. A. Pocock (1975) famously used the 
word “moment” to designate a specific political situation in which a 
certain move was possible. Palonen (2003b: 65) notes that the idea has 
since been borrowed by Rosanvallon (1985) and Palonen (1998) himself. 
54 In Sweden “Vänsterpartiet kommunisterna” [The Left Party the 
Communists] became “vänsterpartiet” [The left party] in 1990. Similarly, 
in Finland and Denmark the communist parties merged in left-wing 
alliances called “Vasemmistoliitto” [The Left Alliance] and “Enhedslisten” 
[The List of Unity]. 
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monopolisation of the conservative-nationalist concept folkhemmet, 
“the people’s home”, in the late 1920s is an example of such a rhe-
torical move.55 Successful rhetorical redescriptions are of a rather 
subtle kind, playing to a considerable extent on existing connote-
tions, but nevertheless using the term as a designation for different 
phenomena or in such a way that the positive or negative charge is 
neutralised or even reversed. 
The Skinnerian perspective has mostly been applied by political 
theoreticians and political historians, or by historians of philosophy 
who have wished to point out the political context of a certain 
philosophical debate. It is also primarily as such that it has been 
used in the present studies (see Chapter iv). However, I will also 
argue that Skinner’s rhetorical perspective forms a fruitful approach 
to disciplinary history. By examining the language that the philoso-
phers use, e.g. the labels that they use to position themselves in 
relation to others, the philosophical discussion can be seen as a 
“political” field in which the actors make rhetorical moves (see 
Chapter iv.d). 
In its focus on the social-historical context my approach also 
draws upon ideas within the sociology of philosophy as it has been 
presented and practised by e.g. Pierre Bourdieu (1988), Randall 
Collins (1998) and Martin Kusch (1995; 1996). By highlighting 
social relations, fields, and networks, sociological perspectives have 
been used in the examination of both the transnational and the 
political aspects of philosophers and their ideas.56 However, I want 
to distance myself from approaches that use the social-historical 
context as something of an explanation for the occurrence or birth 
of particular philosophical ideas and theories. Such accounts leave 
                                                 
55 “Folkhemmet” was originally associated with a conservative-
nationalistic rhetoric, particularly with the political scientist and 
Conservative Member of Parliament Rudolf Kjellén. But in the late 1920s 
the Social Democrats, and particularly their leader Per Albin Hansson, 
adopted the label and transformed its meaning into a designation of their 
own political programme. See e.g. Berman 2006: 163-7; Götz 2001: 190-
275. 
56 While Bourdieu himself focused on the political aspects (e.g. Bourdieu 
1988), there have been many recent attempts to apply a sociological per-
spective on transnational fields and networks. See e.g. Casanova 1999; 
Espagne 1999; Nygård 2008. 
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little room for individual inventiveness. In its focus on the 
ambitions and aims of individual actors, the Skinnerian perspective 
enables us to focus on cases in which the ideas and actions of the 
intellectual stands out in its historical context, when the actor has 
been innovative and made an original move. Instead of reducing 
philosophy to the social-historical context, I wish to treat the 
historical context as a Spielraum in which historical actors made 
their moves, and against which these moves can be interpreted by 
historians like ourselves. The context and the actor should not be 
understood as wholly independent unities, but as inseparably 
interwoven (Hyrkkänen 2009: 260). 
There are differences in the ways in which sociological philoso-
phers regard the importance of their efforts for the philosophical 
discipline itself. Collins seems to hold that the insights of the socio-
logy of philosophy are primarily of sociological interest and that 
philosophy in that sense is autonomous.57 Bourdieu on the other 
hand is often almost imperialistic in his trust in the advantages of a 
sociological perspective; it is only by embracing the sociological 
perspective, he argues, that the philosophers can emancipate them-
selves from their naïve belief in the autonomy of their enterprise.58 
Kusch seems to position himself somewhere in between, arguing 
that even if he does not attempt to “condense all philosophical 
clouds into mere drops of sociology”, there are still many philoso-
phical questions that would benefit from a sociological perspective; 
or rather, that philosophers cannot leave the social realm to 
sociologists without abandoning some of its most central questions 
(Kusch 1996: 95-6).59 
For Skinner the relation between philosophy and history is 
framed somewhat differently. Skinner holds that historical studies 
are important mind-openers that help us appreciate the contingency 
of our present views (Skinner 1969: 52-3). Historical studies 
                                                 
57 See also Lundberg 2007: 214. 
58 “If there is a question that philosophy, itself so questioning, manages to 
exclude, this is the question of its own socially necessary conditions” 
(Bourdieu 1983: 4). 
59 Such as “the study of meaning, the enquiry into the conditions of the 
possibility of knowledge, and investigations into the grounds of norma-
tivity and objectivity” (Kusch 1996: 95). 
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acquaint us with philosophical, cultural and political arrangements 
that might serve as alternatives in the contemporary debate. By 
studying how we came to be who we are, and how we acquired the 
ideas and theories we believe in and the concepts we use, our 
present perspective appears as less uniquely privileged, and thus, 
Skinner claims, we might become less prone to think of our present 
arrangements as necessary and unchangeable (Skinner 1988: 287). 
To follow the Finnish political scientist Kari Palonen, the historical 
perspective can, by appealing to plurality, complexity and imper-
fection, serve as a safeguard against the urge for coherence, unity 
and system that often characterise philosophical studies (Palonen 
2003b: 27). In this sense, the dividing line between studies that are 
“genuinely philosophical” and those that are “merely historical” 
should certainly be overcome, even though, as I have argued, it is 
important to be explicit about whether the study applies a historical 
or a philosophical perspective. 
 
b. Analytic philosophy and the history of philosophy 
 
It should be no secret that many of the scholars examined in my 
studies held diametrically opposed views concerning the objectives 
and methods of a study in the history of philosophy. According to 
them, the history of philosophy should primarily be studied, if at 
all, in order to find arguments or theories that could be useful in 
contemporary philosophical discussion, or, perhaps, in order to 
discover the origins of erroneous conceptions in contemporary 
theories. Explorations of the historical context, let alone specu-
lations regarding the motives, interests or intentions of the 
historical authors, were often considered obsolete or even futile. 
The most famous Swedish example of the history of philosophy 
practised in this vein is Wedberg’s Filosofins historia (1958), which 
was explicitly marketed as “the first book in the Swedish language 
that in the interpretation and evaluation of the ideas of the past has 
made use of the achievements of modern logic, semantics and 
History, Transfer, Politics 
 
38 
epistemology” (Wedberg 1958: back-cover).60 Wedberg’s three-
volume series was undoubtedly an ambitious project that generated 
many novel insights both regarding the philosophical classics and 
the advantages of novel philosophical methods. But from the 
historian’s point of view, the approach had serious problems. It 
seems as if the history of philosophy for Wedberg was a timeless 
container of theories and ideas. Moreover, chapters entitled 
“Plato’s Theory of Forms as a Semantic Theory” and “Megarian-
Stoic Discussion of the Truth Conditions of Composite Proposi-
tions” appear blatantly anachronistic.61 By forging the historical 
theories into a contemporary vocabulary, Wedberg made his task of 
criticising the historical classics almost trivially easy, and doing so, 
he gave a rather one-dimensional image of a progressive and 
cumulative philosophical discipline. 
For sure, during the latter half of the 20th century analytic phi-
losophy gained a reputation of being thoroughly disinterested in the 
history of philosophy in its “antiquarian” form. The aim of analytic 
philosophy is/was not to look backwards in time, but to produce 
new knowledge that served the purposes of modern science and 
society. According to Tom Sorell, for example, there is little room 
for antiquarian history of philosophy within the English-speaking 
world. Analytic philosophy, he claims, is often not merely ahis-
torical but also explicitly anti-historical, i.e. more or less hostile to 
historical contextualisation (Sorell 2005: 1-5). Indeed, in his attempt 
to define “analytic philosophy” Hans-Johann Glock has observed 
that the claim against the analytic philosophers does not seem 
merely to be that they are anachronistic, but also that they are 
“historiophobic” (Glock 2008: 90). Some even accuse analytic phi-
                                                 
60 “Denna är den första i sitt format på svenskt språk, som vid tolkningen 
och värderingen av gångna tiders idéer tagit hänsyn till den moderna 
logikens, semantikens och kunskapsteorins resultat.” However, the 
statement is somewhat doubtful – a result of a restricted national outlook, 
perhaps – as the Finnish philosopher Erik Stenius five years earlier used 
ideas adopted from Kaila, particularly the notion of “invariance”, in his 
examination of pre-Socratic philosophy, which was written and published 
in Swedish. Stenius 1953. See also Österman 2004. 
61 The original Swedish titles were: “Idéläran som logisk teori” and 
“Megarisk-stoisk diskussion av sanningsvillkoren för sammansatta satser” 
(Wedberg 1958: 5-6). 
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losophers of lacking historical self-consciousness as they take them-
selves “as the first to have understood what philosophy is, and 
what questions are the genuinely philosophical ones” (Rorty, 
Schneewind & Skinner 1984: 11). Analytic philosophers tend to 
reduce historical debates into a prehistory of real, i.e. analytic, phi-
losophy, and thus the historical actors and their ideas are judged 
according to how well they have succeeded in anticipating ideas or 
positions represented in the current philosophical discussions. 
These complaints might have been fair a couple of decades ago, 
but they certainly jar with the great many historical studies that 
have recently emerged from within the analytic tradition. Already at 
the beginning of the 1990s the Finnish philosopher Georg Henrik 
von Wright was able to talk about a “retrospective turn” within 
analytic philosophy (von Wright 1993: 47).62 While von Wright was 
undoubtedly right in noting that the interest was “in the first place, 
concentrated on arguments and thoughts of individual philosophers 
who can be considered as remote ancestors of analytic philosophy” 
(i.e., Aristotle, Kant, the British empiricists and logicians of various 
periods),63 the focus has since been turned to the more recent 
history of the analytic tradition, prompting some to talk about a 
“historical turn” in the philosophy of science (Hardcastle & 
Richardson 2003: vii). There has emerged an abundance of 
literature on the linguistic turn and the development of modern 
formal logic,64 on Moore and Russell and their revolt against 
idealism,65 on Wittgenstein,66 and, perhaps particularly, on the 
Vienna Circle. The numerous publications of the Vienna Circle 
Institute (especially Friedrich Stadler’s Studien sum Wiener Kreis, 1997) 
have emphasised with increased strength that the Vienna Circle and 
logical empiricism were part of a distinct philosophical, social and 
                                                 
62 In characteristically pessimistic terms von Wright analysed this 
retrospective turn as “a sign of tiredness and slackening of the enthusiasm 
for the conquest of virgin land which animated the protagonists of what 
was then ‘a new philosophy’” (von Wright 1993: 47). 
63 And, I would like to add, with an especially fond interest in the Pre-
Socratic philosophers. 
64 See e.g. Dummet 1993; von Plato 1994. 
65 See e.g. Griffin (ed.) 2003; Monk & Palmer (eds.) 1996. 
66 See e.g. Janik & Toulmin 1973; Monk 1990. 
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political context that must not be overlooked in order to under-
stand their programme.67 By employing an “antiquarian” historical 
perspective they have been able to overturn the received view of 
logical empiricism as a dogmatic and foundationalist philosophy in 
favour of a more balanced picture that acknowledges the disagree-
ments and tensions within the Circle, as well as the development of 
their views of time. Logical empiricism was not a static doctrinal 
position that remained unchanged throughout the 1930s and 40s; 
rather, the views of the logical empiricists gradually developed as a 
result of internal and external criticisms. It has even been argued 
that logical empiricism succeeded in overcoming itself (e.g. Uebel 
1992). 
Also, in the Nordic countries the analytic tradition has recently 
been subject to an increased historical interest.68 For example, in 
Norway Fredrik Thue has written two volumes on the group 
around Arne Næss, in which he shows how they imported and 
transformed the ideas of the Vienna Circle and how, with inspi-
ration and assistance from the United States, they were able to 
establish a hugely influential social theoretical school (Thue 1997; 
2006). Similarly, the legal historian Sverre Blandhol has argued that 
Alf Ross’s legal philosophy, which was inspired by both the Vienna 
Circle and the Uppsala School, was connected to the rise of the 
Danish welfare state (Blandhol 1999). In fact, even the analytic 
philosophers’, for example Wedberg’s, ahistorical attitude has been 
the subject of historical analyses in which it has been related to the 
processes of modernisation and specialisation of the philosophical 
discipline (Shiött 2000). The philosophic-anachronistic approach 
has been seen as a way in which analytic philosophers tried to accu-
mulate historical legitimacy for their own position (Ers 2004: 73; 
2008: 226-8). By refuting both historical philosophers and con-
temporaneous philosophers with historical interests, the analytic 
philosophers sought to prove the superiority of their own methods. 
                                                 
67 See e.g. Cartwright et al 1996; Heidelberger & Stadler (eds.) 2003; 
Nemeth 1981; Nemeth & Stadler (eds.) 1996; Uebel 1991; Richardson & 
Uebel (eds.) 2007. 
68 Not least manifested by The Vienna Circle and the Nordic Countries – 
Networks and Transformations of Logical Empiricism by Manninen & Stadler 
(eds.) 2010. 
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The merits of a historical perspective on analytic philosophy 
have been exemplified not least by Michael Friedman, who has 
succeeded not only in discrediting many misleading beliefs about 
the origins, motives and philosophical aims of logical empiricism 
(Friedman 1999), but also in revealing both the philosophical and 
political reasons that eventually generated the division between 
analytic and continental philosophy (Friedman 2000). Looking back 
at an era in which the philosophical field was not yet divided in this 
sense might provide a key to bridging the great divide between 
analytic and continental philosophy that for a long time hampered 
the philosophical discussion. Indeed, when it comes to historicising 
the current philosophical scene, and especially to acknowledging 
the contingency of the division between analytic and continental 
philosophy, it is arguably within the analytic tradition that most of 
the work has been done. To press the point: while many historically 
interested philosophers trained within the analytic tradition have 
started reading Husserl, Heidegger and Horkheimer in order to 
learn about the origins and the unrealised eventualities of their own 
philosophical tradition, it is rather rare to find philosophers from 
the continental tradition referring to, or discussing, Frege, Carnap 
or Russell in order to discover something about themselves. Of 
course, there is no point in denying that one major reason for this 
might be that the first three philosophers are more captivating and 
topical than the latter, or perhaps even that the nature of the 
doctrines of the two traditions is such that the analytic philosophers 
might have more to gain from the continental tradition than the 
other way around. Be that as it may, the poor balance does never-
theless raise serious doubts over the recurring claim that the 
analytic philosophers are particularly unaware of the historical 
origins and contingency of their position. 
It is not least to these efforts of historicising the analytic 
tradition that the present studies are intended as contributions. By 
applying a historical perspective on the construction of the analytic 
tradition in Sweden, my ambition has been to analyse the trans-
formations and redescriptions of philosophical positions and tradi-
tions. It should be emphasised, however, that the studies are not 
intended to judge or criticise this young generation of intellectuals, or 
to claim that they were wrong in interpreting Uppsala philosophy as 
History, Transfer, Politics 
 
42 
a parallel movement to logical empiricism, or in presenting it as a 
democratic and progressive philosophy.69 Rather, the aim has been 
to investigate these interpretations and redescriptions as moves in a 
particular historical context. In this way, one of the main purposes 
of the studies is to act as a reminder of the contingency of our 
present views, positions and constellations, i.e. as a reminder that 
Hägerström and the Uppsala School could have served as anchors 
for very different philosophical, legal or political traditions if it had 
been others who had won the right to represent their legacy (Strang 
I: 266). 
                                                 
69 To put the point somewhat bluntly: by calling something a “con-
struction” it is often implied that it does not “really” exist. From my point 
of view, the term “construction” is more appropriately combined with an 
affirmative rather than a negative ontological statement. 
 
 
iii. Transfer 
 
a. Beyond the nation 
 
The Uppsala School of Axel Hägerström can be said to have been 
the last genuinely Swedish philosophical school, and the process 
described in my studies can be viewed as one of internationalisation 
of the philosophical discipline in Sweden. However, such a 
narrative is only partially true. The first generation of Uppsala phi-
losophers did not live and act in national isolation, and those who 
succeeded them by no means abandoned the national context in 
favour of some kind of denationalised cosmopolitan space. Local, 
national and international contexts were constantly and simul-
taneously present, and intellectuals and philosophers developed 
differrent strategies for coping with the often conflicting expec-
tations of these different frameworks. The purpose of this chapter 
is to describe a perspective for studying the interplay between the 
national and the international. 
The nation has for some time been conceived of as the natural 
category by which the world, people, and cultural material are 
structured. The Olympic Games practice of presuming that every-
one and everything represents a (single) nation continues to reign 
despite the fact that in the age of globalisation it has become more 
obvious than ever before that cultural relations, networks and 
societies are not confined to the nation-state.70 Unquestionably, the 
humanities and social sciences have traditionally served more or 
less explicit nation-building purposes, furnishing the nation with a 
history, social characteristics, and sometimes even a philosophy. 
But even if this programmatically nationalistic way of writing social 
science and history has been abandoned, the national outlook 
continues to permeate many studies as a (hidden) methodological 
                                                 
70 I borrow the Olympic Games simile – “If you don’t represent a nation, 
you don’t exist” – from Henrik Stenius. See e.g. Stenius & Haggrén 2005: 
81. 
History, Transfer, Politics 
 
44 
premise determining the perspective of the observer, separating 
historically interwoven cultural and political realities from each 
other and presenting the nation as a natural and enclosed unity. 
This is what Ulrich Beck, among others, calls “methodological 
nationalism” (Beck 2004: 24). 
There is a growing discussion on the methods of overcoming a 
restricted national outlook in the historical disciplines. One of the 
most established ways of looking beyond the nation is by com-
paring it with other nations. Comparisons are valuable not least 
because they open the eyes of the historian towards different 
“might-have-beens”, i.e. developments, events and outcomes that 
were also possible in other contexts. Such an acknowledgement of 
historical contingency undermines the apparent danger of presen-
ting the national history as natural, functional or cumulatively pro-
gressive. However, even if comparisons are useful in widening the 
perspective of the historian, it is not altogether evident that they 
actually overcome the main problems of methodological national-
ism. It is, for example, not easy from a comparative perspective to 
acknowledge the ways in which the compared units interact with 
and transform each other (Werner & Zimmermann 2006: 33-5).71 
Especially in intellectual history, a strictly national perspective is 
bound to be misleading. A comparison between the Vienna Circle 
and the pupils of Russell and Moore in Cambridge might certainly 
be illustrative in many ways, but if it ignores the ways in which the 
representatives of the schools influenced each other, such a story is 
undoubtedly seriously incomplete. 
Another way to transgress the national perspective is therefore 
to focus on the relations between actors in different national, 
regional or local cultures. There is, of course, a long tradition in 
intellectual history of examining the travels of intellectual and 
philosophical ideas. But arguably, in many of these studies the 
cultural transfer is portrayed as a rather mechanical and one-
dimensional process of dissemination or reception. From such a 
perspective the theoretical precedence is often given to the sender 
(the great philosopher), while the mediators themselves, their 
                                                 
71 Moreover, as noted by Kettunen (2006), comparisons themselves are 
often used as arguments for change in a national context. 
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intentions and interests, and the context in which they try to intro-
duce the new ideas, tend to be overlooked. The transfer of logical 
empiricism to Great Britain cannot be studied without taking into 
account the strong British empirical tradition, as well as Russell’s 
works in logic and his relationship with Wittgenstein, i.e. the many 
ways in which British philosophy was intertwined and entangled 
with logical and scientific philosophy on the European continent. 
Indeed, if the nations and the national contexts are taken as self-
evident and fixed frames of reference – as more or less closed 
points of departure and arrival – transfer studies hardly do better 
than comparisons in overcoming the main problems of methodo-
logical nationalism (Secord 2004: 669; Werner & Zimmermann 
2006: 34-6). 
Recently, a number of different approaches have emerged that 
seek to pay more careful attention to the peculiar logic of cultural 
transfers. Whether called entangled history, transnationale Geschichte 
or histoire croisée, the claim is that the intellectual and cultural world 
does not consist of self-enclosed cultural totalities, but of individual 
actors that are connected to each other in a complex web of 
relations which often transgresses the national borders.72 Accord-
ingly, the aim is to focus on the relations and crossings between 
different intellectual cultures, on the problems and challenges 
involved in cultural transfers and on the transfer agents themselves 
and their various strategies. It is important, for example, to pay 
attention to the different “filters” that embody the transfer 
processes (Andersen & Grønlie 2007: 19-20). There are several 
intellectual, cultural, political and economic factors that can have an 
effect on how well a new philosophy is received in a new context. 
Previous efforts to introduce the same or a very similar philosophy 
might facilitate (or, perhaps, hamper) the transfer, and so can a 
domestic tradition with which the philosophy can be associated. 
Radical philosophies might (or might not) be easier to introduce in 
periods of political turmoil than in peaceful times. Moreover, the 
cultural position of the export country or culture in the country or 
                                                 
72 “Transnational history” is presented in e.g. Budde et al (eds.) 2006, 
while histoire croisée was programmatically launched by Werner & Zimmer-
mann 2002; 2006. 
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culture to which the ideas are imported also plays an important role 
with regard to the success of a transfer; in the aftermath of the 
Second World War it was quite impossible to introduce German 
ideas into the Scandinavian countries. And in relation to this, 
language also influences the transfer process: it is easier to intro-
duce ideas that are presented in a language that is familiar.73 
These filters should, however, not be understood as factors that 
determine the transfer processes; rather, they constitute the context, 
or Spielraum, in which the actors employ different strategies and 
make different (Skinnerian) moves in order to introduce a foreign 
philosophy (or prevent it from getting introduced). Indeed, the 
cultural mediators must not be understood as passive receptors of 
foreign philosophies; rather, they have chosen the ideas, theories 
and philosophies that they want to transfer as well as the manners 
in which they present them. The reception or transfer processes 
always involve interpretation and redescription, and therefore many 
transfer theorists prefer to talk about “appropriation” than 
“reception” (e.g. Simon & Herran 2008: 9). Intellectual goods do 
not travel in sealed containers, isolated from all external influence 
and identically reconstruable in any new context. It is more likely 
that the ideas and philosophies are transformed in order for them 
to fit in to or gain attention in the new context. Sometimes the 
novel ideas are simply misunderstood, and sometimes they are 
more or less consciously altered and redescribed.74 Even the same 
philosopher is likely to modify his theories and ideas when 
travelling from one context to another. There have, for example, 
been many studies on the transformation of logical empiricism in 
connection with the emigration to the United States in the 1930s 
and 40s. The “philosophy of science” that Carnap and his fellow 
European logical empiricists promoted as immigrants in the United 
                                                 
73 The popularity of a foreign culture is, of course, intimately related to the 
knowledge of its language. In the Nordic countries around the Second 
World War, the knowledge of English increased with the cultural import 
from the Anglo-Saxon world, while the knowledge of German and the 
cultural import from Germany decreased. 
74 It has, for example, been claimed that the Swedish school reform of 
1962 was based on Alva Myrdal’s idealised misconception of the system in 
the United States back in the 1940s. See Larsson 2003. 
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States borrowed many elements from the American pragmatic 
tradition, while the socialist and internationalist commitments of 
the Unity of Science programme were downplayed in the emerging 
new political constellation of the Cold War (Richardson 2003; 
Howard 2003; Reisch 2005). Moreover, as will be emphasised in 
what follows, it is not always imported intellectual goods that are 
redescribed or transformed in order to facilitate (or hamper) the 
transfer. It is equally possible for the transfer agent to attempt at 
redescription of the (national) context, its traditions and character-
istics, in order to pave the way for cultural transfer. 
It should be evident that methodological nationalism cannot be 
overcome by completely disregarding the national outlook. Many 
professional relations and networks were (and are) undoubtedly still 
local, regional or national, and the relative importance of these 
different contacts should not be ignored. The aim of the trans-
national perspective is rather that the national outlook “becomes 
disenchanted, that is, de-ontologized, historicized, and stripped of 
its inner necessity” (Beck 2006: 17). The scholar should strive at 
distancing himself from the national perspective, or, in Palonen’s 
words, aim at studying the nation as a foreign country, albeit a very 
familiar one (Palonen 2003a: 569).75 The national context, the 
national loyalties and even the national ideology itself must be 
recognised as important social and historical factors constituting 
the field in which the actors made their moves. In fact, the national 
context is often decisive. Even the most programmatically cosmo-
politan intellectual has had a background in a specific national 
context that has shaped his international agenda (Casanova 1999: 
41; Nygård 2008: 16). Often scholars look abroad to strengthen 
their position in the domestic field. It has, for example, been argued 
that the internationalism of Neurath – his strenuous efforts to 
internationalise the Vienna Circle through his Unity of Science 
programme – was to a significant extent motivated by the polarised 
political situation in Austria. The rise of fascism prompted Neurath 
to gather international support for his cause (Cartwright et al 1996: 
82-4). Similarly, Petzäll’s cosmopolitanism was largely caused by the 
                                                 
75 This is certainly a methodological ideal that I hope my own studies live 
up to. 
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fact that the Uppsala dominance hampered his professional 
prospects in Sweden. His persistent efforts to confront the Uppsala 
School with foreign philosophies in Theoria can be seen as attempts 
to compensate for what he experienced as a stifling Swedish intel-
lectual atmosphere and to accumulate foreign support in his 
mission to break the Uppsala hegemony (Strang II: 71-4). 
For similar reasons, the tendency among transfer historians to 
belittle the comparative approach has been criticised by, among 
others, Jürgen Kocka, who points at important questions that can 
only be answered, and indeed asked, from a comparative perspec-
tive (Kocka 2003; 1999). Claims for national exceptionalism (Sonder-
weg), for example, can only be judged through meticulous inter-
national comparison. The special conditions for, and features of, 
the transfer of logical empiricism to Sweden come to light 
especially in comparison with the introduction and appropriation of 
logical empiricism in other countries, for example Finland. It is 
therefore undoubtedly more useful to consider the comparative 
approaches and transfer studies or histoire croisée as complements of 
each other rather than as competing perspectives (Kocka 2003: 44; 
Simon & Herran 2008: 9). 
 
b. The colonisation of Hägerström 
 
The transformation from Uppsala philosophy to analytic 
philosophy was undoubtedly a process that took place gradually 
and in constant interaction with the international philosophical 
scene, particularly with logical empiricism and the Cambridge 
School. Nonetheless, the use that the younger generation of 
Uppsala philosophers made of these foreign ideas was thoroughly 
shaped by the national context. In the 1930s, “Uppsala philosophy” 
was the subject of fierce internal struggles between two antagonistic 
wings. Hedenius, Marc-Wogau and Wedberg were disciples of 
Phalén and in many ways at war with the orthodox Hägerströmians 
(Nordin 1983: 52-3). However, in the public mind, as well as at the 
university (especially after Phalén’s death in 1931), Hägerström 
unquestionably represented the key figure of Uppsala philosophy 
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not least due to the attention and position of the so-called “value 
nihilistic” theory in Swedish debates. 
For the Phalénians the Hägerströmian dominance was a source 
of distress, not only because they were shadowed or overlooked in 
public debates, but also as they were in a rather weak position with 
regard to professional advancement in obtaining a permanent aca-
demic position. It was in this context that Hedenius, Marc-Wogau 
and Wedberg appropriated the ideas of logical empiricism and the 
Cambridge School. My studies are by no means the first to notice 
the shift in the philosophical orientation of this younger generation 
of Uppsala philosophers during the late 1930s and early 1940s, or 
the key role that Hedenius’s modification of Hägerström’s value 
theory played in the transition.76 However, more strongly than pre-
vious studies my work strives to interpret the shift in terms of a 
colonisation of the figure of Hägerström. This was more than a 
mere appropriation and redescription of Hägerström’s ideas; it was 
also a matter of claiming the ownership of the Uppsala tradition in 
order to fascilitate the introduction of foreign ideas. In this way 
Hägerström came to serve as an anchor for the new (analytic) tradi-
tion that Hedenius, Marc-Wogau and Wedberg were establishing. 
From this perspective, Hedenius is by far the most interesting of 
the three. In the study “Theoria and logical empiricism” I describe 
how Hedenius, only eleven days after Hägerström’s death, con-
tacted Petzäll and volunteered to take Hägerström’s place in a pro-
jected debate with Cassirer in the pages of Theoria (Strang II: 84-5). 
In the resulting article “Über den alogischen Charakter der sog. 
Werturteile” Hedenius argued that Cassirer had misinterpreted 
Hägerström’s value theory as a reformulation of the homo mensura 
thesis of the Ancient Sophists. Thus Cassirer had presented Häger-
ström as a value relativist who holds that value statements can be 
true or false (Hedenius 1939). Whether Hedenius was correct in his 
                                                 
76 Nordin (e.g.1983; 2004a; 2004b) has on several occasions described the 
transformation from Uppsala philosophy to analytic philosophy, not least 
by focusing on Hedenius’s redescription of Hägerström’s value theory. 
Furthermore, in order to point out how the phenomenological side of 
Uppsala philosophy was suppressed, thus facilitating the establishment of 
the analytic hegemony, Bengtsson (1991: 151-61) devotes a chapter to the 
transition from Uppsala philosophy to analytic philosophy. 
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criticism is a matter of discussion (Hansson & Nordin 2006: 162-3; 
Thomasson 2004; 106-10). At the very least there are many indica-
tions suggesting that Hägerström actually believed that value state-
ments can be false (but never true). However, more important from 
my perspective is the fact that the article was the first significant 
step in Hedenius’s attempt to replace Hägerström as the main 
advocate of the value nihilistic theory. In the years that followed 
Hedenius published a series of popular articles on Hägerström and 
value nihilism in the Social Democratic journal Tiden, which were 
later gathered as the successful popular book Om rätt och moral 
(1941), by means of which Hedenius firmly established himself as 
the new Hägerström. 
But Hedenius did not merely adopt the value theory of Häger-
ström. On the contrary, he explicitly set out to improve it by “for-
mulating it in a different manner from what is common amongst 
Hägerströmians” (Hedenius 1941: 13), and by proposing “an 
important modification” of it (Hedenius 1941: 53).77 Hägerström 
had based his argument on the act psychology and Werttheorie of 
Brentano and Ehrenfelds (Peterson 1973: 30-58; Danielsson 1993: 
35-8). For him a value judgement is not a real judgement (Urteil) as 
it is not a representation (Vorstellung) of something as existent. 
Instead, a value judgement is characterised by always involving a 
feeling or an attitude (Gemütsbewegung) towards that which is 
represented. While for Hägerström it had been important to prove 
that value judgements (or representations) involve feelings and 
attitudes, this was very much a secondary point in Hedenius’s 
analysis. In his version of the value nihilistic theory the references 
to act psychology had disappeared. Instead he proceeded from a 
distinction between a sentence (sats) and a statement (påstående); 
while “my father is dead” and “mein Vater ist gestorben” are two 
different sentences, they express the same statement. Furthermore, 
Hedenius claimed, every statement is by necessity either true or 
false and it is only statements that can be true or false. This was “a 
                                                 
77 “…den skall även formuleras något annorlunda än vad som brukas 
hägerströmianer emellan” and “…en viktig modifikation”. See also e.g. 
Danielsson 1993; Nordin 1983: 150-1; 2004: 106-13; (and especially) 
2004a. 
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cornerstone of logic and undoubted by every respected philos-
opher” (Hedenius 1941: 14).78 The value nihilistic theory then, 
Hedenius continued, is a theory that claims that there are certain 
sentences that seem to express statements – “this is good”, “this is 
evil”, “this is right”, “this ought to be done” – but which on closer 
examination do not express any statement about anything 
(Hedenius 1941: 16-7). 
Besides re-articulating the value theory of Hägerström, 
Hedenius also criticised the Hägerströmians for failing to acknowl-
edge the distinction between what he called “genuine (äkta) and 
non-genuine (oäkta) value statements” (Hedenius 1941: 58). 
According to Hedenius, Hägerström’s theory only applied to 
genuine value statements, i.e. in cases when “stealing is wrong” is 
used in order to pressure someone into refraining from a certain 
conduct. But the very same sentence can also, as a non-genuine 
statement, be used in order to refer to the presence of genuine 
evaluations, i.e. to the fact that some (legal or moral) authority, 
people in general or people in this particular culture, actually 
condemn stealing. As a non-genuine value statement, Hedenius 
claimed, “stealing is wrong” is a purely descriptive statement that 
can indeed be true or false. In this way, by limiting the scope and 
significance of value nihilism, Hedenius tried to move beyond 
Hägerström. 
The origin of Hedenius’s new ideas has been the subject of 
some discussion. Many scholars have observed that Hedenius (and 
Marc-Wogau) uses Moore’s distinction between the meaning of a 
statement and an analysis or theory concerning its meaning as a 
main argument against orthodox Hägerströmians (Nordin 2004b: 
111; Petersson 2009a: 37).79 There is certainly no point in disputing 
                                                 
78 “…som är en hörnsten i logiken och icke betvivlas av någon ansedd 
filosof”. 
79 For example, in a discussion with the orthodox Hägerströmian legal 
theoreticians Olivecrona, Marc-Wogau noted that one can either analyse 
the meaning of a concept, or the theories that philosophers and theore-
ticians have regarding the meaning of the concept. While Marc-Wogau 
himself, thought it was best to stick to the first type of analysis, he 
complained that Olivecrona frequently slid over to the second type (Marc-
Wogau 1941: 143-6). 
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the significance of the Cambridge School with regard to the shift 
from Uppsala philosophy to analytic philosophy in Sweden, 
especially as the philosophers themselves autobiographically con-
firm these influences.80 My focus on logical empiricism should 
therefore not be understood as an assessment of the relative 
importance of the different, but related, sources of influence, but 
rather, as an attempt to highlight a chapter in the history of 
Swedish philosophy that has been somewhat downplayed in 
previous studies.81 
Even if Hedenius did not explicitly refer to the emotivistic 
theory as presented by leading logical empiricists such as Ayer 
(1936) or Carnap (1935), there were undoubtedly many striking 
similarities. Both Ayer and Carnap argued in a Russellian way that 
value statements have a deceptive grammatical form, which might 
cause one to think that they are regular statements (Ayer 1936: 108; 
Carnap 1935: 24). But where both Ayer and Carnap based their 
argument on the principle of verification (or testability), i.e. on the 
idea that value statements are meaningless as there is no way to 
empirically verify (or test) them, Hedenius was more reluctant in 
specifying what actually determines whether a statement is true or 
false, or indeed, if a sentence is a statement or not. In a rather 
vague manner, Hedenius claimed that it was “a difficult, and 
perhaps still unsolved, problem” (Hedenius 1941: 14-5).82 However, 
later in the same book (Om rätt och moral), when discussing the 
                                                 
80 See e.g. what Hedenius (1951: 69) and Marc-Wogau (1951: 122) have 
written about themselves in Alf Ahlberg’s autobiographical lexicon 
Filosofiskt lexikon (1951). In the same lexicon Wedberg (1951: 206), in turn, 
refers only to “international philosophical movements” and to studies in 
logic in the United States. The importance of the Cambridge School, and 
particularly G. E. Moore, on the development of Hedenius’s ideas in the 
late 1930s have been emphasised by e.g. Nordin 1983: 146-9; Henschen-
Dahlquist 2009: 10-1. 
81 A third related and important, but equally neglected, source of influence 
with regard to the transformation of Uppsala philosophy in the 1940s is 
Wedberg’s studies in the United States in 1939-43 (Princeton and Har-
vard). It is arguably largely due to Wedberg that formal logic became a 
leading field in Swedish philosophy during the latter half of the 20th 
century. 
82 “…ett svårt, kanske ännu olöst problem”. 
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problem of “meaning” which, according to Hedenius “was 
emerging as the central challenge of philosophy”, he subscribed to 
the view that “the meaning of a statement is the fact (sakförhållande) 
that makes it true” (Hedenius 1941: 62),83 which undoubtedly 
echoes Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as well as subsequent formulations 
by different logical empiricists (e.g. Carnap 1928b: 325). 
There were also other signs of an increasing influence from 
logical empiricism in Om rätt och moral. It is, for example, likely that 
one of the sources for Hedenius’s distinction between genuine and 
non-genuine value statements was an article on “Imperatives and 
Logic” by the Danish logical empiricist Jørgen Jørgensen in Theoria 
(1938). Here Jørgensen stated that an imperative such as “You 
ought to close the door!” could also be used as a description of the 
fact that such a command exists, which undoubtedly seems to point 
in the direction of Hedenius’s distinction (Strang III: 72). 
A couple of years later, in 1943, Hedenius tried to reconcile 
Moore’s commonsense realism (that there are certain empirical 
statements that cannot be doubted, e.g. “This is a hand”) with 
“dem Satz des logischen Positivismus”, namely that empirical state-
ments are by necessity merely hypothetical as they can never be 
conclusively verified. According to Hedenius it was a great mis-
understanding to contrast these statements with each other because 
while the first was a statement regarding an empirical fact, the latter 
was a logical analysis of statements regarding empirical facts. 
“Persönlich glaube ich”, Hedenius concluded, “dass sowohl 
Moores Gedankengang als auch die These des logischen Posi-
tivismus wahr sind” (Hedenius 1943: 173). Indeed, for Hedenius it 
was important to show that he was part of a coherent international 
philosophical movement. That he (autobiographically) emphasised 
the influences from Cambridge over those from Vienna was 
perhaps only natural given Petzäll’s self-evident position as the 
main representative of logical empiricism in Sweden and the rather 
hostile confrontations between Uppsala philosophy and logical 
empiricism in Theoria during the late 1930s. 
                                                 
83 “Detta problem framstår alltmer som ett av filosofiens centralaste” and 
“…en sats’ mening utgörs av det sakförhållande, vars existens gör satsen 
sann”. 
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Be that as it may, from Hedenius’s perspective, the Cambridge 
School and logical empiricism belonged to the same larger move-
ment, a movement to which he also wanted to connect his own 
Uppsala philosophy. Even if influences from Moore and from 
logical empiricism moved Hedenius’s philosophical views away 
from the ideas of Hägerström and Phalén, it was by no means his 
intention to make a definitive break with the Hägerströmian legacy. 
On the contrary, his mission was to emphasise continuity and thus 
to claim the ownership of the Uppsala legacy. By colonising and 
redescribing (“improving”) Hägerström, Hedenius effectively 
started to create an image of Hägerström as the father of the 
Swedish analytic tradition (Strang I: 262-4). Hägerström’s own phi-
losophical intentions and contexts were repressed, and instead he 
was portrayed as a loner, an autodidact or something of a philoso-
phical oracle. In the beginning of Om rätt och moral Hedenius 
explicitly described Hägerström and Uppsala philosophy as “a 
similar and contemporaneous reaction against metaphysics as the 
Cambridge School and logical empiricism” (Hedenius 1941: 9).84 
Hedenius’ companions Marc-Wogau and Wedberg soon joined 
Hedenius in this construction of the Swedish analytic tradition. In 
his inaugural lecture “Uppsalafilosofin och den logiska empiris-
men” (1947) Marc-Wogau argued that Uppsala philosophy and 
logical empiricism were “united against a wide range of different 
movements in modern philosophy” (Marc-Wogau 1947: 49).85 
Marc-Wogau did note that there were significant differences 
between Hägerström and the logical empiricists, particularly 
regarding their views on natural science and formal logic, but he 
emphasised that these were points where “younger Uppsala 
philosophers had moved closer to the position of the logical 
empiricists” (Marc-Wogau 1947: 49).86 Similarly, when Gilbert 
Ryle’s (et al) famous book The Revolution in Philosophy (1956), which 
                                                 
84 “…en nära nog samtidig, rent av negativ reaktion mot den s.k. 
metafysiken”. He had written in a similar fashion in the journal Tiden a 
year earlier. See Hedenius 1940: 36-7. 
85 “…bilda gemensam front mot en hel rad andra riktningar i modern 
filosofi”. 
86 “…där yngre uppsalafilosofer närmat sig den logiska empirismens 
inställning”. 
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canonised Frege, Moore, the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein and 
ordinary language philosophy (Strawson) as a distinct revolutionary 
philosophical movement, was translated into Swedish, a chapter by 
Marc-Wogau on “Axel Hägerström och Uppsalafilosofin” was 
included. The preface explained the addition by claiming that the 
three most significant branches of modern scientific philosophy – 
“often called analytic philosophy” – are the Cambridge School, 
logical empiricism and Uppsala philosophy (Marc-Wogau & 
Wennerberg 1957: 7).87 Some years later, in a three-volume collec-
tion of central historical texts in philosophy, Filosofin genom tiderna, 
Marc-Wogau did not include a text by Hägerström or Phalén, but 
the Uppsala school was again mentioned – in the introduction to an 
excerpt from Carnap’s Aufbau – as a parallel to Russell, Moore and 
logical empiricism (Marc-Wogau 1964: 123).88 
Wedberg, the youngest of the three, was arguably less concerned 
with construing continuity between Uppsala philosophy and 
analytic philosophy. Instead he did his best to historicise Uppsala 
philosophy, i.e. to present it as a past stage in the development of 
analytic philosophy – or, in Jonas Schiött’s words, “as a talanted but 
uncultivated provincial cousin” of the Cambridge and Vienna 
Schools (Shiött 2000: 155).89 In the small two-piece pamphlet Den 
nya logiken I-II (1945a; 1945b) Wedberg argued that the analytical 
                                                 
87 “[De uppsatser som återges i det följande] behandlar den moderna 
vetenskapliga filosofin och i viss mån dess historiska utveckling. Det 
utmärkande draget i denna filosofi är dess avvisande inställning till 
metafysik och dess åsikt att filosofi är liktydig med vetenskaplig analys av 
de i vetenskapen använda grundläggande begreppen. Den kallas därför 
ofta analytisk filosofi. De mest betydande riktningarna inom denna filosofi 
är Cambridgeskolan (G. E. Moore och B. Russell m fl.), den logiska empi-
rismen (i dess tidiga skede Wienskolan, M. Schlick, R. Carnap m.fl) och 
Uppsalaskolan (A. Hägerström, A Phalén, m.fl). I den engelska upplagan 
av detta arbete har den sistnämnda riktningen inte behandlats. Det har 
därför ansetts lämpligt att den svenska upplagan kompletteras med en 
karekteristik av denna.” The preface was not signed, so it is a matter of 
speculation if it was the translator Hjalmar Wennerberg or Marc-Wogau 
himself who wrote these lines. 
88 Two years later, in his Filosofins historia Wedberg (1966: 366) repeated the 
same narrative of Hägerström’s philosophy as a parallel to the Cambridge 
School and logical empiricism. 
89 “...en begåvad men obildad kusin från landet”. 
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intentions of Hägerström had been honourable, but that his 
mission had been compromised by his poor insights into modern 
logic. According to Wedberg, this was the main reason for some of 
Hägerström’s paradoxical ideas, for example, that the concept of a 
“relation” was metaphysical (Wedberg 1945b: 5-6). 
In 1944 Wedberg published two articles on logical empiricism in 
the journal Theoria. The first was a review of von Wright’s textbook 
Den logiska empirismen (1944), which was welcomed by Wedberg “as 
the knowledge of logical empiricism in the Swedish philosophical 
world is deplorably scarce” (Wedberg 1944a: 78). The second was a 
critique of Carnap’s Aufbau (1928a), in which Wedberg argued that 
Carnap’s programme had failed and that the projected phenomena-
listic construction “remained but a mere philosophical hypothesis” 
(Wedberg 1944b: 246). Together the articles give a rather 
ambivalent picture of Wedberg’s familiarity with the recent devel-
opments of logical empiricism. While he criticised von Wright for 
remaining trapped in the past stages of the development of logical 
empiricism (Wedberg 1944a: 80), his own article on Aufbau 
appeared rather strange as by 1944 the phenomenalistic approach 
had long since been abandoned by leading logical empiricists, 
including Carnap himself (see e.g. Uebel 1992). The articles should 
perhaps be understood as moves by which Wedberg, in two 
different ways, tried to historicise logical empiricism in order to 
legitimise the emerging analytic philosophy. 
Hedenius, Marc-Wogau and Wedberg used international philos-
ophical ideas in order to overcome the Hägerströmian dominance 
that had been in their way in the early 1930s. They succeeded not 
by straightforward confrontation, but by monopolising the Häger-
strömian tradition and gradually replacing it with new ideas. In the 
late 1940s, Hedenius and Marc-Wogau obtained the Chairs in 
Philosophy in Uppsala, while Wedberg became Professor in 
Stockholm. Hedenius was also successfully able to replace Häger-
ström in the Swedish public debate as not only the main advocate 
of the value nihilistic theory, but also the leading “modern” 
philosopher-intellectual – a position he both used and strengthened 
through his infamous criticism of religion in Tro och vetande (1949b). 
The colonisation of Hägerström was a great success and was 
met with little opposition. Among the orthodox Hägerströmians it 
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was mainly the legal theoreticians Lundstedt and Olivecrona that 
protested, arguing that Hedenius had misunderstood and belittled 
Hägerström. According to Lundstedt, for example, Hedenius had 
trivialised the value theory and failed to acknowledge Hägerström’s 
true originality (Lundstedt 1942: 14). But also in legal theory there 
gradually emerged a second generation of Scandinavian legal realists 
who relied more on the tenets of logical empiricism than on Häger-
ström’s philosophy (Strang III).90 In the public debate, no one 
really noticed that Uppsala philosophy had gradually been furnished 
with new ideas.91 Neither did anyone notice that suddenly Uppsala 
philosophy had disappeared altogether. When no longer needed, 
Hägerström and Uppsala philosophy were rapidly disposed of; the 
references to Hägerström were replaced in the late 1940s with the 
great names in analytic philosophy. In 1949 it was not Hägerström 
but Charles Stevenson’s classic Ethics and Language (1944) that was 
hailed by Hedenius as the foremost representative of the value 
nihilistic theory (Hedenius 1949a: 211), and in 1954 Hedenius was 
already engaged with Richard Hare’s The Language of Morals (1952) 
(Petersson 2009a: 54-5). In just a few years, Uppsala philosophy, 
which had dominated the cultural and political debates in the 1930s, 
completely disappeared from the agenda. It had gradually been 
replaced by something which was coming to be known as “analytic 
philosophy”.   
 
c. The Hedenian moment 
 
Hedenius’s move of colonising the legacy of Hägerström in order 
to use it as an anchor for the introduction of a foreign philoso-
phical movement was undoubtedly a result of some innovative 
redescription and interpretation. But the amalgamation would 
hardly have succeeded if there had not been some similarities in the 
                                                 
90 Logical empiricism formed the philosophical starting point for not only 
Ross’s Om ret og retfærdighed (1953) but also, for example, Björn Ahlander’s 
Är juridiken en vetenskap? (1950). 
91 This was, according to Nordin (2004b: 170), one of Hedenius’s main 
advantages in the debate on his next book Tro och vetande (1949b). 
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philosophies of the Uppsala School and logical empiricism that he 
could take advantage of. Such common features were, for example, 
the interest in language and logical analysis, the anti-metaphysical 
attitude, and the basic idea of the value theory (see e.g. Nordin 
1983: 51, 157). Moreover, a striking similarity can also be found in 
the modernistic and progressive cultural and political atmosphere 
that surrounded the two movements. In the same way that the 
Vienna Circle was associated with Social Democracy, with the 
Freidenkerbund and with the Bauhaus movement, Uppsala philosophy 
was associated with progressive leftish politics, secularism, as well 
as functionalistic architecture.92 In this sense, there were also 
political and cultural factors that facilitated Hedenius’s move 
(Strang I: 259-60).93  
But this raises the question of why there had not been any 
attempts to merge Uppsala philosophy with logical empiricism 
before 1940. There seem to have been good prospects for a close 
collaboration between the movements at a much earlier stage. 
Marc-Wogau has argued that the similarities between Uppsala phi-
losophy and logical empiricism actually hampered the breakthrough 
of logical empiricism in Sweden. According to him, the anti-
metaphysical programme and emphasis of conceptual analysis were 
received with more scepticism in Uppsala and Sweden than in many 
other places where these ideas appeared as novel and revolutionary 
(Marc-Wogau 1949: 17).94 This is probably a fair point, even if 
Marc-Wogau’s judgement must be seen in the light of his own 
ambitions at the time, i.e. as part of the move in the making of 
Hägerström as the father of the Swedish analytic tradition. Of 
crucial importance was undoubtedly also the fact that Petzäll, with 
whom logical empiricism was long associated in Sweden, was a 
vehement opponent of Uppsala philosophy. For him, the Uppsala 
                                                 
92 On the cultural-political relations of the Vienna Circle, see e.g. Stadler 
1997: 178-94; Galison 1990; 1996. For the cultural-political relations of 
Uppsala philosophy, see e.g. Källström 1984: especially Chapters 2 and 3. 
93 This even if logical empiricism was actually used in a somewhat differ-
rent way, i.e. as an argument against the political radicalism of Uppsala 
philosophy. See below: 79. 
94 In an overview of Scandinavian philosophy written much later, von 
Wright (1972: 6) presents the same idea. 
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School represented a self-sufficient, doctrinaire, and sectarian 
philosophy that had nothing in common with the international and 
cross-disciplinary programme of logical empiricism. In fact, when 
Neurath, after discussions with Tegen and Ross in 1934, asked 
Petzäll for bibliographic data on Scandinavian members of the 
“empiristisch-logischer Zug”, Petzäll did not even understand that 
Neurath was referring to the Uppsala philosophers, about whom he 
had been informed by Alf Ross (Strang II: 79).95 
Despite some similarities, there was in the mid-1930s little that 
suggested that Uppsala philosophy and logical empiricism would 
jointly form the basis for a Swedish analytic tradition. There were 
fundamental philosophical disagreements on, for example, the 
nature of logical analysis, and the relation between philosophy and 
natural science, which surfaced not least in the debates in Theoria in 
1937 (Strang II, 78-83). When Hedenius, Marc-Wogau and Wed-
berg gradually converted from Uppsala philosophy towards analytic 
philosophy, it was not only a matter of innovative interpretation 
and redescription; it was also to a considerable extent a matter of 
timing. In fact, the move would hardly have been possible five or 
ten years earlier; around 1940 there were a number of factors that 
worked in their favour. 
First of all, Hägerström died in 1939. With him alive, the change 
would hardly have been possible.96 It is striking that this group of 
young Phalénians started to show a positive interest in Häger-
ström’s philosophy immediately after his death in 1939. While 
Hedenius focused on the value theory, Marc-Wogau wrote several 
articles on Hägerström’s ontology and epistemology (Marc-Wogau 
1940; 1946; 1949). Even if Marc-Wogau’s articles must be seen as 
candid efforts to make sense of Hägerström’s philosophy rather 
than attempts to redescribe him, they can nevertheless be under-
stood as moves to claim the right to interpret the Hägerströmian 
                                                 
95 See the correspondence between Petzäll and Neurath in November 
1934. The bibliographic data of leading members of “Die Richtung von 
Upsala (Schweden)” was eventually published at the end of a 30-page 
bibliography of the logical empiricist movement in Erkenntnis 1935: 427-8. 
96 In 1934, Hägerström defended his follower Lundstedt against criticisms 
by Hedenius and Wedberg, thus effectively denying them the right to 
interpret his legacy. See below: 83-4. 
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legacy. Hägerström’s death made it possible to discuss the Uppsala 
legacy without the great man interfering himself, and it was only 
now that it became possible, as in the case of Hedenius, to merge 
his ideas with a philosophy that he himself had opposed.97 
Secondly, the move was also aided by the fact that by 1940 
logical empiricism was by no means a novelty in the philosophical 
discussion in Sweden. Petzäll had published two studies on the 
movement, which, even if they failed to reach large recognition, 
undoubtedly made the Swedish philosophical community aware of 
the Vienna Circle (Petzäll 1931; 1935).98 Even more important in 
this respect was the strong position of logical empiricism in the 
neighbouring countries. The Nordic countries are good examples 
of nations with entangled histories; the relationship between the 
countries was (and is) close and in many ways self-evident. For 
example, even if the journal Theoria was launched and financed as a 
Swedish journal and in order to promote Swedish philosophy, it still 
had the explicit aim of furthering dialogue between the Nordic 
countries.99 And even if some members of the editorial board, most 
notably Marc-Wogau, were strongly opposed to Petzäll’s ambitions 
of internationalising the journal, no voices protested against the 
Nordic contributions. There was no conflict between the national 
and the Nordic, and even if there certainly were great differences in 
                                                 
97 Hägerström did not, to the best of my knowledge, directly comment on 
logical empiricism in his publications, but his negative attitude towards any 
contemporary philosophy, not least empiricism, certainly indicates that he 
was less than impressed with logical empiricism. Martin Fries, Häger-
ström’s disciple who was responsible for editing the Swedish translation of 
Hägerström 1929, claims that Hägerström, in refuting “the common 
movement in modern epistemology” [den vanliga riktningen i modern 
kunskapslära] was referring to logical empiricism. Hägerström 1929: 111, 
120. 
98 In his dissertation, Hedenius had himself referred critically to Carnap’s 
(1932: 240) famous statement that “metaphysicians are musicians without 
musical capacity”. According to Hedenius, at this time still very faithful to 
the Uppsala doctrines, this was to take the threat of metaphysics too 
lightly, as the dialectical nature of the metaphysical systems “reflects diffi-
culties inherent in our common-sense notions, difficulties that have not so 
far been solved by philosophical research” (Hedenius 1936: 10).   
99 This was programmatically stated in the first editorial of the journal in 
1935: v. 
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the philosophical traditions of the four countries, there was never-
theless a well-established practice of reading philosophical literature 
from the neighbouring countries. In the 1930s logical empiricism 
may not have had (m)any active proponents in Sweden, but it was 
nevertheless a living part of the Swedish philosophical scene 
through the writings of Kaila, Jørgensen, and soon also Næss.100 
Thirdly, the shift from Uppsala philosophy towards logical 
empiricism and analytic philosophy was also assisted in a direct and 
institutionalised way by the Nordic neighbours as Kaila, Jørgensen 
and Næss regularly figured among the referees in the professorial 
appointments in Sweden.101 These were splendid opportunities to 
make a long-lasting mark on the direction of Swedish philosophy. 
The most striking example was Kaila’s verdict in the race for the 
Chair in Theoretical Philosophy in 1945 (Strang I: 262). In Kaila’s 
view there was a main dividing line between the orthodox Häger-
strömian applicant Fries on the one hand, and the “Uppsala phi-
losophy in progress” represented by Hedenius, Marc-Wogau and 
Wedberg on the other (Kaila 1945-46: 12).102 Kaila strongly encour-
aged the interest that the younger generation of Uppsala philoso-
phers was showing in logical empiricism. He even promoted Hede-
nius over the more experienced Marc-Wogau, as Hedenius, accord-
ing to Kaila, was more original and independent, and because he 
was more rapidly than his competitors abandoning the Uppsala 
doctrines in favour of “the more advanced logical-empiristic (neo-
positivistic) platform” (Kaila 1945-46: 28).103 Even if Hedenius, as 
the far less experienced scholar, eventually lost the race to Marc-
Wogau, Kaila’s verdict made him an unchallenged favourite for the 
                                                 
100 In this sense the transfer of logical empiricism to Sweden can be seen 
as an example of what Michel Espagne calls “triangular transfers” 
(Espagne 1999: Chapter VIII, quoted by Nygård 2010 [forthcoming]). 
101 Foreign evaluators were often, in the name of impartiality, preferred 
over Swedish. However, as most works to be evaluated were written in 
Swedish the evaluators were often appointed from the neighbouring 
countries. 
102 “…en uppsalafilosofi i utveckling”. 
103 “…den mera avancerade logisk-empiriska (nypositivistiska) platt-
formen”. In the next breath, Kaila also notes that Hedenius himself 
seemed to believe that he still remained true to Uppsala philosophy. 
History, Transfer, Politics 
 
62 
next available Chair, which happened to be Hägerström’s old Chair 
in Practical Philosophy in Uppsala (Nordin 2004b: 126-9). 
It is also, fourthly, crucial to acknowledge that logical empiri-
cism itself had undergone a significant transformation during the 
1930s, evolving from a small and rather informal discussion group 
into “something more nearly resembling a political party” (Ayer 
1959: 4), aggressively promoting the Unity of Science programme 
in its search for international allies. Logical empiricism had become 
a focal point of the international philosophical discussion. Its 
philosophy had been presented in a number of popular and 
widespread introductions such as Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic 
(1936), Carnap’s small pamphlets in the Psyche miniature series The 
Unity of Science (1934) and Philosophy and Logical Syntax (1935), and 
von Mises’ Kleines Lehrbuch der Positivismus (1939). Indeed, the 
Vienna Circle had been transformed into an international Unity of 
Science movement that hosted a number of international publica-
tion series, and organised annual congresses. The leading light of 
this expansion and internationalisation was Neurath, who in the 
spring of 1934 had been forced into exile in The Hague, and who 
spent much time travelling and organising different events and 
giving lectures on the Unity of Science, as well as on the method of 
picture statistics (ISOTYPE) (Cartwright et al 1996: 63-88). In the 
autumn of 1934, Neurath made a trip to Scandinavia giving lectures 
in Copenhagen, Lund, Oslo, and Gothenburg, which were un-
doubtedly very important in establishing closer relations between 
the logical empiricists and the Swedish philosophers.104 It was 
Petzäll who arranged Neurath’s lectures in Gothenburg, and he also 
invited Neurath and other leading members of the movement to 
participate in the discussion in Theoria. During the same trip 
Neurath also made contact with Ross who seems to have been the 
first to direct Neurath’s attention to the teachings of Hägerström 
and the Uppsala School (Strang II: 79).105 Among the Swedish 
                                                 
104 Carnap also visited the Nordic countries in the 1930s (see e.g. Nordin 
1983: 146). 
105 Ross was later central in introducing logical empiricism into the Nordic 
legal theoretical discussion, where he joined Hedenius in merging it with 
the legacy of Uppsala philosophy. See Strang III: 73-7. 
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Uppsala philosophers, Tegen was the first to come into contact 
with the logical empiricists. Serving as Professor of Practical 
Philosophy in Lund he attended Neurath’s lecture in 1934 and in 
the correspondence that followed Neurath persuaded Tegen to 
participate in the first international congress for Unity of Science in 
Paris 1935, which, however, proved to be a disappointing expe-
rience for Tegen (Strang II: 81).  
Thus, the central position of logical empiricism in not only the 
international, but also, fifthly, in the Nordic philosophical discus-
sion, was undoubtedly an important factor that contributed to the 
success of Hedenius’s (and his collaborators’) move to merge 
logical empiricism with the Uppsala legacy. The most revealing sign 
of how well-established the relations between Scandinavia and 
logical empiricism were in the mid-1930s was the fact that the 
Second Congress for the Unity of Science was arranged in Copen-
hagen in 1936.106 This was an event of great magnitude for the 
Nordic philosophical community, and it was naturally attended by 
some Uppsala philosophers as well (at least Marc-Wogau, Tegen 
and Ross). It was at this congress that Petzäll launched his plans for 
an extensive internationalisation of his journal Theoria by, for 
example, organising a debate between logical empiricism (Frank) 
and Uppsala philosophy (Oxenstierna) that appeared in 1937. 
Finally, the shift from Uppsala philosophy to analytic philos-
ophy must also be seen in connection with the general cultural shift 
towards the English-speaking world (Strang I: 237). Whereas the 
Swedes had previously looked to Germany for the latest inno-
vations in art, music and literature, the United States gradually 
emerged as the new cultural centre for the Nordic countries during 
the 1930s and 40s. The academic world was no exception; the 
Americanisation of science, medicine, and especially social science 
was facilitated not least by generous scholarships by American 
agencies such as the Rockefeller foundation (see e.g. Thue 2006: 
157-62). The transformation from Uppsala philosophy to analytic 
philosophy fits well into this general picture, and it is after all, 
                                                 
106 The sixth congress for Unity of Science was set to take place with Næss 
in Oslo in 1940, but the Nazi occupation cancelled the plans. See e.g. 
Stadler 1997: 391; 2010: 26-7. 
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perhaps no great surprise that it was allowed to transpire in a rather 
unproblematic and even unnoticed manner. 
 
d. Uppsala – a self-sufficient periphery?  
 
An important question that needs to be addressed is why Hedenius 
anchored the new ideas that he imported from abroad in the 
domestic and local Uppsala tradition? Why did he not simply 
profile himself as a logical empiricist, as a follower of Moore, or as 
an analytic philosopher, and in explicit opposition to the Uppsala 
legacy? There are several reasons that must be taken into account. 
First of all, it must be emphasised that by 1940 there was no single 
rising philosophical movement to which Hedenius and his collabo-
rators could associate themselves. Logical empiricism was dispersed 
around the world and its main organ, Erkenntnis, was closed down. 
The Cambridge philosophers Moore and Russell were arguably no 
longer the latest fashion, and analytic philosophy had yet to 
establish itself as a definite movement. Secondly, it must also be 
judged from a personal perspective. Hedenius, Marc-Wogau and 
Wedberg had been philosophically brought up within the Uppsala 
School, and it was arguably only natural that they conceived of and 
presented the shift as a gradual one (Nordin 1983: 216). Thirdly, 
the central cultural-political position of Uppsala philosophy in the 
Swedish debates made it a desirable prey. By emerging as the new 
Hägerström, Hedenius acquired a natural position as a leading intel-
lectual in Sweden. But finally, it can also, from a sociological 
perspective, be argued that the academic culture in Sweden or 
Uppsala at the time was such that it was impossible for Hedenius to 
play the foreign card as a trump. Instead, in order to succeed with 
the transfer of logical empiricism to Uppsala and Sweden, he 
needed to elaborate the more sophisticated strategy of smuggling it 
in the disguise of Hägerström’s value theory. 
The discussion on cultural transfers, transnationale Geschichte and 
histoire croisée has mainly been a French and German discourse, with 
some occasional glances to other large cultures such as the Untied 
States, Great Britain, or Russia. It is, as the Finnish historian Henrik 
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Stenius rightly points out, not very often that the peculiar con-
ditions, problems and challenges involved in “asymmetrical trans-
fers”, between the large “centres” and smaller “peripheries” where 
the degree of reciprocity is rather small, have been recognised 
(Stenius 2004: 176). It cannot be denied that the intellectual life in 
the periphery consists to a large extent of discussions that mirror 
the debates and positions in the centres. But this does not mean 
that scientific and intellectual ideas are produced only in the 
centres, from where they are transmitted to the passive peripheries 
where, in turn, faithfulness to the original is a measure of success 
(Guillem-Llobat 2008: 292-4). The recent discussion on cultural 
transfers can undoubtedly provide useful tools by which a static 
centre-periphery model can be overcome, without pretending that 
there is not a peculiar logic involved in asymmetrical transfers. 
Even when the outskirts of the intellectual republic are concerned, 
cultural transfers are hardly ever questions of passive reception 
(Nygård 2008: 9-23). Rather, in the same way as in transfers 
between two large and symmetrical cultures, the national context 
often determines both what and how ideas are transferred. It is 
important to analyse the different selective and instrumental ways 
by which small country intellectuals approach the centres in order 
to gain cultural capital to be used at home. 
The intellectual life in the peripheries can also be understood in 
terms of what Pauli Kettunen, in his studies on the history of the 
Nordic Welfare State, has labelled “the avantgardism of the 
intellectual elite of a peripheral country” (Kettunen 2008: 136).107 
Kettunen gives examples of how social politicians of a “backward” 
periphery such as Finland travelled to more “advanced” countries 
in order to be able to anticipate solutions to problems that had not 
yet emerged at home. Even if philosophical problems arguably 
cannot be anticipated in the same manner as social problems, the 
study trips and the references to the philosophical centres never-
theless often played a similar role in setting the agenda in the 
domestic discussions. It was not only a matter of “catching up”, but 
also of defining philosophy and the tasks of an intellectual on the 
                                                 
107 “...perifeerisen maan oppineen eliitin avantgardismi”. See Kettunen 
2006: 37-8 for an English discussion of the phenomenon. 
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basis of the foreign experiences. In a small periphery novel philoso-
phies can rapidly become dominant trends if they are adopted and 
promoted by the right people, in the right way, at the right time. 
The tenets of logical empiricism were at a strikingly early stage 
made part of the reading list at many Nordic universities, and thus 
this “backward periphery” came to establish itself in the forefront 
of the international philosophical discussion (albeit within a very 
specific part of it).108 
The smallness of the Nordic countries might have contributed 
to the dominance of analytic philosophy in the mid-20th century, as 
it contributed to the idealistic dominance a century before. The 
number of chairs in philosophy was rather small and the reigning 
professors were often were called upon to give assessments of the 
candidates for a vacant chair, and thus a leading tradition could 
easily become dominant, even hegemonic. Within a few years after 
the Second World War, and with considerable help from their 
Nordic colleagues, the analytic school had claimed nearly all the 
chairs in philosophy in Sweden. On the other hand, the smallness 
and peripheral location might also prevent the leading philosophical 
tradition from becoming dogmatically hegemonic. Small peripheral 
countries are by necessity “translation cultures”, and thus a small-
country intellectual is arguably more likely to be aware of the 
existence of different academic and philosophical discourses, and, 
indeed, of different competing intellectual centres (Stenius 2004: 
176-80). In the periphery it is self-evident that one has to position 
and define oneself not only domestically, but also in relation to 
foreign intellectual cultures. In this way translation, transfers and 
reflexivity form unavoidable parts of the intellectual discussion to a 
greater extent than in larger cultures where universalistic modes of 
thinking are closer at hand (Casanova 1999: 41, 43).109 Moreover 
                                                 
108 As early as 1929 Kaila ordered ten copies of Carnap’s Abriss der logistik 
(1929) in order to use them in his teaching (Niiniluoto 2006: 186). The 
Nordic philosophers were also early in producing rather programmatically 
logical empiricist textbooks in their native languages. See e.g. Jørgensen 
1942; Kaila 1939; Næss 1941a; 1941b; von Wright 1943. 
109 As Jani Marjanen (2009) points out, references and connotations to 
foreign countries and languages were (and are) omnipresent in a minority 
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the intellectuals of the periphery are perhaps not forced to position 
themselves as aggressively as their colleagues in the intellectual 
centres where schools and movements are often gathered and 
institutionalised at different universities and departments. The fact 
that representatives of different philosophical movements were 
forced to meet each other on a daily basis at a small peripheral 
university such as the one in Helsinki might have prevented many 
academic disputes from developing into fierce antagonisms 
(Nygård 2008: 9). In this way, the peripheries can become venues 
for discussions between different intellectual movements that are 
hardly ever confronted in the centres, thus providing a fruitful soil 
for creative thinking beyond conventional borders (Casanova 1999: 
43; Skirbekk 1997: 10). For example, both von Wright and Næss 
made early and widely recognised attempts at bridging the gulf 
between analytic and continental philosophy (Næss 1965; von 
Wright 1971). 
However, the problems and challenges of the periphery were 
undoubtedly framed in a different way in Sweden than they were in 
Finland and Norway.110 It was by no means self evident for 
Swedish intellectuals to conceive of themselves as belonging to a 
cultural periphery in the same way as it was for their neighbours. 
Swedish intellectuals were less concerned with looking abroad in 
order to catch up with, or to imitate, foreign developments, and in 
this sense Sweden can be conceived of as a more self-sufficient 
intellectual culture than its Nordic neighbours (Nygård & Strang 
2006: 9-10). While in Finland and Norway it was seen as a merit 
and advantage to be in contact with a celebrated foreign philoso-
pher or school, such connections were more often received with 
suspicion in Sweden. While Kaila and Næss were able to use their 
                                                                                                  
language such as Finnish, and thus it is difficult to pretend that there is a 
universally accepted meaning of, for example, “liberalism”. 
110 Denmark, in turn, has traditionally played the role of a regional centre 
through which foreign ideas have been transmitted to the more peripheral 
parts of the Nordic countries. In philosophy Harald Høffding (1843-1931) 
is more than anyone associated with this role (see e.g. Heidegren 2004: 
510-23; Nygård 2008: 143.) One could argue that Jørgensen, at least to 
some extent, (for example by arranging the congress in 1936) continued 
this legacy. 
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contacts with the Vienna Circle as trumps in the domestic 
meritocratic struggles,111 this was not possible for Petzäll in Sweden 
(Strang II: 88-9). This is not necessarily to say that Swedish intel-
lectuals were less dependent on cultural imports than their Finnish 
or Norwegian colleagues. It merely meant that they had to present 
foreign ideas in a different way. When Hedenius brought logical 
empiricism to Uppsala and Sweden during the 1940s, he seldom 
used the term “logical empiricism” or explicit references to foreign 
philosophers. Instead, logical empiricism was introduced in the veil 
of Hägerström, and thus effectively as a continuation of a national 
tradition (Strang I; Strang II). In this sense, Hedenius’s move of 
strongly anchoring foreign ideas to a national tradition is more akin 
to how cultural imports are performed in larger, more self-
sufficient, cultures than in dependent peripheral cultures like 
Finland. For example, when introducing logical empiricism to 
Great Britain with his famous Language, Truth and Logic in 1936, 
Ayer portrayed the new philosophy as “the logical outcome” of the 
British empiricist tradition (Ayer 1936: 31).112 
The difference between the self-sufficient Swedish and the 
dependent Finnish and Norwegian intellectual cultures can, on the 
one hand, be seen in connection with a general turning point in 
Swedish political and cultural life. As previously mentioned, in the 
1930s Sweden evolved from being a poor, small and peripheral 
country, to a modernistic beacon that had little to learn from the 
outside world (see above: 24-5). On the other hand, the difference 
between Sweden and Finland can also be traced back to at least the 
19th century. While German Hegelianism enjoyed nothing less than 
a hegemonic position in Finnish philosophy during the 19th century, 
                                                 
111 For a discussion of the turns regarding the appointment of Kaila to the 
Chair in Philosophy in Helsinki 1930, see Niiniluoto 2006: 171-5. For a 
discussion of the appointment of Næss in Oslo 1938, see Thue 1997: 47-9; 
2006: 127-30. 
112 Ayer (1936: 31-2) began his book by declaring that his views “derive 
from the doctrines of Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein, which are 
themselves the logical outcome of the empiricism of Berkeley and Hume”. 
On the next page he claimed, “the philosophers with whom I am in the 
closest agreement are those who compose ‘the Viennese Circle’ [...] com-
monly known as logical positivists”. 
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not least through the national philosopher Johan Vilhelm Snellman 
(Manninen 1996: 175-248),113 the vastly influential Swedish 19th 
century idealist, Professor of Practical philosophy 1840-1866, 
Christopher Jacob Boström, was conceived of as an indigenous 
national philosopher and was often explicitly defined in contrast to 
Hegelianism (Heidegren 2004: 293-315; Nordin 1981: 47-58). 
Arguably, however, this must not merely be interpreted as a 
difference in national culture. The situation in Sweden was more 
like that in the greater European countries, where different intel-
lectual and philosophical traditions and cultures were concentrated 
around different universities, departments and chairs. The main 
dividing line in the Swedish philosophical scene was between the 
two old universities, Uppsala and Lund (and their respective allies, 
Stockholm and Göteborg).114 To a certain extent it is possible to 
interpret Lund as a “periphery” in which it was important to use 
foreign references as alternatives to the universalistic and hegemo-
nic claims of the “centre” Uppsala. For example, Johan Jacob 
Borelius (1823-1909) had in the 19th century represented a Lunden-
sian Hegelian opposition to the Boströmian dominance much in 
the same way as Petzäll tried to introduce logical empiricism as an 
alternative to the Hägerströmian school. On the other hand, the 
(comparative) internationalism of Lund must also be understood in 
terms of its geographical location close to Copenhagen, which 
made relations not only to Denmark but also to the European 
continent, easier and more natural than in Uppsala. In any case, it 
was hardly a surprise that the journal Theoria was founded and led 
by Petzäll in Göteborg and later Lund; or that Cassirer was invited 
to Göteborg; and that the philosophers in Lund were the first to 
come into contact with the logical empiricists. From this perspec-
tive, my study on “Theoria and Logical Empiricism” not only 
concerns the confrontations between Swedish intellectuals and an 
international philosophical movement, but also the struggles 
                                                 
113 Norwegian 19th-century philosophy was also largely dominated by a 
Hegelian, Marcus Jacob Monrad (1816-97). 
114 The division was, however, not without exceptions. Einar Tegen, for 
example, was Professor of Practical Philosophy in Lund in 1931-37 before 
moving over to Stockholm. 
History, Transfer, Politics 
 
70 
between two different academic cultures in Sweden. Petzäll’s 
efforts to internationalise the journal were repeatedly met with 
resistance from the Uppsala faction in the editorial board, not least 
by the Uppsala philosopher Marc-Wogau (Strang II: 72-4). 
 
 
iv. Politics 
 
a. Philosophy and politics 
 
It was largely the position of Uppsala philosophy in the Swedish 
cultural and political debates that made it so important for the 
younger generation. It is therefore necessary to give considerable 
weight to politics as an important aspect of the field in which these 
intellectuals manoeuvred. But if the relation between philosophy 
and history is complex and troublesome, the relation between 
philosophy and politics arguably raises even more methodological 
challenges. Philosophy is often conceived of as primary and some-
times even foundational to political praxis. Philosophers are pic-
tured as visionaries that from the safe academic distance of their 
university offices or, perhaps, from their eremite cottages in the 
mountains, construe political ideologies and models that, to various 
degrees of success, are adopted and implemented by politicians “in 
real life”. Certainly, studies that discuss the impact of “positivistic 
philosophy” on 20th century society or Hägerström’s influence on the 
Swedish welfare state might certainly constitute important contri-
butions to the current political debate.115 However, as historical 
accounts they tend to be misleading, not only because they give too 
much weight to philosophers and their ideas – philosophers are 
rarely kings and the general public and politicians are often wise 
enough not to be too influenced by their ideas, but also, and even 
more importantly, because they fail to acknowledge that the philos-
ophers themselves are participants in political life. Philosophical 
ideas, theories and texts are seldom intended as complete and 
coherent ideologies – as models applicable in any given society – 
but rather as contributions to particular philosophical and political 
debates in particular historical contexts. In this sense, the idea of 
the eremite philosopher is surely a misleading myth. 
                                                 
115 For studies that go in this direction, see e.g. Bexell 1995 and Sigurdson 
2000. 
History, Transfer, Politics 
 
72 
It should be emphasised, again, that my intention is not to argue 
that the history of philosophy should be understood or studied as 
mere epiphenomena of economic or social structures. The claim, to 
repeat what has been said earlier, is not that the historical-political 
context determines the actions of the individual; instead the context 
should be understood as a Spielraum in which actors make their 
moves, which simultaneously constitutes a background against 
which their actions can be interpreted by the historian. The aim of 
my studies has neither been to analyse the political effects of 
Uppsala philosophy or logical empiricism, nor to scrutinise the 
relation between an alleged philosophical superstructure and a 
certain social-political basis. Rather, the intention has been to look 
at how a number of philosophers and intellectuals manoeuvred in a 
historical context that was largely defined by certain political chal-
lenges. This is in Kari Palonen’s words to follow “the Skinnerian 
revolution in the study of political thought”, i.e. to shift the 
perspective from an analysis of thoughts and theories applied to a 
separate sphere of politics, to an analysis of thoughts and theories 
as moves in the political world itself (Palonen 2003b: 3, 175). Phi-
losophical ideas are not examined as answers to perennial philoso-
phical problems, but as attempts to overcome challenges raised by 
the particular historical situation. 
There are many recent studies that have with great success 
applied a historical-political perspective to the philosophers and 
philosophies of the 1930s and 40s.116 For example, by turning the 
attention from the customary discussion of the possible influences 
of (mainly, Hegelian) philosophy on the politics of the Third Reich 
to an examination of the philosophers as actors in this turbulent 
political period, Hans Sluga has been able to argue that it was not 
so much a case of politicians making use of philosophers and 
philosophies, as of philosophers making use of Nazism for differ-
                                                 
116 Inspiring examples of similar studies on a period preceding the 1930s 
are Kusch’s (1995) examination of the fall of naturalistic philosophy in 
Germany between 1880 and 1920, and Nordin’s (1998) vivid presentation 
of (mainly German and French) philosophers and their activities during 
the First World War. 
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ent opportunistic purposes (Sluga 1993: 15).117 Moreover, as hinted 
above, the political perspective has also proved fruitful in the recent 
reassessment of logical empiricism. Many studies have emphasised 
the political context in which the Vienna Circle was formed – their 
relations to the Monists, the Freethinkers, the Bauhaus movement, 
and to the labour organisations – and argued that it cannot be 
viewed as essentially separate from the philosophical programme of 
the circle.118 The increasing political polarisation of Austria pro-
vides a background that cannot be overlooked when accounting for 
the formation of the programmatic Unity of Science movement, its 
interest in international collaboration, and also the hostile attitude 
of many logical empiricists towards what they conceived of as 
reactionary and metaphysical philosophies, particularly Heidegger. 
The political dimension of logical empiricism was also central to 
how the Vienna Circle was understood in its domestic context. As 
pointed out by Friedrich Stadler, the official organisation of the 
group, the Verein Ernst Mach, was dissolved as a Social Democratic 
organisation when the Austro-fascists of Engelbert Dollfuss gained 
power in 1934 (Stadler 2001: 61, 582). Eventually the rise of 
fascism and finally the Anschluss meant the exodus of logical empiri-
cism from the European continent. It has even been argued that 
the post-war divide between analytic and continental philosophy 
was largely an indirect consequence of the political development 
around the Second World War, as most of the logical empiricists 
remained in the United States after the war (Collins 1998: 751-3; 
Simons 2001; Sluga 1993: 11; Strang I: 242-3). George Reisch, in 
turn, has analysed the transformation and depoliticisation of logical 
empiricism after the move over to the United States, particularly 
during the era of McCarthyism in the early Cold War period 
(Reisch 2005). 
                                                 
117 Sluga (1993: 147-8) is, however, cautious not to reduce philosophy to 
politics, as he argues that this was one of the main problems with 
Bourdieu’s (1988) analysis of Heidegger’s political ontology. 
118 Some significant examples of studies that have utilised a political per-
spective on logical empiricism are: Cartwright et al 1996; Dahms 1994; 
Gabriel 2004; Galison 1990; 1996; Heidelberger & Stadler (eds.) 2003; 
Howard 2003; Nemeth 1981; Reisch 2005; Richardson & Uebel 2007 
(particularly part one); Stadler 1997; Uebel 2004; 2005. 
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My studies contribute to this discussion by proceeding from the 
idea that the relation between the Uppsala philosophers and politics 
should be studied not so much in terms of how much, for example, 
the Nordic welfare state originates in, or was influenced by, the 
philosophical ideas of Hägerström and Hedenius, but rather, in 
terms of how the actors themselves tried to make sense of their 
philosophy in a historical context that was largely defined by the 
threat of totalitarianism on the one hand, and the rise of the 
Swedish people’s home on the other. The aim of my studies has 
been to read the authors in a political way, i.e. to interpret their 
writings as actions, or moves, in a particular political context. 
It must be emphasised that not all the intellectuals examined in 
my studies were active in party politics. In fact, it was only Gunnar 
Myrdal, Herbert Tingsten and Alf Ross who were members or 
active supporters of the Social Democrats, and among them it was 
only Myrdal who can be considered to have been a leading, albeit 
very controversial, ideologist of the party.119 By contrast, Tingsten 
became one of the most famous renegades of the Social Demo-
cratic party, abandoning it in 1945 and quickly establishing himself 
as a major critic of Social Democracy from his position as editor-in-
chief of the leading liberal newspaper in Sweden, Dagens Nyheter 
(1946-59). Ross supported Social Democracy in the years that 
followed the Second World War, but was by no means a pivotal 
figure for the party (Strang IV: 58-9).120 The professional philoso-
phers discussed in my studies were even less involved in party 
politics. Hägerström himself had undoubtedly been sympathetic 
with the labour movement, although he vehemently criticised teleo-
logical elements in Marxism (Källström 1984: 101; Nordin 1983: 
48-9; Sigurdson 2000: 69-70). Hedenius, in turn, swung between the 
                                                 
119 Bo Rothstein (2002: 206-25) has argued that Alva and Gunnar Myrdal 
had a rather small influence on the practical decisions in comparison to 
Gustav Möller, the Minister of Social Affairs (1924-26 and 1932-51). 
However, following Götz (2002: 37-40) the difference between the visions 
of Möller and the Myrdals was marginal. In any case, as public intellectuals 
and agenda setters, the Myrdals must be seen as very important, and their 
position in modern Swedish history is almost mythological. 
120 Some years later, in 1966, Ross also broke with Social Democracy. See 
e.g. Fonsmark 1990: 62-5. 
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Social Democrats and the Liberals (Folkpartiet), whom his wife 
represented in the municipal council (Nordin 2004b: 315). Except 
for their criticism of Marxism, there are few signs of political 
engagement in the writings of Marc-Wogau and Wedberg. 
But this relative lack of party-political engagement does not 
mean that the philosophical and theoretical writings of these 
intellectuals were without political connotations. Indeed, one of the 
main benefits of a Skinnerian perspective on the relation between 
philosophy and politics is that one can avoid generalising and 
essentialising claims that the Uppsala School was a Social Demo-
cratic philosophy without abandoning the idea that the historical 
actors nevertheless conceived of their philosophical and political 
ambitions as intimately connected. The threat of totalitarianism and 
the rise of the Swedish people’s home were significant aspects of 
the historical context even if the ambitions of the intellectuals were 
not explicitly party-political. 
 
b. Value nihilism and politics 
 
It was, above all, Hägerström’s value nihilistic theory that gave 
Uppsala philosophy its political significance. Even if, from the 
perspective of disciplinary philosophy, Hägerström has been por-
trayed as a turning point, and as the first philosopher to deny value 
judgements truth value altogether,121 his theory must from a his-
torical perspective be seen as a continuation of the cultural radical 
heritage from the 1880s (Wiklund 2006: 149-57; Östling 2008: 199-
200). The value nihilistic theory was used as part of a radical and 
progressive cultural and political rhetoric that aimed to overcome 
traditional and conservative views in favour of social and political 
reforms (see e.g. Källström 1986: Chapters 3-5). This was undoubt-
edly also largely the source of the great symbolic value of Häger-
ström for the younger generation. 
Hägerström’s value theory has always been controversial. Its 
critics conceived of it as a culturally and politically dangerous 
                                                 
121 See e.g. Danielsson 1990: 13. 
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philosophy that undermined the conditions for a traditional and 
humanist morality. With the rise of totalitarianism on the European 
continent and eventually the Second World War, these critical 
voices gained strength. The value nihilistic theory was accused of 
preaching that everything is allowed, or of leaving people in a 
spiritual void which was being exploited by destructive forces 
(Källström 1986: 110-6; Strang IV: 38-40). Accordingly, the young 
generation of value nihilists found themselves in a position where 
the theory that they supported (and were establishing themselves as 
the main representatives of) was under increasing political fire. The 
situation prompted a reply, and it was not only a matter of finding 
an answer that would satisfy themselves and their critics; it was 
also, to a considerable extent (especially for the philosopher Hede-
nius), a matter of saving the reputation of Uppsala philosophy. It is 
important to notice that the intellectuals never seemed to consider 
abandoning the value nihilistic theory. Value nihilism constituted a 
central part of their worldview, and instead they put much effort 
into elaborating and redescribing it. 
My studies can be said to examine three different but closely 
related topics that emerged from the political context of the late 
1930s; “juridical rights” (Strang III), “democracy” (Strang IV), and 
“social engineering” (Strang V).  
 
(1) The problem of juridical rights emerged largely from the legal 
theoretician Vilhelm Lundstedt’s extensive use of Hägerströmian 
slogans such as “there are no rights” and “the notion of rights is 
meaningless and metaphysical” for radical purposes in both 
scholarly and political debates during the 1920s and 30s (see e.g. 
Källström 1991: 14-31). This caused much frustration, not least as 
the legal sovereignty of the Nordic countries was under increasing 
threat from revolutionary political movements and also from 
foreign armed forces. Approaching the Second World War critics 
noted that the Hägerströmians, in their strict separation of law and 
morals, were forced to accept that the Nazi system was a “legal 
order” in the same way as any democratic “legal order”. To make 
things even worse, in 1939, in a well-written and succinct 
presentation of the Hägerström’s legal philosophy, the Häger-
strömian disciple Olivecrona made use of the Uppsala philoso-
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phical criticism of the notion of “legal rights” as part of an 
argument in support of the strongest power in Europe (Olivecrona 
1940b: 226-9; 1940c: 195-8).122 In this situation it became a pressing 
task for the younger generation of Uppsala philosophers not only 
to find a way in which totalitarian legal systems could be criticised, 
but also to save the notion of “legal rights” (Strang III: 68-73). 
(2) This discussion was, of course, intimately connected to the 
problem of justifying democracy. Several critics claimed that there was 
some kind of connection between the moral “relativism” or 
“nihilism” of Hägerström and the rise of totalitarianism on the 
European continent – that value nihilism formed a theoretical 
foundation of the modern totalitarian states and thus it became 
important for the value nihilists to find ways in which democracy 
could be defended despite the value nihilistic theory (Strang IV).  
(3) Finally, the problem of reconciling value nihilism with a strong pro-
gramme for social reform, or social engineering, is in the present studies 
primarily examined as a personal struggle in the development of 
Gunnar Myrdal’s ideas on social engineering (Strang V). While 
Myrdal in the late 1920s and early 30s primarily used Hägerström 
and the value nihilistic theory as a critical weapon by which he 
unveiled the concealed political aims, “the hidden value premises”, 
in the theories of his scholarly opponents, it soon became apparent 
for him that the same arguments could be directed at his own 
normative programme. From 1932 onwards, Myrdal’s main meth-
odological challenge was to elaborate ways in which the social 
scientist was able to propose certain political and social reforms 
without violating the Hägerströmian premises.  
 
The three challenges were, of course, intimately related to each 
other; not only because most of the intellectuals examined in my 
studies were supporters of both democracy and (Social Demo-
cratic) social reforms, but also because the challenges basically 
concerned the same problem: how can the value nihilistic theory be 
combined with a strong normative political conviction and pro-
gramme? If value statements cannot be true or false, how is it 
                                                 
122 In a subsequent pamphlet, England eller Tyskland (1940a), Olivecrona 
explicitly gave his support to Germany. 
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possible to justify legal rights, democracy or social reforms – 
indeed, how is it possible to justify anything? My studies argue that 
the younger generation of Uppsala philosophers looked for a 
solution to the challenges in two separate directions. On the one 
hand, they often stressed the responsibility and fate of the 
individual to make a personal moral decision, and in this sense they 
expressed an almost existentialist view on morals. On the other 
hand, they often seemed to argue that there was, as a matter of 
(empirical) fact, a strong consensus on a basic set of fundamental 
values and that these shared values could be taken as a starting 
point in an instrumental argument in favour of democracy or social 
engineering. 
The usual response of the value nihilists to the charges that their 
theory, in one way or another, led to the decline of civilisation, to 
the rise of totalitarianism or to a practical nihilism (according to 
which everything is allowed), was to insist on a strict epistemo-
logical division between fact and value, between science (veten-
skap)123 and morals (moral). As a scientific theory on the proper 
analysis of moral judgement, they argued, value nihilism could not 
serve as a basis for any normative moral judgement, not even one 
that claimed that everything is allowed (e.g. Hedenius 1941: 145-6). 
In this connection, the younger generation, and particularly 
Hedenius, also distanced themselves from paragraphs in which 
Hägerström suggested that the value nihilistic theory would have 
positive emancipatory effects, and that it would lead to a more 
humane and understanding moral.124 To follow Nordin, Hedenius 
reduced the significance of value nihilism, which for Hägerström 
had been a concern for nations and peoples, to a rather specific 
theory, of interest mainly to academic philosophers (Nordin 2004b: 
107). 
Nevertheless, the younger generation of value nihilists empha-
sised that the distinction between science and morals, between 
meaningful and meaningless sentences, was not to be understood as 
a claim that ethics and values were unimportant. On the contrary, 
                                                 
123 The Swedish word “vetenskap” is akin to the German “Wissenchaft” 
and is accordingly used also of the humanities and the social sciences. 
124 See e.g. Hägerström 1911: 63; 1934b: 92. 
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they were keen on stressing that the value nihilistic theory did not 
prevent anyone from having or expressing strong moral beliefs. 
“Because a point of view is a point of view and not a scientific 
truth, it naturally does not follow from this that one cannot have 
some point of view”, Ross argued in his book Hvorfor Demokrati? 
(Ross 1946: 182).125 Thus, even if Ross admitted that the Nazi laws, 
precisely like the laws of a democratic country, formed a “legal 
order”, he insisted that one could, as he did, conceive of it as one’s 
highest moral obligation to do whatever it takes to destroy that 
order (Ross 1953: 44). Indeed, from the point of view of Hedenius 
and Ross, it was one of the main strengths of their theory that they 
could distinguish the fundamental and important political and 
moral questions, such as the one between democracy and totalitar-
ianism, from the mere empirical and scientific questions of how a 
legal system is construed (Blandhol 1999: 21). From their per-
spective, they defended the autonomy of morality and the integrity 
of the individual from alleged moral authorities that by means of 
rational-scientific arguments tried to prove that a certain moral 
behaviour was correct. Everyone is free to choose his or her own 
values, but must also be responsible for his or her choices, they 
argued. On this point the value nihilists seemed, as Bo Petersson 
has noted, to nurse ideas parallel to contemporaneous existentialists 
such as Jean Paul Sartre (Petersson 2009b: 59). Indeed, Bernt 
Skovdal points out that one of the few times Tingsten tried to make 
a moral appeal for democracy, he did it by referring to Sartre and 
by stressing that “we are alone, and the responsibility is ours” 
(Skovdal 1992: 404; Tingsten 1948: 303).126 
It might strike a contemporary reader as surprising that in this 
way the value nihilists expressed lines reminiscent of existentialism; 
not least as they were often rather hostile towards existentialism in 
their efforts to legitimise their own school of philosophy (see 
below: Chapter iv.c). But the connection is by no means absurd. In 
his examination of the circle around Arne Næss, Fredrik Thue 
                                                 
125 “Fordi et Standpunkt er et Standpunkt og ikke en videnskabelig Sandhed, følger 
heraf naturligvis ikke, at man ikke kan have noget Standpunkt.” Ross emphasised 
the argument by printing it in italics.  
126 “Vi är ensamma, och ansvaret är vårt”. See also Strang IV: 49. 
History, Transfer, Politics 
 
80 
notes an “underlying ambivalent attraction” towards the funda-
mental existentialist theme of human freedom and responsibility 
among many of Næss’ students (Thue 2006: 411-4). Gottfried 
Gabriel and Thomas Mormann, in turn, have argued that Carnap’s 
emotivism was largely rooted in German Lebensphilosophie, and thus 
anchored in the idea that morals and politics was based on a 
Lebensgefühl rather than on scientific reasoning (Gabriel 2004; 
Mormann 2007).127 Against this background Thomas Uebel has 
explicitly claimed that Carnap’s emotivism must be understood as 
“something of a proto-existentialism” (Uebel 2005: 764). Likewise, 
in his quest for British intellectuals, Stefan Collini notes that for a 
short period after the Second World War, the logical empiricist 
Ayer was actually known as one of the few people in Britain who 
knew something about existentialism (Collini 2006: 397-8).128 Quite 
like the Scandinavian value nihilists, Ayer’s emotive theory led him 
to the conclusion that morality is ultimately something concerns the 
individual him- or herself. There are no authoritative answers to 
how people ought to live their lives; in the end each individual has 
an inescapable responsibility of choice. But, as pointed out by 
Ayer’s biographer Ben Rogers, while the absence of transcendent 
meanings for the existentialists was conceived of as something of a 
moral tragedy, it remained little but a logical necessity for Ayer 
(Rogers 1999: 197). A similar attitude can to a large extent be said 
to have characterised the Scandinavian value nihilists during the 
1930s and 40s. Even if they strongly argued that moral statements 
cannot be true or false, none of them appeared to be concerned 
that this might represent an existential problem.129 Quite the 
                                                 
127 One of the first to notice this is Næss 1965: 18. 
128 However, Ayer (1977: 284) strongly preferred Camus’s “…semi-
philosophical essay Le Mythe de Sisyphe to Sartre’s very much longer and 
more pretentious metaphysical treatise L’Etre et le Néant [which was] 
principally an exercise in the art of misusing the verb ‘to be’”. 
129 Thue (2006: 413-4) suggests that one reason for this might lie in the 
different war experiences of the French and Scandinavian scholars. While 
both France and Norway were occupied by the Nazis, the German 
occupation in Scandinavia was arguably conceived of as less precarious, 
agonizing, and nationally shattering than it was in France. Sweden, in turn, 
was never occupied. 
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contrary, they seemed to view it as a source for optimism; as 
evidence of the fact that the world is ours to make. 
The existentialist response was, however, bound to be criticised 
as impotent when it came to the challenge of totalitarianism. 
According to the critics, the value nihilist appeal to the respon-
sibility of the individual was effectively to surrender to the destruct-
tive forces at play. Another response, therefore, proceeded from 
the idea that people do in fact choose to endorse certain values, and 
that these valuations can (as empirical facts) be used as starting 
points in an instrumental argumentation in favour of democracy or 
social engineering (Strang IV: 45-7; Strang V: 168-71). Hedenius, 
for example, argued that the only way one could give arguments in 
favour of democracy was by pointing at certain features in the 
democratic system that one presupposes that the audience actually 
likes (Hedenius 1949: 210-1). Similarly, for Gunnar Myrdal, the 
social scientist was able propose social reforms as long as they were 
based upon values actually present in the society in question (see 
e.g. Myrdal 1930: Chapter 8; 1944: appendixes 1 & 2). 
It might seem to be a rather curious idea that moral argument-
tation presupposes shared values (värdegemenskap), but as shown by 
Ola Sigurdson, it was actually a rather common idea among the 
Scandinavian value nihilists (Sigurdson 2000: 240-7). And it was by 
no means a Swedish curiosity. For example, Ayer also famously 
claimed, “argument on moral questions is only possible if some 
system of values is presupposed” (Ayer 1936: 111). Philosophically, 
the idea seems to be based on a kind of axiomatic reasoning 
common among many scientists and scholars during the first half 
of the 20th century, not least in logical empiricism (Aspelin 1935: 
259; Strang V: 161-2). In 1949, Hedenius explicitly argued that all 
of our beliefs, theoretical as well as practical, must rest on some 
ultimate principles that have to be accepted without conclusive 
evidence. The difference between science and ethics is, Hedenius 
continued, merely that while the theoretical principles can be true 
or false (even if they cannot always be verified) the moral principles 
cannot (Hedenius 1949: 211-2). The idea of presupposing a set of 
values also seems to have been part of Hedenius’s distinction 
between genuine and non-genuine legal statements. As mentioned 
above, it was in its appeal to the presence of a genuine norm that 
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the non-genuine value statement acquired its meaning. This 
“presence” could then, in turn, be either the legal system (for legal 
norms) or some kind of moral community (for moral norms) 
(Hedenius 1941: 81). 
It must also be noted that the idea that shared values is a pre-
requisite for democracy was also very much present in the inter-
national literature in political science. Among those referred to in 
Tingsten’s Demokratiens problem (1945), Joseph Schumpeter and 
Ernest Barker most explicitly stressed the need for some kind of 
“agreement on fundamentals”. In his influential Capitalism, Socialism 
and Democracy Schumpeter argued that “democracy cannot be 
expected to function satisfactorily unless the vast majority of 
people in all classes are resolved to abide by the rules of the demo-
cratic game” which, in turn, required that “they are substantially 
agreed on the fundamentals of their institutional structure” 
(Schumpeter 1942: 295, 301). Similarly, the liberal British political 
scientist Barker argued that democracy requires a “mental habit of 
agreement upon a number of axioms” concerning the democratic 
procedure, such as “the majority principle” and “the principle of 
compromise” (Barker 1942: 63-9). Clearly, there is a difference 
between agreeing on the principles of democracy on the one hand, 
and a cultural or ethical conformity or harmony on the other. But 
in Tingsten’s and Ross’s writings this difference was often blurred, 
not least when instead of “agreement on fundamentals” they wrote 
about “värdegemenskap”/“værdifælleskab” [value-community] (see e.g. 
Tingsten 1945: 65, 136; Ross 1946: 283). 
Given the frequent references to this community of shared 
values, it is striking that the Scandinavian value nihilists seldom 
tried to specify the values, nor the limits of the society or culture 
that shared them. Among the scholars examined in my studies it 
was only Myrdal who made a thorough attempt at finding a way of 
determining the values of a particular community or culture. In the 
years from 1932 to 1944 he tried a wide range of solutions, from 
opinion polls to an eclectic cultural analysis based on interviews and 
central written material, such as the Constitution and canonised 
fiction, in order to specify the values, or “creed”, of a society 
(Strang V: 157-77). For most of the other intellectuals, these values 
were tacitly presupposed or taken as somewhat self-evident, 
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perhaps tailored to suit particular rhetorical or political purposes. 
For example, in their defence of democracy the value nihilists often 
appealed to a set of national or Nordic values, which was based, for 
example, on the idea of a Nordic democratic heritage. In my studies 
I argue that these arguments must be seen in connection with the 
form of “communitaristic” (Berman 2006) or “culturally nationa-
listic” (Kayser Nielsen 2004) rhetoric that characterised the political 
discussion in the Nordic countries during the 1930s and 40s (Strang 
IV: 63). However, I am not claiming that the idea of shared values 
was used specifically in order to promote the Social Democratic 
idea of a “people’s home” (folkhemmet). As argued above, nearly all 
political factions tried to claim the nation and its symbols during 
the 1930s, and therefore, a nationalistic or “völkish” rhetoric was as 
such no indication of a particular political inclination. 
There was no logical conflict between the existentialist concept-
tion of morality and the idea of shared values: even if every indivi-
dual is doomed to choose his or her own moral values, there can be 
statistical similarities within a certain domain of people. Still, there 
was undoubtedly a peculiar tension in the argumentation of the 
Scandinavian value nihilists between the idea of the autonomous 
individual and the idea that people share their basic values with one 
another. It was a tension between the unscientistic acceptance that 
there are certain things in life that lie (and should remain) beyond 
the domain of science, and the scientistic ambition that science 
should indeed be able to solve any problem. 
This tension manifested itself not least in the different ways in 
which the value nihilistic theory was used by Myrdal and Tingsten 
respectively. Myrdal used the strict division between facts and 
values as an argument for the necessity of revealing hidden political 
premises in rival social scientific and economic theories. For him, it 
was important not to present political views as if they were 
scientific truths. He did not want to eradicate politics from social 
science; instead, he called for explicit value premises. Only in this 
way could social science become politically relevant (Myrdal 1930; 
Strang V). Tingsten used the separation between facts and values in 
a very different way. It was often argued, he claimed, that political 
ideologies cannot be criticised as they consist of values which, 
following Hägerström, cannot be true or false. However, Tingsten 
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claimed, properly analysed, (totalitarian) ideologies are not essen-
tially characterised by their values, but by their (erroneous) factual 
statements regarding, for example, the differences between races, 
the existence of a natural law, or a teleological conception of 
history (Tingsten 1941c: 12; Strang IV: 50-2). That is, while Myrdal 
used Hägerström’s theory in order to unveil valuations that were 
concealed as facts, Tingsten used it in order to unveil facts that 
were concealed as valuations. Indeed, for Myrdal, it was the values 
that were important, while for Tingsten it was the facts.  
 
c. Politics as rhetorical struggle 
 
The conceptual historians that follow Skinner and Koselleck 
undoubtedly have an important point in claiming that political 
theory and intellectual history has much to gain from shifting the 
perspective from the attempts to give unambiguous definitions of 
certain political key concepts such as “freedom”, “liberty”, “demo-
cracy”, “justice”, “progress”, “the state”, “people” or “citizen”, to a 
study of the various meanings that different actors have given these 
terms in different historical contexts. This shift in perspective pro-
ceeds from the nominalistic idea that the meaning of a term is not 
given once for all, but that it is constantly contested and thus 
subject to struggles for changes and redefinitions. In the present 
studies, the political nature of conceptual struggles is exemplified 
not least in the post-war discussion of “democracy”. In this debate 
Ross reacted against what he conceived of as communist attempts 
to claim the term “democracy” by using it to denote a particular 
economic policy. According to Ross, the opposite of “democracy” 
is “autocracy”, while the opposite of “socialism” is “capitalism”, 
and it is possible to combine these in any way one likes. Ross’s 
intention was, of course, to pave the way for a position that was 
both democratic and socialist, i.e. Social Democratic (Strang IV: 57-
8).130 
                                                 
130 Doing so, he was naturally also very much concerned with arguments 
about the incompatibility of socialism with democracy presented at the 
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The intellectuals examined in my studies can certainly be seen as 
“innovative ideologists” in the Skinnerian sense, i.e. as actors who 
have striven for political change by attempting to redefine certain 
central political terms (Palonen 2003b: 51-6; Skinner 1988: 112; see 
above: 32). The value nihilistic theory itself can be interpreted as a 
manifest attempt to redefine a set of moral and political key 
concepts such as “value”, “justice”, “duty” or “right”. To deny that 
moral judgements can be true or false was to challenge the prevail-
ing understanding of these terms, and as such, the value nihilistic 
theory served progressive political purposes. 
It has become a commonplace to claim that while the Nazi 
experience and the Second World War in many other places 
prompted a revival of natural law philosophy, this was not the case 
in the Nordic countries (Nergelius 1996: 94-9; Skirbekk 1984: 31; 
Östling 2008: 181-98). However, in my study “Two Generations of 
Scandinavian Legal Realists” I argue that Hägerström’s legal phi-
losophy did not go unchanged through the Second World War. 
With the rise of totalitarianism on the European continent, and as 
the legal sovereignty of the Nordic countries was threatened by 
foreign forces, the conceptual redescriptions proposed by orthodox 
Hägerströmians were often received with suspicion, particularly 
Lundstedt’s repeated claims that “there are no rights”. In this 
situation, Hedenius’s and Ross’s modification of the value nihilistic 
theory can be interpreted as a rhetorical move to deradicalise the 
Hägerströmian doctrine (Strang III: 73). Not only did Hedenius 
and Ross vehemently criticise the idea that value nihilism was a 
radical theory that would lead to a social or moral upheaval; they 
also attempted to provide alternative definitions of “rights”, 
“duties” and “justice” which were closer to public and juridical 
conceptions. According to Hedenius and Ross, it was perfectly 
sensible to continue to use these legal concepts as long as one 
recognised that they do not refer to something divine or meta-
physical, but rather to a set of human conventions and stipulations. 
Moreover, even if Hedenius and Ross preserved the core of 
Hägerströmian radicalism – that there are no objective moral 
                                                                                                  
time by famous liberal theorists such as Hayek, whose ideas were loudly 
represented in a Nordic context by Tingsten. Strang IV: 58-61.  
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truths, that law is man-made and can be used as a vehicle for social 
reform – they nevertheless strongly anchored moral and political 
attitudes to cultural and national traditions and heritages, for 
example by referring to a shared Nordic democratic tradition 
(Strang IV: 39, 63). In this way the second generation of value 
nihilists represented a blend of social and political radicalism and 
traditional, even conservative, nationalism that can be said to have 
marked the rhetoric of Scandinavian and particularly Swedish Social 
Democracy in the 1930s (see e.g. Berggren & Trägårdh 2006: 195-
226; Kayser Nielsen 2004; Trägårdh 2002). 
In this connection it is interesting to note that Hedenius and 
Ross gave logical empiricism a different political significance than 
the one it had in its original Austrian context in the 1920s and 30s. 
In Sweden, it was the Uppsala School and particularly Hägerström 
that occupied the position as the rational, scientific and modernistic 
enlightenment philosophy. In this situation, logical empiricism 
could no longer be imported and presented as a radical philosophy. 
Instead, when Hedenius and Ross introduced logical empiricism to 
the Scandinavian legal discussion, they used it as an argument 
against the radicalism of Uppsala philosophy (Strang III). This 
shows that the context to which ideas are transferred is often of 
greater significance than the context from which they are adopted. 
However, it must also be acknowledged that by this time (the 
1940s), logical empiricism was itself undergoing significant trans-
formations as it was dispersed around the world, particularly to the 
United States. The Swedish appropriation of logical empiricism can 
undoubtedly be said to have fallen in line with the disarmament of 
the political aspects of the Unity of Science programme that 
occurred in connection with the transfer of logical empiricism to 
the United States in an emerging Cold War context (Howard 2003; 
Reisch 2005; Strang I: 245). 
It is perhaps not surprising that analytic philosophy was 
depoliticised as it was transferred from the original context which 
had given rise to the political charges in the first place. On the 
other hand, the political disengagement of analytic philosophy can 
also be interpreted as a professionalisation of the philosophical 
discipline (Edgar 2009), and undoubtedly this was also to a large 
extent the way in which the young generation of Uppsala philos-
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ophers conceived of it themselves. But in claiming that their own 
philosophical standpoint was autonomous and wholly free from 
any political underpinnings, rivalling philosophers were also often 
portrayed as politically suspicious. This was accomplished, for 
example, by associating them with a German intellectual tradition, 
preferably Hegelian idealism, i.e. by giving them what the Swedish 
historian Johan Östling has labelled “a secondary Nazi-
stigmatisation” (Östling 2008: 116). Both Hedenius and Tingsten 
were active in representing German idealism as something like the 
ideological origin of totalitarianism, and in this task they were able 
to appropriate ideas from foreign philosophers and intellectuals 
such as Karl Popper and Friedrich Hayek (see e.g. Ers 2008: 96-
110; Östling 2008: 123-34, 149-51).131 Similarly, in 1945, Ross made 
the most of an opportunity to discredit and outmanoeuvre his older 
colleague Vinding Kruse by presenting the choice between legal 
realism and natural law philosophy as, ultimately, a choice between 
democracy and totalitarianism (Blandhol 1999: 121-3). 
But the stigma of Nazism was not the only manner in which 
“the other philosophies” were discredited.132 For example, in his 
inaugural lecture, Hedenius claimed that neo-Thomism and 
Marxism were popular philosophies largely only because of the 
support that these philosophies received from the Catholic Church 
and the Communist party. Existentialism, in turn, was refuted as a 
psychological symptom of the crisis and war on the European 
continent (Strang I: 263). In fact, Hedenius explicitly claimed that if 
philosophy was given full freedom everywhere, the philosophical 
tradition to which he himself subscribed, i.e. the most scientific 
one, would most certainly prevail (Hedenius 1948: 17-9).133 In this 
                                                 
131 In retrospect Tingsten (1967: 389-91) has claimed that it was Hayek’s 
Road to Serfdom (1944) that made him abandon Social Democracy. Tingsten 
also gave an enthusiastic review of Popper’s Open Society and its Enemies 
(1945) in Dagens Nyheter, August 21, 1947. 
132 “The other philosophies” [De andra filosoferna] was Hedenius’s (1977: 
33) way of denoting “…not only structuralisms, but also other existen-
tialisms and neo-Marxisms and driveltheologies” [inte bara strukturalismer 
utan också andra existentialismer och nymarxismer och svammel-
teologier]. 
133 Marc-Wogau contributed to the same stigmatisation in the introduction 
to his textbook Att studera filosofi (1961). Before presenting philosophy as it 
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way, the new Uppsala philosophy, i.e. analytic philosophy, was pre-
sented in Scandinavia as the only politically scrupulous philosophy; 
it was more autonomous, scientific and rational than its contenders. 
This depoliticisation and professionalisation of analytic philosophy 
was little more than the End of Ideology thesis without a political 
agenda or connotation of its own. As the other philosophies were 
presented as fascist or Communist, analytic philosophy emerged as 
the democratic alternative. Moreover, as the other philosophies 
were presented as German, Catholic or Soviet, analytic philosophy 
was both more “Swedish”, due to the Hägerströmian roots, and 
more “Western”, as analytic philosophy was by now emerging pri-
marily as a British and American movement. 
The making of the image of analytic philosophy as a democratic 
philosophy was accomplished by monopolising the figure of Häger-
ström, by redescribing his philosophy, and by discrediting rivalling 
philosophies. In hindsight, these efforts must be conceived of as 
successful. But the connection between analytic philosophy, logical 
empiricism or Uppsala philosophy and the democratic Swedish 
welfare state was, of course, by no means a necessary one. An 
important counterexample is the Finnish logical empiricist Eino 
Kaila, who in 1941 also claimed the political autonomy of his 
philosophical programme, but not in contrast to the politics of 
other philosophical movements, but rather, in contrast to Neurath’s 
increased politicisation of logical empiricism (Kaila 1941: 49; Strang 
I: 251).134 In Sweden, Olivecrona’s book Law as Fact (1939) pro-
                                                                                                  
should be studied in the chapter “Analytic philosophy” [Analytisk filosofi], 
Marc-Wogau made a brief settlement with philosophy as it should not be 
studied in a chapter entitled “Unscientific philosophy” [Ovetenskaplig 
filosofi]. This chapter had the telling subchapters “In the grip of politics. 
Philosophy in Soviet Russia” [I politikens våld. Filosofin i Sovjetryssland], 
“In the duty of religion. Neo-Thomism” [I religionens tjänst. Ny-
thomismen], and, finally, “In the wake of the World Wars. Existentialism” 
[I världskrigens kölvatten. Existentialismen]. See Marc-Wogau 1961: 1-24. 
134 During the Second World War both Kaila and von Wright wrote 
supportive articles for Finland’s co-operation with Nazi Germany in the 
war against the Soviet Union. However, there are good reasons to inter-
pret these publications as wartime propaganda efforts (commissioned or 
not), rather than as spontaneous utterances of sympathy with the Nazi 
regime. See Gasche & Strang 2009; Manninen 2007; Salmela 1998: 171-84.   
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vides an alternative form in which Hägerströmian ideas were given 
political significance. Whether Hägerström could have served as the 
anchor for a Swedish philosophy in a Nazi-dominated Europe is, of 
course, a matter of speculation, but it is in any case not a priori 
impossible that he could have done so. 
 
 
d. The politics of philosophy 
 
Philosophers often look upon the labels of intellectual movements, 
such as “idealism”, “positivism”, “existentialism” and “pragma-
tism” with great suspicion and sometimes even contempt. By 
labelling a scholar a representative of a particular philosophical or 
intellectual movement that person is reduced to an advocate of 
simplistic philosophical slogans or erroneously ascribed ideas and 
theories that he or she does not in fact support. Also among 
intellectual historians it is quite common to argue that scholarly 
labels are more likely to confuse than to bring clarity. A philoso-
phical label is seen as the result of an unwarranted generalisation 
that blurs the ideas and theories of the historical actor and makes it 
utterly impossible to appreciate the originality of the individual 
intellectual. Countless articles and books have been written in order 
to revise the received view of an intellectual as belonging to a 
particular school or movement, and, to be sure, on closer exami-
nation almost any scholar will turn out to be something of an 
exception to the school that he or she is commonly regarded as a 
representative of. 
In my studies, I have tried to take these labels seriously and to 
examine the rhetorical struggles involved in the formation of 
scholarly movements. From a conceptual history perspective, the 
name of a philosophical movement or school is not understood as 
a definite description of a certain set of philosophical doctrines, but 
as a contested “political” term that has been used by various actors 
with various intentions. There are good reasons to pay careful 
attention to the labels of philosophical schools and movements 
from this perspective, not least because they reveal how the 
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historical actors thought about themselves in relation to others and 
how they distinguished friends from enemies. From this perspec-
tive, philosophical struggles and debates have similar rhetorical 
features as the political ones, and in this sense, it is justified to talk 
about a form of “politics of philosophy”.135 Just as when it is 
applied to political labels and terms, the nominalistic perspective is 
particularly rewarding when studying periods of great turbulence, 
for example, when opposing philosophical schools and movements 
are formed and defined against each other (“analytic” vs. 
“continental”), or when two factions of the same school dissociate 
and struggle for the sole right to represent the movement and its 
legacy (Phalénians and Hägerströmians on “Uppsala philosophy”). 
The label “Uppsala philosophy” was originally a pejorative label 
used by Hägerström’s and Phalén’s critics. A significant example of 
this rhetoric was John Landquist’s pamphlet Uppsalafilosofien och 
sanningen (1929), which he wrote when Hägerström had deemed 
him unqualified for the Chair in Philosophy in Lund. In a very 
angry and dejected tone, Landquist used not only “Uppsala philoso-
phy” (Uppsalafilosofien), “the Uppsala School” (Uppsalaskolan) 
and “the Uppsala thinkers” (Uppsalatänkarna) but also “the 
Uppsala sect” (Uppsalasekten) which he thought was threatening to 
take over every single philosophical chair in Sweden, thus “stifling 
the philosophical freedom of thought in the country” (Landquist 
1929: 29).136 By using the geographical name, Landquist emphasised 
the sectarianism and narrow-mindedness of the Uppsala philoso-
phers, implying that they were self-satisfied, introverted, and 
provincial. Moreover, Landquist also depicted their philosophy as a 
form of “anti-metaphysical abracadabra” that was heartlessly trying 
to demolish morality, religion and every philosophy but their own 
(Landquist 1929: 29). 
Understandably, perhaps, the Uppsala philosophers themselves 
initially disapproved of the label. In an article in the Swedish 
newspaper Svenska Dagbladet (March 5, 1934), Hedenius and Wed-
berg responded to a criticism against “the barbaric Uppsala School” 
                                                 
135 For a different, but related use of “politics of philosophy”, see e.g. 
Palonen 2003b: 138; Pulkkinen 2003.  
136 “…förkväva all filosofisk tankefrihet i landet”. 
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raised by the famous literary critic Fredrik Böök, by claiming that 
there is no such thing as an Uppsala philosophy. The philosophers 
in Uppsala, Hedenius and Wedberg argued, did not propose any 
common doctrines save the call for a careful analysis of the 
concepts involved, and these individual philosophers could not be 
brushed aside by a single argument. However, later in the same 
debate, and as part of the struggles between the Phalénians and the 
Hägerströmians, Hedenius and Wedberg suddenly adopted “Upp-
sala philosophy” and used it as a label for their own position. They 
attacked their fellow Uppsala philosopher, the Hägerströmian legal 
scholar Lundstedt, accusing him of making illegitimate use of 
Hägerströmian ideas for popular and political purposes. By 
presenting these simplistic caricatures Lundstedt had “damaged the 
reputation of Uppsala philosophy far more than the antagonists 
Böök and Landquist” (Hedenius & Wedberg 1934).137 This attempt 
to expel Lundstedt from the distinguished group of Uppsala 
philosophers provoked a reply from Hägerström himself who 
entered the discussion by publically sanctioning the writings of 
Lundstedt and by arguing that “Upsala philosophy” should be 
evaluated on the basis of its arguments rather than its public 
reputation (Hägerström 1934a). 
By now, “Uppsala philosophy” had become a positive term and 
a subject of internal struggles between the two different branches 
of the school: the Hägerströmians and the Phalénians. One of the 
most explicit efforts to promote Adolf Phalén as the main repre-
sentative of Uppsala philosophy was the small pamphlet with the 
revealing title Vad är Uppsala-filosofien? [What is Uppsala philoso-
phy?] by Gunnar Oxenstierna (1938). Here Phalén is hailed as the 
sole originator of nearly every aspect of Uppsala philosophy except 
the value nihilistic theory, while some early works by Hägerström 
were considered to have “nothing to do” with Uppsala philosophy 
(Oxenstierna 1938: 4).  
Later, when the transformation from Uppsala philosophy to 
analytic philosophy was completed, the term “Uppsala philosophy” 
                                                 
137 “…därigenom har uppsalafilosofiens anseende skadats i långt högre 
grad än vad som kunnat ske genom angrepp sådana som prof. Bööks och 
dr Landquists”.   
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was mostly used to denote a past phase in the development of 
Swedish philosophy. By presenting it as a parallel movement to 
logical empiricism and the Cambridge School, Hedenius, Marc-
Wogau and Wedberg gave domestic roots to the analytic tradition 
that they were establishing at the same time as they legitimised their 
own personal philosophical development from Uppsala philosophy 
to logical empiricism or analytic philosophy. 
Another contested philosophical label was “value nihilism” 
which, apparently, was launched by the same Landquist in the 
newspaper Aftonbladet (May 23, 1931).138 “Value nihilism” was used 
by Landquist as a pejorative term which implied that Hägerström’s 
theory entailed a practical nihilism according to which “everything 
is allowed”. By using “nihilism” Landquist and other critics sug-
gested that the theory was responsible for moral degeneration and 
the decline of civilisation. “Value nihilism” rapidly established itself 
not only among the antagonists but also among neutrals, and the 
Hägerströmians struggled to overcome the negative connotations 
that it gave rise to (Strang IV: 38-40). Eventually, however, 
precisely like “Uppsala philosophy”, “value nihilism” became a 
term that its proponents would use themselves. In this connection 
Hedenius’s book Om rätt och moral (1941) marked a decisive turning 
point (Strang I: 261; II: 86-8; III: 69-73). Hedenius was perhaps not 
the first Uppsala philosopher to use the label,139 but he was 
certainly the first to programmatically defend “value nihilism” as a 
philosophical position. It was a conscious rhetorical move; his 
motivation to use this, what he called, “totally misleading term” was 
partly brevity, and partly the aspiration to “wear out the dismal, but 
unfounded associations, that have made the word a useful weapon 
against Uppsala philosophy” (Hedenius 1941: 13).140 It is probably 
safe to say that Hedenius succeeded with this ambition. There were 
no complaints about the terminology in the reviews of Om rätt och 
                                                 
138 According to Marc-Wogau 1968: 202. 
139 Wedberg (1933: 433) had used “nihilism” in a review of Ross’ book 
Kritik der sogenannten praktischen Erkenntnis already in 1933. 
140 “...i hoppet att genom nötning få bort de kusliga, sakligt ogrundade 
associationer, vilka någon gång gjort ordet i fråga användbart som 
tillhygge mot uppsalafilosofien”. 
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moral, and “value nihilism” quickly became a rather neutral term for 
the theory in Sweden. 
But there are good reasons to presume that Hedenius had addi-
tional and more subtle intentions in using the term “value nihilism” 
in 1941. It must also be seen as a move to colonise the heritage of 
Hägerström and Uppsala philosophy in the ongoing struggles 
between the antagonistic wings of Uppsala philosophers (Strang I: 
261-2). By adopting the pejorative but popular label “value 
nihilism”, Hedenius emerged as Hägerström’s successor and as the 
main proponent of value nihilism in Sweden, ahead of more 
doctrinal Hägerströmian scholars such as Lundstedt. Moreover, 
Hedenius’s use of “value nihilism” must also be seen as a move to 
facilitate the introduction of logical empiricism and analytic phi-
losophy to Sweden (Strang II: 87-8). By using the familiar rhetoric 
of “value nihilism”, “Uppsala philosophy”, “conceptual analysis” 
and “scientific philosophy” Hedenius and his companions (Marc-
Wogau, Wedberg and Ross) were able to blur the transformation of 
their ideas, from Hägerström and Phalén to the doctrines and 
methods of logical empiricism and analytic philosophy. It is striking 
that even if Hedenius and particularly Ross were clearly inspired by 
the tenets of logical empiricism, the labels “logical empiricism” or 
“logical positivism” hardly ever figured in their writings. Instead 
they preferred terms that served as rhetorical bridges between 
Uppsala philosophy and logical empiricism. 
In this sense the term “analytic philosophy”, which made its 
international breakthrough around 1950, fitted particularly well into 
this Swedish and Scandinavian context (Strang I: 265). Even if the 
form of analysis that had been conducted by the Hägerströmians 
was rather different from the logical analysis of the logical empiri-
cists, Hedenius and Ross were nevertheless able to subscribe to the 
rhetoric of “analytic philosophy” as a link between their Häger-
strömian past and their logical empiricist present. Ross’s book Om 
ret og retfærdighet (1953), which was dedicated to Hägerström (as well 
as to Kelsen and the Danish legal scholar Viggo Bentzon) but was 
also a very consistent application of the tenets of logical empiricism 
(verificationism, behaviourism etc.), could hardly have been given a 
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more suitable subtitle than en indførelse i den analytiske retsfilosofi (an 
introduction to the analytic philosophy of law).141 
                                                 
141 In the English translation On Law and Justice (1959), the subtitle was, 
however, dropped. 
 
 
v. Summaries 
 
The five studies reprinted in this volume have not been written 
with the governing ambition that they would be gathered as a 
complete and exhaustive examination of the topic. They are 
intended, rather, as five separate contributions to particular discus-
sions in different scholarly forums. As a consequence, they follow 
primarily the demands and requirements of their original contexts 
instead of the ones raised by the volume at hand. This means, for 
instance, that the studies overlap each other to some extent, and 
that there will inevitably be some repetition.142 It also follows, that 
the methodological underpinning of the articles, as well as the 
general historical background of the actors, is somewhat under-
communicated. These problems have hopefully been amended by 
this introduction. The intention has been to write the studies in a 
manner that is accessible to anyone interested in the topic, regard-
less of scholarly background, and not least, by writing most of them 
in English, to communicate this interesting piece of Swedish 
intellectual history to a larger international audience. In what 
follows, I will give brief summaries of the backgrounds and aims as 
well as the main arguments and results of the five studies.  
 
I. Arvet efter Kaila och Hägerström – den analytiska filosofin i 
Finland och Sverige 
 
The study “Arvet efter Kaila och Hägerström – den analytiska 
filosofin i Finland och Sverige” (The legacy of Kaila and Häger-
ström – analytic philosophy in Finland and Sweden) was written as 
a contribution to an anthology on the Finnish and Swedish 
reception of international philosophical movements and schools 
                                                 
142 Similarly, the articles also use different systems for giving references, as 
well as, to a certain extent, different forms of spelling due to the pre-
ferences of the editors of, and proofreaders assigned by, the different 
publishers. 
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between 1880 and 1950 (Nygård & Strang (eds.) 2006). The 
purpose of the book was to portray an era of great plurality in 
Nordic philosophy, i.e. the period between the dominance of 
idealistic philosophy in the 19th century and analytic philosophy 
during the latter half of the 20th century. My task was to give an 
exposition of the birth of the latter hegemony. 
The article makes use of conceptual history as well as a combi-
nation of comparative and transfer perspectives. The key argument 
is that the analytic tradition was not created by Kaila and Häger-
ström as is usually stated, but by their successors who canonised 
Kaila and Hägerström as the fathers of a tradition that they them-
selves were interested in representing. The structure of the article is 
threefold. In the first section I describe the consolidation of the 
analytic tradition on the international (or Anglophone) philoso-
phical scene. A brief statistical analysis of the usage of the term 
“analytic philosophy” in the digital archives of JSTOR indicated 
that, even if “the method of analysis” had been practised by Moore 
and Russell since the early 20th century, it was not until after the 
Second World War that the term “analytic philosophy” was 
established as a label for a fairly distinct philosophical movement. 
In this process the Cambridge School, the Vienna Circle and 
American pragmatism were canonised as the basic pillars of the 
analytic tradition. 
In the second section of the article I examine the narrative of 
Eino Kaila as the father of the Finnish analytic tradition. Kaila 
visited the Vienna Circle in 1929 and 1932-34, brought logical 
empiricism to Finland, and provided his successors with both the 
theoretical means and the social contacts that enabled them to 
make successful careers within the analytic tradition. However, 
looking at Kaila’s philosophical programme it becomes evident that 
while he sympathised with the general aims of the logical empiricist 
movement of the 1920s and early 30s, he did not look kindly on its 
development in the 1930s and 40s. Kaila was never particularly 
impressed with British analytic philosophy, neither with Ayer’s 
version of logical empiricism, nor with the ordinary language 
philosophy that emerged after the Second World War. In fact, Kaila 
was rather suspicious of the term “analytic philosophy” as his 
personal ambition remained to establish a “synthetic” world 
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conception on the basis of the empirical sciences. But Kaila was 
(and is) nevertheless conceived of as the self-evident father of the 
Finnish analytic school that his successors (e.g. von Wright and 
Jaakko Hintikka) established in his name. 
In the third section of the article I argue that the construction of 
the Swedish analytic tradition was completed by a particular branch 
of Uppsala philosophers (i.e. Hedenius, Marc-Wogau and Wed-
berg), who assumed Hägerström’s mantle and used him as an 
anchor to which they attached the new philosophical ideas that they 
had imported from abroad. Over the past few decades intellectual 
historians have often pointed out that the story of Hägerström as 
the father of the Swedish analytical tradition is seriously misleading, 
as the philosophical tenets of Hägerström and Phalén were largely 
abandoned by their successors. However, in this article I argue that 
this perspective is hardly less misleading than the one which pro-
motes the notion of Kaila as the father of the Finnish analytical 
school, or the idea that logical empiricism is the basis of analytic 
philosophy. The analytic tradition was created in hindsight, and the 
theoretical ambitions of those who were canonised as the fathers of 
the tradition were often downplayed or redescribed in order for the 
tradition to emerge. 
It is the comparative perspective of this article that makes it of 
paramount importance for my project. The comparison to Finland 
points out significant differences in the way that the national 
analytic traditions were established, for example in terms of their 
relationship to logical empiricism. But even more importantly, the 
comparison seems to indicate a common basic structure of the 
establishment of the analytic tradition in Finland and Sweden. This 
tradition was established in hindsight by a younger generation who 
colonised some predecessors who they chose to present themselves 
as followers of. The article also contributes to the political side of 
my project, as Finland seems to be a case that falsifies the idea of a 
necessary connection between Social Democracy and logical 
empiricism. Already in the 1930s Kaila was rather cautious of, if not 
explicitly hostile to, the increased political profile of Neurath’s 
Unity of Science programme.  
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II. Theoria and logical empiricism – on the tensions between 
the national and international in philosophy 
 
This article on the Swedish philosophical journal Theoria and logical 
empiricism was written, more or less, as a commissioned work on 
behalf of the organisers of the symposium Networks and Trans-
formations of Logical Empiricism: The Vienna Circle and the Nordic 
Countries in Helsinki, September 2007.143 My task was to examine 
Theoria as a forum for logical empiricists. The aim of the article is 
on the one hand to examine the role that the journal had for the 
logical empiricists at a time when the conditions on the European 
continent were rapidly deteriorating, and on the other hand to 
examine the appropriation and breakthrough of logical empiricism 
in Sweden. 
The article is divided into two parts. In the first half I describe 
the repeated efforts of Åke Petzäll, as the editor-in-chief of Theoria, 
to internationalise the journal, and the resulting struggles in the 
editorial board. Petzäll invited leading representatives of different 
international philosophical movements to participate in the discus-
sions in Theoria. But as it was only the logical empiricists who 
answered the call, the internationalisation of Theoria became 
intimately connected to logical empiricism. It was also often met 
with scepticism by the other members of the editorial board, 
especially by the Uppsala philosopher Konrad Marc-Wogau who 
argued that internationalisation should not take place at the expense 
of Swedish (or Nordic) contributions. 
The second half of the article focuses more closely on the 
confrontations between Uppsala philosophy and logical empiricism 
in the pages of Theoria. While the logical empiricist Otto Neurath 
seemed to be interested in collaboration with the Uppsala School 
(although on his own terms), the Uppsala philosophers remained 
for some time rather hostile towards logical empiricism. In an 
article in 1936, Einar Tegen attacked what he conceived of as the 
two basic pillars of logical empiricism, logic and empiricism (Tegen 
1936), and the following year Gunnar Oxenstierna was engaged in a 
                                                 
143 That is, Juha Manninen and Friedrich Stadler. 
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fierce discussion on the theory of relativity with Phillipp Frank 
(Oxenstierna 1937; Frank 1937). Indeed, at this point in time, there 
was little that suggested that Uppsala philosophy and logical 
empiricism would soon merge and jointly form the Swedish analytic 
tradition. This, however, was largely the achievement of Hedenius 
who, after Hägerström’s death in 1939, succeeded in amalgamating 
the traditions by on the one hand taking up Hägerström’s mantle 
by becoming the main apostle of the value nihilistic theory, and on 
the other hand by gradually approaching and adopting the ideas and 
theories of logical empiricism. In this way Hedenius succeeded in 
presenting analytic philosophy as a natural continuation of the 
Uppsala legacy. 
It is chiefly in the discussion and elaboration of different 
transfer strategies that the study on Theoria forms an essential con-
tribution to my project. By contrasting Hedenius’s strategy Petzäll’s, 
I am able to bring out the importance of redescriptions in cultural 
transfers. While Petzäll’s rather straightforward attempt to intro-
duce logical empiricism to Sweden by participating in the inter-
national discussion arguably failed, Hedenius’s move to anchor 
logical empiricism to the national tradition after Hägerström was 
more successful. However, Petzäll’s attempts must not be seen as a 
complete failure. Hedenius’s move would hardly have been possible 
without Petzäll’s efforts, and thus Petzäll nevertheless succeeded 
both in breaking the Uppsala hegemony, and in transforming and 
internationalising the Swedish philosophical scene. His journal 
Theoria became a leading journal of analytic philosophy in the 
Nordic countries, and one of the few forums for analytic philos-
ophy outside of the English-speaking world.  
 
III. Two generations of Scandinavian Legal Realists  
 
The article on “Two generations of Scandinavian Legal Realists” 
was published in the Nordic journal for jurisprudence, Retfærd. The 
central claim of the article is that there are good reasons to 
distinguish between two generations of Scandinavian Legal Realists, 
which are marked by different theoretical as well as political 
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ambitions. While the first generation of Scandinavian Legal Realists, 
i.e. Lundstedt and Olivecrona, used Hägerströmian arguments to 
propose a radical transformation of not only the relation between 
law and politics, but also of the legal system as such, the second 
generation, i.e. Hedenius and Ross, was inspired by logical empiri-
cism and was considerably more concerned with political continuity 
and democracy. 
It has often been claimed that whereas the experience of 
Nazism prompted a revival of natural law philosophy on the 
European continent, the Nordic legal discourse continued its 
realistic-positivistic emphasis. In this article I argue that Scandi-
navian Legal Realism was not unaffected by the Second World War. 
One of the main ambitions of the second generation of Scandi-
navian Legal Realists was to deradicalise Hägerströmian ideas, 
which had become increasingly questioned due to the political 
situation. It was partly due to this criticism that Hedenius and Ross 
adopted and utilised ideas and arguments from logical empiricism 
and the Cambridge School. Hedenius emphasised that the meaning 
of a statement is not some psychological state of mind, but the 
facts that would make the statement true. Accordingly, he argued, a 
value statement could be meaningful if it referred to the actual legal 
system, i.e. the particular legal situation and its consequences. In a 
similar vein Ross argued that the term “rights” had a perfectly 
legitimate use in legal language despite the fact that it lacked a 
“semantic reference”. 
This study combines cultural transfer and political perspectives. 
It shows Hedenius and Ross appropriated logical empiricism in a 
way that enabled them to use it as part of their criticism of the 
radicalism of the Hägerströmian doctrines. It is also important to 
note that even if Hedenius and Ross vehemently criticised the 
tenets of the first generation, they nevertheless presented their 
critique as if it was part of a discussion within the same scholarly 
comminuty. They preserved the core of the Hägerströmian message 
– that the law is man-made and can be revised in any way we like, 
but they supplied these ideas with a new philosophical motivation 
adopted from logical empiricism. In this way they presented their 
ideas as an improved and updated version of Uppsala philosophy. 
They were not trying to completely disprove of Hägerström’s ideas, 
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rather, their ambition was to claim his legacy and change the 
direction of Scandinavian Legal Realism.  
 
IV. The Scandinavian value nihilists and the crisis of 
democracy 
 
The article “The Scandinavian value nihilists and the crisis of 
democracy” was published in the German journal Nordeuropaforum 
(2009/1). The main aim of this article is to examine how a group of 
Hägerströmian scholars tried to defend democracy, given their 
support of the non-cognitivist, emotivist value theory. This was a 
pressing problem for democratically minded Uppsala philosophers 
in the 1930s and 40s as many critics saw Hägerström and the value 
nihilistic theory as a symptom of the same moral and cultural 
nihilism and decadence that spawned the rise of totalitarianism and 
the Second World War. 
The standard reply of the value nihilists was to emphasise the 
rift between science and politics. Ingemar Hedenius, for example, 
did his best to present the value nihilistic theory as a purely aca-
demic affair, with little or no consequences for political or cultural 
life in general. However, this line of argumentation gave added fuel 
to those critics who claimed that the value nihilists were forced into 
indifference with respect to the choice between democracy and 
totalitarianism. The value nihilists tried to counter such arguments 
by stressing that their theory did not imply that morality was 
unimportant: Alf Ross, for example, argued that even if it could not 
be established as a scientific truth that democracy is better than 
totalitarianism, the value nihilists could nevertheless conceive of it 
as their highest moral duty to do whatever they can to promote 
democracy. Herbert Tingsten’s strategy on the other hand was to 
hold that the democratic line in the debate was less a positive 
ideology than a criticism of irrational elements in other ideologies. 
According to Tingsten, totalitarian ideologies were not to be 
understood as sets of valuations, but as (erroneous) factual theories 
about the world, and that they, as such, could be subjected to 
scientific criticism. 
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An important result of the article is that the defences of 
democracy presented by the value nihilists in the 1930s and 40s 
seemed to involve a peculiar idea of the necessity of shared values. 
For Hedenius, the idea of shared values was a logical consequence 
of the value nihilistic theory, as moral discussions are only possible 
if the discussants share the same basic values. For Tingsten and 
Ross the idea of shared values was more of a precondition for a 
well-functioning democracy. It was only if the individuals in a 
society shared the same basic values that the minority were able to 
accept the decisions of the majority. However, the idea of shared 
values can also be interpreted in connection to the political context 
of the 1930s where nationalistic and “völkish” rhetoric prevailed 
not only within the political right wing, but also among Social 
Democrats, most notably through the slogan of a “people’s home” 
(folkhem). 
This study on the defences of democracy forms an important 
part of my thesis as it examines not only how the Uppsala philos-
ophers succeeded in overcoming the associations with fascism and 
Nazism, but also how they succeeded in presenting analytic philos-
ophy as an inherently democratic philosophy. It was not only a 
matter of finding theoretical solutions that satisfied them as intel-
lectuals, it was also to a considerable extent a matter of saving the 
reputation of the philosophical tradition that they represented.  
 
V. Overcoming the rift between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ – Gunnar 
Myrdal and the philosophy of social engineering 
 
This article on Gunnar Myrdal was published in a thematic issue on 
“social engineering” in the journal Ideas in History. The aim of the 
article is to examine the ways in which Myrdal used Hägerström’s 
value nihilistic ideas in his economic, social and political thinking, 
i.e. as a premise in his philosophy of social engineering. Whereas 
the value nihilistic theory provided the young Myrdal with a 
powerful critical weapon that he used to expose and invalidate 
hidden value premises in the theories of his predecessors and 
scholarly rivals, it did not take long before Myrdal became painfully 
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aware of the problems that the theory mounted for his own 
political agenda. His challenge came to be to elaborate on a way in 
which the value nihilistic theory could be reconciled with a strong 
normative programme for social reform. 
Myrdal’s basic idea, already hinted at in 1930 but more 
comprehensively developed in the appendixes of An American 
Dilemma in 1944, was to establish a set of valuations that could be 
used in an instrumental argumentation for social reform. Myrdal 
argued that a normative social scientific programme had to proceed 
from explicit value premises anchored in the society under study. 
These value premises had to be explicitly accounted for in the name 
of scientific objectivity, i.e. in order to ensure that social science 
was not used as political propaganda; and they had to be anchored 
in the investigated society in order for the study to be of political 
relevance. It was especially the question of relevance that occupied 
Myrdal during the 1930s and 49s. He toiled hard in order to 
establish a way in which the actual values of a society could be 
determined as an empirical fact. Arguably, however, his efforts 
failed. He did not succeed in developing a method to establish the 
actual values of a society that met his own requirements. Eventually 
it seemed as if the same Enlightenment values were characteristic 
of practically any society that Myrdal studied (the United States, 
Sweden or South Asia), and therefore an observer could easily be 
led to think that Myrdal was simply promoting his own 
valuations.144 Indeed, there remained a peculiar tension in Myrdal’s 
writings between the idea that moral questions are ultimately a 
matter of personal conviction and that politics therefore cannot be 
reduced to science, and a rather dogmatic faith in the universal 
validity of the modernisation and Enlightenment values he 
endorsed. 
This article forms an essential contribution to my project in its 
examination of the varying and sometimes paradoxical political uses 
and implications of the value nihilistic theory. One of the central 
arguments in the article is that the Hägerströmian claim that 
                                                 
144 This is arguably what Ulrich Beck (2004: 51) calls the “universalism of 
sameness” – the true American, Swede, and Asian share the same 
enlightenment values. 
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valuations cannot be true or false did not lead Myrdal to believe 
that values or politics were unimportant or to argue that these 
“irrational” valuations should be replaced by scientific truths. For 
Myrdal (as opposed to e.g. Tingsten) value nihilism was more of a 
defence of the autonomy and primacy of politics than a call for 
scientific purity. Accordingly, his main ambition in the 1930s and 
40s was not so much to solve the problem of objectivity as to find 
a way for social science to be politically relevant. 
 
 
vi. Results 
 
The joint aim of these studies has been to examine how a group of 
younger scholars colonised the legacy of Hägerström and Uppsala 
philosophy, and faced the challenges they met in trying to con-
solidate this legacy with the changing philosophical and political 
currents of the late 1930s and 40s. 
The perspective of cultural transfers has been adopted in order 
emphasise that the transformation from Uppsala philosophy to 
analytic philosophy was not a development that occurred in 
national isolation, but something that transpired in constant inter-
action with the international philosophical scene. The transfer per-
spective has been rewarding in emphasising the role of cosmo-
politan and transnational actors such as Petzäll, the editor of the 
journal Theoria, who tend to be somewhat neglected in nationally 
centred histories. And the studies have also shown that it was by 
using ideas acquired from abroad that the younger generation of 
Uppsala philosophers was able to overcome the Hägerströmian 
legacy. However, a more significant result is arguably that the 
young generation did not intend to break completely with Häger-
ström; rather, what they did was to monopolise Hägerström and 
use him as an anchor for the new ideas that they were importing. 
By highlighting the move of transferring logical empiricism by 
anchoring it in the Uppsala tradition, I have been able to emphasise 
the active role of the transfer agents in redescribing not only the 
transferred intellectual goods, but also the national context into 
which the foreign ideas were introduced. In this sense, my studies 
contribute to the discussion of cultural transfers by stressing the 
importance of the context to which the ideas are transferred. From 
this perspective, methodological nationalism is not so much a 
failure to look beyond the nation, as a failure to historicise the 
national outlook. 
The political connotations of these debates have been examined 
not by studying how political development in Sweden was 
influenced by philosophers, but by looking at the ways in which the 
philosophers themselves manoeuvred in this particular political 
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context. From this perspective, the studies have been able to show 
that many of the transformations and redescriptions that the 
younger generation employed in their appropriation of the legacy of 
Hägerström were prompted by political concerns. In a context 
defined by the rise of totalitarianism and the Second World War, it 
became one of the main aims of the younger generation to 
moderate the image of the radical and revolutionary Uppsala 
philosophy and to make way for a defence of, for example, juridical 
rights, democracy and social engineering. It is important to 
emphasise that the value nihilists themselves conceived of the value 
nihilistic theory not as a scientistic philosophy by which values, 
morals and politics would be replaced with reason, rationality and 
science, but rather as a defence of an autonomous individual in the 
face of alleged moral authorities. On the other hand, their con-
ceptions nevertheless also seemed to be based on an idea of shared 
values, akin to the “communitarian” or culturally nationalistic 
rhetoric of the people’s home (folkhem) era. 
The studies presented in this volume have by no means 
exhausted the topic. A more complete examination would probably 
generate two separate monographs in which the cultural transfer 
and the political perspectives could respectively be more meticu-
lously pursued. A comprehensive study on the transfer of logical 
empiricism to Sweden would, for instance, have to look more 
closely at the role that logical empiricism played in Lund during the 
1930s, and especially at the relations that were established in 
connection with Neurath’s and Carnap’s lecture trips in Sweden 
and at the dialogue and confrontations in connection with the 
Copenhagen congress in 1936. It would also be imperative to 
investigate more thoroughly the intra-Nordic relations, for example, 
by studying the correspondences between the Swedish philoso-
phers and Næss, Jørgensen and Kaila. A study that aimed at a more 
complete examination of the establishment of analytic philosophy 
in Sweden would, in turn, also have to look more closely at the 
influences from the Cambridge School.145 Another crucial, but 
                                                 
145 In this connection a particularly interesting chapter would be C. D. 
Broad’s Swedish visits after the Second World War. Broad even translated 
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largely neglected, chapter in modern Swedish philosophy is 
Wedberg’s study trips to the United States in 1939-43, during which 
he established himself as a leading scholar of formal logic, for 
instance by publishing regularly in the highly esteemed Journal of 
Symbolic Logic. Finally, it would also be important to pay more 
careful attention to those who were outmanoeuvred in the estab-
lishment of the Swedish analytic tradition, i.e. those who tried to 
preserve Uppsala philosophy as an indigenous Swedish philosophy, 
or tried to connect it to other foreign philosophical trends. 
Similarly, a more thorough examination of the political under-
tones of Uppsala philosophy would also have to look more closely 
at the losers, i.e. those who strove to give Uppsala philosophy other 
political connotations. Furthermore, a more political study would 
also have to pay considerably more attention to both official 
political documents and the discussions in newspapers and other 
media. While Källström’s work focuses on the 1920s and 1930s, the 
immediate post-war era would certainly deserve more attention. 
There are many topics that would be of great interest in such a 
study, for example, how the analytic tradition was related to and 
consolidated with Sweden’s official politics of neutrality in the 
emerging Cold War.146 It would also be important to examine how 
Hägerström’s heirs related themselves to the wave of natural law 
philosophy on the European continent, and, for example, how they 
received and interpreted the United Nation’s declaration of human 
rights. After all, even in Hedenius moderated version the notion of 
“rights” remained, if not plainly metaphysical, at least a highly 
doubtful concept. Finally, the time is certainly also ripe for a 
thorough historical examination of how the analytic hegemony in 
Sweden was challenged during the Positivismusstreit of the 1960s and 
70s.147 
On the face of it, my studies seem to have generated more 
questions and challenges than answers. However, this is not to say 
                                                                                                  
some of Hägerström’s legal theoretical work into English, i.e Hägerström 
1952. 
146 In this connection, the position of the NATO supporters Tingsten and 
Lundstedt would be of special interest. 
147 In the vein of Dahms 1994. 
History, Transfer, Politics 
 
108 
that the double perspective applied in the present studies has been 
worthless. On the contrary, it is only through a simultaneous study 
of the cultural transfer and political aspects that I have been able to 
show, for example, that the modernistic leftish political agenda of 
the Vienna Circle was largely overlooked, if not reversed, in 
Sweden. This might seem paradoxical, as Sweden was one of the 
few countries in the world actually governed by Social Democrats. 
One of the main reasons for this was that Hägerström and Uppsala 
philosophy already occupied the role of a radical and modernistic 
philosophy in the political and cultural debates. Thus, when the 
younger generation introduced logical empiricism it was actually 
used as an argument against excessive political use of Hägerström’s 
philosophy. In this sense, the turn from Uppsala philosophy to 
logical empiricism fell in line with the “apolitical” analytic philoso-
phy that emerged in the wake of logical empiricism in the United 
States after the Second World War. 
The combination of cultural transfer and political perspectives 
has also generated an account on how one can study a philoso-
phical movement, or indeed what constitutes a philosophical move-
ment such as analytic philosophy. Many scholars have pointed to 
the fact that a philosophical school or movement cannot be defined 
by means of common philosophical doctrines, and that genealogical 
or sociological perspectives must be included (see e.g. Glock 2008; 
Sluga 1997). However, by employing a Skinnerian actor-focused 
perspective, my studies emphasise that philosophical movements 
and traditions are often consciously construed by historical actors 
for certain particular purposes. In the case of analytic philosophy in 
Sweden it was a matter of rhetorical struggles in which the actors 
strove to position themselves not only in relation to different con-
temporary and historical philosophers, but also in relation to 
political traditions and currents. The analytic tradition in Sweden 
was launched as the sole heir of the radical and progressive Uppsala 
School, and thereby as a continuation of the cultural radical heritage 
since the 1880s. But it was simultaneously also presented as an 
updated version that was more able to face contemporary chal-
lenges than its predecessors: less radical perhaps, but also more 
professional, democratic, and internationally oriented.  
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